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Re-centering Justice in African Studies
J e S S i C a  J o H n S o n  a n d 
g e o r g e  H a m a n d i S H e  K a r e K Wa i va n a n e
I N  R E C E N T  D E C A D E S ,  J U S T I C E  h A S  b E E N  O v E R S h A D O w E D  A S  A 
subject of concern for scholars of Africa by vast literatures centering on 
rights, crime, punishment, policing, and social order. Given the increas-
ing presence of international justice institutions, such as the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, on the African continent and the remarkable 
diversity of legal structures of justice, this neglect is striking. Indeed, 
across Africa complex pluralities of “customary,” religious, state, and 
transnational justice regimes interact on what is often contested terrain.
 This volume builds on recent work in sociolegal studies that fore-
grounds justice over and above concepts such as human rights, legal 
pluralism, or vigilantism. We do so in an empirical as well as a theo-
retical sense, asking both what it is that people mean when they invoke 
“justice” on the ground, and what we might gain as analysts by framing 
our studies through the lens of justice. We see justice as promising in its 
expansiveness, its ability to hold together disparate topics, time periods, 
and locations, and its broad appeal to scholars, policy makers, and ordi-
nary citizens across Africa and beyond. There is an instinctive sense in 
which justice is greater than human rights and more capacious than law. 
And yet they are related in practice as they are in (legal) imaginaries. It 
is in their interstices that the chapters of this volume are located, and 
the authors work to delineate the specific relevance of justice to their 
particular concerns. Here, we ask more generally, why justice? What 
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might we gain and lose by focusing on justice in our efforts to under-
stand the hopes and aspirations of men and women in Africa as they 
intersect with legal realms?
 While the theme of justice has been accorded a somewhat marginal 
place in African sociolegal studies, it has been central to the field of 
moral and political philosophy. From Aristotle’s musings about what it 
means to be a just person, through to John Rawls’s and other latter-day 
philosophers’ reflections on what a just society might look like, numerous 
theories of justice have been advanced.1 “The positions,” Robert Solo-
mon notes, “have been qualified, the objections answered and answered 
again with more objections, and the ramifications further ramified and 
embellished. But the hope for a single, neutral, rational position has been 
thwarted every time.”2 It is, however, possible to discern an approach to 
thinking about justice that has proved to be increasingly dominant in 
the work of a number of contemporary philosophers such as John Rawls, 
Ronald Dworkin, and Robert Nozick. This approach seeks to define what 
a perfectly just society would look like in the abstract and to prescribe 
the institutional arrangements that are necessary in order to achieve it.3 
This “transcendental institutionalism” can be traced back to the work of 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. However, as Amartya Sen points out, there are two 
main problems with these theories of justice. First, they are, for the most 
part, not feasible as it is unlikely that a consensus about the perfectly just 
society could ever be reached. Second, a theory about the perfectly just 
society is of no real use when one is more likely to be confronted with a 
decision between imperfect but realizable options. Sen thus proposes an 
alternative theory of justice that focuses on the use of reason in deciding 
the more just of two or more realizable options.
 Notwithstanding the insights offered by Sen and his interlocutors, 
in this volume we take a different approach. Our aim is not to propose 
an overarching and abstract theory of justice in Africa. The divergent 
understandings and experiences of justice from across the continent 
that are captured in this volume cast doubt on the usefulness of such a 
theory. Instead, we start from the proposition that “justice is inextricably 
contextual.”4 As Kamari Clarke and Mark Goodale have pointed out, 
individual and collective decisions about what justice means and how 
to pursue it are rarely, if ever, made from behind a Rawlsian “veil of ig-
norance.”5 Considerations about what makes a specific act an injustice, 
what a just arrangement would be, and how to go about restoring the 
3
Introduction: Re-centering Justice in African Studies
balance are all substantially influenced by specific sociocultural, eco-
nomic, and political contexts. As such, at the center of this volume are 
real people in concrete circumstances and their quests for justice. The 
chapters therefore focus on particular actors pursuing specific visions of 
justice in Africa, and the authors attend to their aspirations, divergent 
practices, and articulations of international and vernacular idioms of 
justice. It is for this reason that we refer to the pursuit of justice in the 
volume title. Pursuing justice claims in Africa, as elsewhere, is necessar-
ily a dynamic and historically situated process. We conceive of justice as 
something that is striven for rather than a state of being that could ever 
be taken for granted. Precisely what it is that people strive for when they 
seek justice cannot be assumed: as the chapters that follow show, aspira-
tions for justice are many and varied, and there is much to be gained 
from treating justice as the subject of inquiry rather than proceeding 
as if the contours of justice were everywhere the same. As a result, we 
do not offer a pithy definition of “justice.” One of the key things that 
connects the various chapters of this volume is a commitment to ap-
proaching justice from a position of openness. The authors ask questions 
such as What is being claimed in the name of justice, and How do 
people recognize justice or injustice when they encounter them? Within 
this shared orientation, disciplinary differences remain, and we see the 
multidisciplinarity of the volume as a further strength.
 While our intellectual project differs from Sen’s in an important re-
spect, there is one objective we share. Like Sen, the contributors to this 
volume look beyond the canon of Western moral and political philoso-
phy, seeking to uncover local understandings and practices of justice and 
to tease out the insights that emerge. As such, the chapters deal with 
such themes as Baganda debates about the administration of justice 
(Earle), the influence of maslaha (an Islamic concept connoting public 
weal) among Somali refugees (Ikanda), and Acholi ideas and practices 
of justice in the wake of a long and bitter civil war (Porter, Macdonald).
 Nevertheless, it is not our intention to dismiss more abstract ap-
proaches to thinking about justice. The fundamental questions that have 
driven moral and political philosophers’ inquiries into justice are similar 
to those that have exercised individuals and communities in Africa. 
These include questions such as, what does it mean to be a just man or 
woman? What constitutes a just society, and how might we achieve one? 
How can we come to terms with violent acts and the perpetrators of 
such acts? The chapters in this volume examine contextually grounded 
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responses to these fundamental questions about justice. The Muslim 
sermons Felicitas Becker examines, for example, wrestle with the ques-
tion of what it means to be a just woman. At the same time, the maslaha 
talks Fred Ikanda investigates are concerned with restoring order after 
violence, while Olaf Zenker’s chapter focuses on South Africa’s struggle 
to create a more just society through the distribution of resources. At 
times, the writings of Enlightenment thinkers have informed African 
understandings of justice. It was not uncommon for educated elites to 
invoke Enlightenment philosophers in their critiques of colonial and 
postcolonial governments. As Jonathon Earle’s chapter shows, classi-
cal liberal philosophers, such as Rousseau, shaped the thinking of the 
Ugandan politician Benedicto Kiwanuka. What all of the chapters in 
this volume share is a concern to understand what justice means to par-
ticular African actors in particular times and places.
Law, Rights, and Justice in Africa
Over the last three decades the field of African sociolegal studies has 
grown in breadth and depth as scholars have brought the theoretical in-
sights and methodological approaches of their respective disciplines to 
bear on a range of themes. A central concern of many studies has been to 
understand the multiple ways in which law has been employed in past and 
present projects of state construction in Africa. Historical and anthropo-
logical studies of the colonial period, for example, demonstrate that law 
was central both to the constitution of the state and to the assertion of its 
power. Law, we have learned, was a key symbolic “language of stateness,”6 
while the courts instantiated the state and served as sites where its power 
was ritualized and performed.7 Evidence from settler states such as South 
Africa and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) demonstrates that the adher-
ence to legalism was actually about expanding, as opposed to constraining, 
state power.8 Law was the means by which colonial officials commanded 
and demanded, empowering them to conscript forced labor, expropriate 
land, and extract tax. At the same time, they sought to use it to construct a 
new moral and social world in their African colonies.9 The manipulation 
of the law by colonial states extended to efforts to “invent” customary law 
and co-opt African male elders in order to stabilize colonial governance 
through “Indirect Rule.”10 In much of this state-focused literature, how-
ever, the notion of justice was not subjected to critical reflection. When 
it did feature, it was used descriptively to refer to the legal system, or 
metaphorically as a way of talking about the administration of law.
5
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 Studies of the (ab)uses of the law by colonial states provoked two 
key responses. The first was an effort to counterbalance the narrative 
by showing how law could be appropriated by the ruled. Echoing E. P. 
Thompson,11 scholars maintained that despite, and often because of, law’s 
complicity with the colonial project, it was available for appropriation by 
colonial subjects.12 The sites where it was administered could be usurped, 
albeit temporarily, and elaborate performances of state power could be 
subverted by nationalists who transformed courtrooms into theatres of 
resistance. However, optimism about the emancipatory possibilities of the 
legal arena was tempered by studies that showed its limits as a site of 
agency or resistance. Law, as Richard Abel cautions, is more effective as 
a shield than a sword.13 In addition, courtroom victories against repres-
sive authorities often served to expose legal loopholes that were swiftly 
closed and resulted in even more repressive legislation. The second re-
sponse issued a caution against adopting a default cynicism toward legal 
struggles. In her examination of the Botswana Manual Workers Union 
strikes and litigation between 1991 and 2011, Pnina Werbner shows that 
the law is not simply an expression of the interests of the powerful. “No-
tions of fairness and unfairness,” she notes, “permeate [workers’] rela-
tions with employers, and hence also litigation and negotiation in labor 
disputes.”14 Similarly, the presiding judges did not simply focus on the 
facts of the matter and the relevant law. Rather, they considered what 
was “morally and ethically at stake” in the cases before them, appealing to 
ideas such as “fairness,” “reasonableness,” and “legitimate expectations” in 
their rulings.15 Taken together, such studies encourage a more nuanced 
view of the law and its effects in African contexts.
 Approaching sociolegal studies from a different perspective, a wave 
of research on penality published in the 1990s and early 2000s evinced 
a preoccupation with power, owing, in part, to the influence of Michel 
Foucault.16 Drawing on Foucault’s work, many of these studies sought 
to investigate the ways in which power found expression through dif-
ferent penal practices. While some scholars, including Florence Ber-
nault, found Foucault’s ideas useful in thinking about the history of 
penal practices in Africa, several others cast doubt on the relevance of 
his work.17 Among other things, they demonstrated that neither the 
concept of the “carceral archipelago” nor the shift from premodern to 
modern techniques of punishment, which Foucault distils from Euro-
pean history, map onto the experience of African countries particularly 
well. As Foucault’s hold on the research agenda has waned, alternative 
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avenues of inquiry have emerged. Taylor Sherman, for instance, calls for 
new studies of punishment in colonial and postcolonial contexts that 
are not focused on single institutions or penal practices but instead ex-
plore “the interlocking nature of different practices and institutions” and 
the way they combine to constitute a coercive network.18 In addition, 
recent social and political histories of prisons show that they were not 
necessarily only sites of suffering and death but were often also spaces 
where productive politics could, and did, emerge.19
 It is in the research on crime, however, that the multiple ways in which 
legal language can be mobilized discursively have been brought to the 
fore most forcefully. Labels like “criminal,” “deviant,” and “delinquent” 
have often been deployed by powerful groups to serve their sectional 
interests. In colonial Mombasa, Justin Willis shows how the criminaliza-
tion of palm wine was linked to concerns about labor supplies,20 while 
Linda Chisholm demonstrates that the deployment of ideas about devi-
ance in relation to white girls in early twentieth-century Natal signified 
a desire to control female sexuality and channel it in directions that were 
deemed respectable.21 Similarly, Nakanyike Musisi notes that the ap-
plication of the label “bad women” in colonial Uganda partly reflected 
the anxieties of male elders in the context of rapid social change and the 
erosion of patriarchal control.22 As we shall see, the importance of paying 
attention to the languages of law is a key theme of this volume.
 Scholars working in the field of African sociolegal studies have not 
been able to avoid dealing with the ever-present reality of violence in the 
legal arena. They have grappled with a range of questions, such as What 
is the relationship between law and violence? What forms of violence are 
utilized in the legal arena, and how are they legitimated? Who is targeted 
by specific acts of violence, and what intended or unintended meanings 
does such violence carry? Studies of flogging, in particular, reveal how 
law was used to authorize colonial violence. In colonial Natal, for ex-
ample, flogging was legally sanctioned and brutally applied, and it served 
both as a deterrent and a performance of racial power.23 Nevertheless, it 
is clear from the research on carceral, corporal, and capital punishment 
that investing legally sanctioned violence with meaning has never been 
easy.24 For one thing, there were often disagreements within the colonial 
state about appropriate or legitimate levels of violence. This was further 
complicated by the inevitable discrepancies between the intended and 
received messages of violence, as well as possibilities for its subversion. 
Richard Wilson has highlighted the ongoing complexities of violence in 
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postapartheid South Africa, where the sanctioning of violent retribution 
continues to invite debate amid ambivalent local claims to legitimacy.25
 Recognition of the complex uses and meanings of violence has also 
been central to studies of vigilantism. The fragmented sovereignty of 
many postcolonial African states, and their inability to command a mo-
nopoly of legitimate force, have given rise to the active privatization 
of violence. However, as Lars Buur and Steffen Jensen point out, the 
relationship between states and vigilantes need not always be viewed as 
antagonistic. Vigilantes regularly appropriate state symbols and prac-
tices, and they often operate with the tacit approval of state officials.26 
Studies of vigilantism have also paid attention to the “semiotic potential 
of vigilante violence.”27 As Atreyee Sen and David Pratten make clear, 
public acts of vigilante violence signify efforts to define the boundaries 
of the moral community by marking out who or what is deemed to be 
outside of it.28 Of particular significance, however, is the more critical 
way in which the literature on vigilantism has engaged with the concept 
of justice. It is clear that vigilantism cannot simply be reduced to mob 
violence, and thus scholars have had to do more work to uncover the 
moral economies and notions of justice that animate vigilante groups.
 It is in studies of transitional justice, however, that the concept of 
justice has received its most comprehensive treatment in recent years. 
The many experiments with transitional justice in Africa since the es-
tablishment of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (TRC) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
the mid-1990s have given rise to a vast literature that examines diverse 
efforts, at both local and national levels, to deal with the social, politi-
cal, and economic legacies of large scale atrocities.29 These studies have 
examined the retributive, deterrent, and restorative approaches to justice 
that have informed different transitional justice agendas. In addition, 
they have paid close attention to the institutions and processes behind 
them, from innovative Truth and Reconciliation Commissions to self-
consciously “traditional” court procedures. More recently, scholars have 
begun to move beyond the usual sites where “ideas about justice, recon-
ciliation and political participation are . . . instantiated and contested.”30 
This shift has seen less conventional spaces, such as refugee camps, 
prisons, and reeducation camps for demobilized combatants, emerge as 
important sites of study.31
 The transitional justice literature has persuasively challenged some 
of the normative assumptions about justice that have often shaped the 
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work of aid agencies. One such assumption is that “justice,” by which 
is often meant instituting criminal proceedings against alleged perpe-
trators of war crimes in domestic or international legal forums, is an 
unambiguously “good” thing. The decision to forgo the prosecution of 
apartheid leaders, and to make reconciliation a central objective of the 
South African TRC, signaled the early questioning of this assumption. 
The prosecutions initiated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Darfur revealed 
further tensions between justice and peace in contexts where arms have 
yet to be laid down or peace is still fragile.32 In theory, the prosecution of 
alleged perpetrators of war crimes bears the promise of ensuring peace 
by acting as a deterrent to others who might be inclined to commit 
similar crimes. In reality, however, the threat of prosecution has often 
proved to be an obstacle to achieving peace, as alleged perpetrators have 
refused to lay down their arms until they are assured of amnesty. Clearly, 
an analytical framing that posits an opposition between justice and 
peace relies on a much narrower, not to mention externally determined, 
conception of justice than we propose in this volume.
 The second and related assumption that has been challenged is the 
view that a liberal notion of justice is universally acceptable and can, 
therefore, be pursued in any context. The challenges of implementing 
externally imposed transitional justice mechanisms in areas like North-
ern Uganda laid bare the fallacy of such universalizing assumptions. 
This in turn led to a substantial investment by donor agencies, NGOs, 
and scholars in searching for “locally grounded and socially acceptable” 
means of dealing with people who have committed violent acts or crimes 
against the community.33 It was hoped that these could be incorporated 
into broader national transitional justice agendas. The most significant 
effort to employ local idioms as a means of achieving transitional justice 
was the gacaca court system in Rwanda, which was based on a tradi-
tional Kinyarwanda practice of “conducting hearings in open spaces in 
full view of the community.”34 All told, between 2002 and 2012, over 
250,000 lay judges tried approximately 120,000 alleged genocidaires in 
about 11,000 jurisdictions.35 On the face of it, this concern with uncov-
ering local practices and idioms of justice, such as gacaca in Rwanda, 
as well as mato oput in Northern Uganda, seems laudable. However, 
donor-driven searches for local practices that could be instrumentalized 
have resulted in rituals being taken out of their original contexts and “re-
invented” for new purposes.36 Building on Paulin Hountondji’s work on 
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ethnophilosophy, Adam Branch has shown that donor-driven efforts in 
Northern Uganda have given rise to an essentialized view of Acholi tra-
ditional justice.37 This “ethnojustice,” he argues, poses the risk of helping 
uphold the power of a specific social group and legitimizing “a disciplin-
ary social project . . . which imposes the same forms of domination and 
inequality that gave rise to conflict in the first place.”38 In an evocative 
phrase, Branch characterizes this as “the violence of ethnojustice.”
 When talking about justice in Africa, it is impossible to proceed 
without engaging with human rights. Human rights talk is loud in Af-
rica, and it is often intimately intertwined with aspirations for justice 
and the expectation that where rights lead, justice will follow. Just as 
human rights have animated conversations, policy documents, media 
reports, and NGO programs in Africa, they have also been the subject 
of a great deal of Africanist scholarship, particularly in the field of legal 
anthropology. Importantly, the anthropological study of human rights 
has highlighted the broad reach of this global discourse, as well as illus-
trating some of the ways in which it has been subjected to transforma-
tion as it has come up against particular demands.
 Across Africa, from large cities to remote villages, from conflict and 
postconflict zones to areas with no living memory of mass violence, human 
rights are discussed, debated, claimed, and rejected on a daily basis. Rights 
are engaged with in European and local languages, and by women, men, 
youths, politicians, civil society organizations, and donor representatives. 
Human rights are understood in myriad ways: embraced at the same time 
that they are held to account for their neocolonial intent,39 their disruptive 
potential, and the sense that they have been pushed too far, undermining 
the fabric of society and respect for older generations and traditional ways 
of life.40 For many “ordinary” African citizens, then, as for some of their 
leaders, the equation between rights and justice is not unambiguous.
 Human rights came to prominence in the legal anthropological litera-
ture in the form of seemingly interminable debates weighing the merits 
of a universalizing schema against the broadly relativist sensibilities of 
the discipline.41 Ultimately, the framework of universalism versus rela-
tivism proved limiting, and discussions of human rights began to focus 
on the effects of human rights discourse and practice on the ground, 
looking at how rights were being claimed, invoked, and put to use in 
particular settings.42 This move made plain that human rights could be 
much more malleable than the earlier approach had allowed; they could 
be “vernacularized,” in Sally Merry’s terms, made to bear the imprint of 
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local understandings and concerns, albeit in a circumscribed manner.43 
This volume maintains an empirical focus on the ways in which African 
citizens, and other actors operating within Africa, engage with rights, 
both practically and rhetorically, in their efforts to address particular 
kinds of injustice.
 More recent scholarship in legal anthropology has sought to tease 
out differences between human rights and justice. Goodale and Clarke 
thus argue that justice functions discursively “as an ever-receding and 
ever-shrouded social ideal, rather than as an alternative normative ori-
entation characterized by a set of concrete expectations and practices.”44 
They highlight what is perhaps justice’s most captivating characteristic: 
its ability to unite people with disparate concerns and interests in its pur-
suit; in other words, its motivating force. Parties to disputes can usually 
agree that they are each seeking justice, that a just resolution to their dif-
ferences is their shared goal. Of course, what constitutes justice in each 
situation is a more complicated (and contested) question. Human rights, 
on the other hand, vernacularized or not, are prescriptive; they exist in 
relation to a body of documents that has been ratified by governments 
around the world. Specified in this way they can be politicized, critiqued, 
and rejected. Perhaps most importantly, human rights are formally de-
fined in advance of the claims that people make, the things that they 
worry about and aim for. Justice, on the other hand, is not.
 Aspirations for justice play out on a number of different scales: as a 
matter of structural change, or in the realm of interpersonal relation-
ships; as a question of personal ethics, religious beliefs, or individual 
conduct; as well as a concern for governments, militaries, and national 
and international criminal courts. The very notion of aspirations for jus-
tice indicates that justice exists on a plane with hope. There is a prospec-
tive quality to justice talk, just as there is to hope;45 both contain within 
them a vision of the future, and both provide motivation for action that 
seeks to shape that future. Indeed, this could be said to be where justice’s 
political potential lies.
 The chapters in this volume investigate these varied aspirations for 
justice across Africa and the ways they have been articulated and enacted 
both in the recent and the more distant past. In part 1 of the volume, the 
chapters attend to the ways in which ideas about religion and morality 
shape individual and collective quests for justice. In so doing they also 
illuminate local languages of justice, which open the door to achieving a 
nuanced understanding of how individuals conceive of justice in Africa. 
11
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Part 2 of the volume is devoted to the theme of gender justice in Africa. 
The chapters in this section explore some of the ways in which women, 
girls, and sexual minorities seek recourse in the face of grave injustices. 
In addition, they cast light on the multiple tensions that the search for 
gender justice can provoke. In Part 3, the focus turns to the question of 
resource injustice in Africa and efforts to resolve it. These chapters tease 
out the complex nexus between justice and conflict. In what follows we 
lay out the key themes of the volume in more detail and introduce the 
individual chapters.
Morality, Religion, and the Languages of Justice
In large part, justice is of interest to scholars in the field of sociolegal 
studies because it combines legalism and morality, and research focus-
ing on the relationship between morality and justice in Africa has a 
distinguished history, particularly in the work of Max Gluckman.46 
Gluckman’s ethnographic engagement with Barotse law in Northern 
Rhodesia (Zambia) led him to write explicitly about the proximity of 
morality and justice, and about the ways in which those charged with 
administering the law strove to navigate a complex moral and legal 
landscape. Famously, he introduced the figure of the “reasonable man” to 
gain purchase on exactly how they did this, arguing that judges employed 
the concept of the reasonable man in order to weigh the cases before 
them against standards for the reasonable behavior of people occupy-
ing particular social positions: as reasonable brothers, sisters (reasonable 
men were not always male), uncles, aunts, parents, headmen, and so on. 
Crucially for Gluckman, “the upright man is implicit in the reasonable 
man,”47 and thus considerations of moral judgment and comportment 
entered into judges’ decisions. Indeed, as Pnina Werbner has recently 
pointed out, the concept of the reasonable man is misunderstood if it is 
“taken as a substantive description of a type of person rather than as a 
principle of practical ethical judgment.”48 It is also key to grasping how 
Barotse judges dealt with changing circumstances under colonial rule, 
which were reflected in shifting expectations for reasonable behavior.
 For Gluckman, it was highly significant that concepts like “reason-
able,” “right,” and “duty” were flexible in a way that provided leeway to 
interpret legal rules in the light of historically shifting moral and ethical 
considerations. He argued that the flexibility of linguistic terms like 
these, which blend the legal and the moral, allowed logical arguments 
to be built that served to “import justice into judgement.”49 Gluckman 
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insisted on the need to pay careful attention to vernacular terms while at 
the same time seeking to grasp their specificities through comparative 
efforts that necessitated the use of English-language legal categories 
and analytical terms. In the context of a volume that brings together 
studies from across the African continent in an effort to advance under-
standings of justice that transcend particular settings, it goes without 
saying that we require a language of justice that can travel. Nevertheless, 
African languages of justice are a fertile source of conceptual inspiration 
for our contributors.
 The words employed to refer to concepts of rights and justice in Af-
rican languages cover different semantic fields, and paying attention to 
these can be instructive, not least in bolstering Gluckman’s claims as 
to the proximity of justice and morality. In the Chichewa/Chinyanja 
language, widely spoken in Malawi as well as in parts of Zambia and 
Mozambique, “justice” finds a ready and somewhat uncontroversial 
translation in the word chilungamo, which is derived from the verb ku-
lungama, to be righteous, honest, and fair, as well as to be straight or 
upright. Human rights, on the other hand, have taken hold by way of 
the less straightforward coinage, ufulu wachibadwidwe, “birth freedom” 
or the “freedom one is born with,” since the transition to multiparty 
politics in the mid-1990s. The individualizing use of “freedom” (ufulu) 
for “right” has had a narrowing effect on the kinds of claims that can 
be convincingly made in the Chichewa/Chinyanja language of human 
rights, particularly when combined with an emphasis on political and 
civil rights, however understandable the latter may have been at the 
dawn of the multiparty era. As Harri Englund has argued, when rights 
are individual freedoms, “obscured is the fact that people generally pur-
sue freedoms from unequal positions.”50 Englund’s discussion can be 
read alongside Kathleen Rice’s recent examination of Xhosa terms for 
human rights, which include irhayti, a “Xhosaization of the English 
‘[human] right.’”51 This new coinage is apparently necessary in order to 
capture the values of “autonomous action and equality as parity” (35),52 
which, while seemingly central to the English language concept of 
human rights, are not contained within the vernacular term amalungelo, 
“a socially embedded and relational form of rights” (29).53 By contrast 
with Chichewa/Chinyanja, in certain other African languages, rights 
have found more ready cognates, while translations for justice have 
proved difficult to pin down. This is the case in Kiswahili (see Becker’s 
chapter in this volume and below).
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 Mark Hunter has offered similar analysis of the isiZulu term for 
“rights,” also amalungelo, which invites comparison with the Chichewa/
Chinyanja rendering of “justice.” Amalungelo is derived from the verb 
ukulunga, meaning “to be right” or “to be in order.” Hunter cites a 
dictionary definition of lunga: “Get or be in order, fit correct, be as it 
should be . . . Be morally good, be righteous.”54 He goes on to suggest 
that isiZulu invocations of rights thus speak to “historically embedded 
moral claims that do not rest on inalienable bodily traits”;55 in the realm 
of gender rights, he argues that these thus “always come together with 
gendered expectations of ‘rights and wrongs.’”56 While the Setswana 
term tshiamo combines reference to both “fairness” and “justice,”57 the 
Shona word for “justice,” ruenzaniso, refers to the act of balancing or 
weighing two sides of a story. Shona folktales dealing with the theme of 
justice thus praise the abilities of shrewd adjudicators whose ability to 
balance cases frustrates the unscrupulous. These very languages of rights 
and justice, infused as they are with moral considerations, almost ren-
der Gluckman’s perceptive arguments about the proximity of law and 
morality redundant: more so than English, these African languages, in 
different ways, make the shared terrain of morality and justice explicit.
 African languages of rights and justice draw our attention to the 
complex conceptual terrain that we are entering into, where neat dis-
tinctions between what is legal and what is morally right have to be 
created rather than assumed. Rights and justice share a semantic field 
with notions of righteousness, fairness, truth, equality, reason, and 
upright behavior; they jostle for space with invocations of obligation, 
respect, and entitlement. We are reminded that this is also the case 
in the English language, where “right” is only the clearest example of 
such slippage. When it comes to justice, this implies that more is at 
stake than legal procedure, or the application of legal rules and norms. 
Justice incorporates subjective assessments of behavior, intention, and 
appropriateness; it bridges the gap between particular happenings and 
abstract certainties.
 Jonathon Earle’s examination of the intellectual history of the concept 
of justice in the kingdom of Buganda, located in present-day Uganda, 
uncovers the different languages of justice that were invoked within 
Ganda society. He finds that justice has been the subject of vigorous 
and longstanding debate between different religiopolitical factions 
among the Ganda. While Baganda Protestants in the early 1900s 
emphasized sala (o) musango, a top-down approach to administering 
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justice, Catholics advocated for a more deliberative approach, which 
was captured in the word bwenkanya. Earle shows that advocates for 
these contending approaches to thinking about justice drew on diverse 
sources of elaboration and legitimation. In addition, they used these 
“to reinforce and reconstitute different types of political authority.” 
Through his analysis, Earle makes a compelling case for the need for 
efforts to make sense of contemporary political processes in Uganda to 
be founded on an understanding of older vernacular historiographies 
and processes of knowledge production.
 The promise, and indeed the challenge, of studying local languages 
of justice in Africa is made clear in Felicitas Becker’s chapter. Becker 
notes the fecundity of the Swahili term haki, which can be used to 
refer to both “rights” and “justice.” Haki is most commonly employed 
as a relatively straightforward translation of “right(s),” while “justice” 
seems to span the terrain of several Swahili concepts, including usawa 
or equality. In searching for vernacular equivalents for the term “justice,” 
Becker finds a crowded linguistic field, demanding both linguistic and 
historical analysis. As she points out, part of the difficulty in identifying 
accurate translations for these English terms lies in the complexity of 
the English words themselves, which bear the marks of their various 
histories. Becker’s analysis of Muslim sermons, for instance, reveals a 
conception of justice that it is at once connected to personal virtue, to the 
following of divine instruction, and to living harmoniously with others. 
The sermons, she argues, “portray the pursuit of justice as a question of 
forbearance, compassion, generosity, and patience, as well as obedience 
toward God and his law.” In her analysis, morality is never far from view.
 Morality is also central to Benson Mulemi’s discussion of efforts to 
treat cancer patients in Kenya. At the core of his chapter is the argu-
ment that access to cancer care for the poor in Kenya is a question of 
social justice and thus that the government has a moral duty to fulfill 
this need. Mulemi observes that because of severe resource constraints, 
a two-tier system of cancer care has emerged in which wealthy patients 
receive preferential treatment and privileged access to cancer care facili-
ties by virtue of their status. By contrast, the poor are left to suffer from 
both the debilitating effects of cancer and its destabilizing impact on 
their livelihoods. The response of medical personnel working in such 
dire circumstances has been to resort to improvisation in cancer care in 
order to make the limited resources reach as many people as possible, 
even if such improvisation does not translate into effectively treating 
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cancer. This, Mulemi argues, reflects “the convergence of a general sense 
of human and professional moral obligation to mediate desolate care 
circumstances.” Overall, his chapter makes a strong case for a cancer 
care regime in Kenya that balances market justice with social justice.
 Morality in Africa, as Kwame Gyekye points out, is not necessarily 
connected to religion. However, religion has often had an important in-
fluence on moral imaginaries.58 Moreover, different religions and sacred 
beliefs have generally had something to say about justice. Judaism, Islam 
and Christianity all deal with distributive justice and enjoin their fol-
lowers to engage in good deeds, to give alms, and to welcome strangers.59 
A similar concern with distributive justice, reinforced by religious belief, 
is evident within Diola communities in Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea 
Bissau. Among the Diola, those with wealth have an obligation to share 
it, and it is commonly held that failure to do so will result in a reversal 
of fortunes. In addition, Robert Baum notes that witchcraft accusations 
serve “as a powerful check against violation of a Diola ideal of universal 
access to arable land.”60 Religious movements often also contain within 
them a vision of social justice, which has, at times, been used to justify 
the waging of war. Early anticolonial uprisings, such as the Maji Maji 
rebellion and the Chimurenga uprisings in what are now Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe, respectively, as well as the millenarian Watchtower revivals 
that rocked central Africa during the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, are but a few examples of religious movements that aimed to bring 
about particular visions of justice by violent means.61
 Nevertheless, it is not always obvious how religion shapes ideas and 
practices of justice in specific contexts. Fernanda Pirie’s study of the 
notions of justice espoused by two Buddhist communities living at dif-
ferent ends of the Tibetan plateau reveals a striking contrast.62 Among 
Nomadic pastoralists on the Amdo grasslands, conflicts often resulted in 
revenge attacks or the payment of compensation. These and other acts, 
she suggests, indicated that a form of retributive justice was in opera-
tion. By contrast, villagers of Ladakh sought to resolve conflict through 
community meetings in which the principles of public morality were 
invoked in order to restore harmony. During these processes of arbitra-
tion, there was no attempt at invoking the law or “adjudicating between 
the rights and interests of the individuals and households involved.”63 
What this case so clearly illustrates is that while religion shapes ideas 
about justice, it does so in combination with a range of economic, so-
ciocultural, and political factors, and the interplay between these factors 
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changes over time. This understanding informs the chapters in this sec-
tion and their investigation of the role of religion in shaping notions of 
justice in Africa.
 Duncan Scott’s chapter asks what Christian relational ethics might 
contribute to efforts to lessen the injustice and inequality that has char-
acterized postapartheid South Africa. Scott examines the work of a 
Christian nongovernmental organization, The Warehouse, which aims 
to tackle inequality, poverty, and racial division in the country. He is 
specifically interested in how the organization translates relational ideas 
about justice into social action in a context in which there is dire need for 
social and economic transformation. For Scott, The Warehouse’s focus 
on transforming relationships does not necessarily divert attention from 
the structural roots of injustice in South Africa. Rather, it adopts an 
alternative transformation agenda that starts at the individual level. In 
countering criticisms leveled at other relational justice approaches, such 
as ubuntu and reconciliation projects, he maintains that, if transformed 
into practice, relational ethics provide a means of pursuing justice in 
South Africa from the bottom up.
Gender Justice
The notion of gender justice promises to take the study of justice into 
the realm of gender and marital relationships, of mundane domesticity, 
intimacy, and care. It asks what might constitute justice in the context 
of interpersonal relationships and suggests that answers to that question 
will be multiple and particular.
 The clamor of external agents with something to say about appro-
priate gender relations and the treatment of women and LGBTQ+ 
communities in Africa can at times be overwhelming. Terms like “viola-
tion,” “forced marriage,” “harmful cultural practices,” and “genital mu-
tilation” ramp up the rhetoric and squeeze out dissenting voices, even 
when those voices are those of the people concerned. A focus on justice, 
and on what gender justice might mean to particular African men and 
women, opens up the possibility of bringing their voices to the fore, of 
asking rather than telling.
 Thus we might recall the Maasai women activists whom Dorothy 
Hodgson has described proclaiming in frustration that “challeng-
ing polygyny and female cutting are not our priorities” when, for the 
umpteenth time, they came up against the realization that the inter-
national development apparatus, and indeed, local Tanzanian feminist 
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organizations, were moved more by their genitals than by their concerns 
with economic and political rights.64 Their own priorities, on the other 
hand, included “land rights, livestock, hunger, poverty, and education.”65 
While these Maasai women favor alternatives to female genital modi-
fication, which is “only one small part of a long series of ceremonies 
and celebrations that ritually transform a Maasai girl into a Maasai 
woman,”66 they are also concerned to confront poverty and marginaliza-
tion, and in doing so they find it more difficult to garner support from 
their feminist and development “partners.” Literature on women’s rights 
in Africa suggests that activism and rights struggles might look quite 
different were listening a more consistent starting point on the part 
of those seeking to “uplift” African women. Failing to do so is not the 
preserve of foreign actors; elite Africans, such as the participants in the 
Tanzanian Gender Festival that so irked the Maasai women activists, 
are often just as likely to proceed without taking on board the views of 
impoverished African citizens.
 We are also reminded of Saba Mahmood’s influential study of the 
women’s piety movement in Egypt, in which she argues that the women 
with whom she worked, who actively embrace principles of women’s 
subordination to male authority, are radically misunderstood by feminist 
scholars if they are seen as suffering from “false consciousness.”67 Mah-
mood challenges us to conceive of feminist politics beyond a universal-
izing assumption that women everywhere share a desire for “freedom” 
and a will to challenge rather than uphold social norms. She thus high-
lights the shortcomings of an approach that would foreground feminist 
concerns with women’s resistance at the expense of an understanding 
of the lives, intentions, and commitments of the Cairene women with 
whom she worked. Hers is an argument for the importance of paying 
attention, in every case, to the specificities of people’s lives and concerns, 
even when these do not converge neatly with those of the international 
development industry and “Western” feminism. The implication is that 
we must ask, rather than assume, what justice means for Cairene women, 
as we must for women elsewhere on the African continent.
 African scholars of gender have also emphasized the need to reach 
beyond Western feminist sensibilities and Euro-American academic 
texts in order to understand gender relations and women’s aspirations 
in Africa. In this vein, Nkiru Nzegwu has argued that a peculiar result 
of transformations in Africa since the nineteenth century has been the 
coming together of Western feminist and patriarchal African men’s 
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visions of African societies: “Both are engaged in the enterprise of cast-
ing their patriarchal view of families as traditional and culturally rooted. 
Both share the task of representing African women as voiceless and 
inferior to men. Both have successfully established as true the myth that 
African women lack agency.”68 Much of this work contains a distinct 
nostalgia for precolonial gender relations, which, it is suggested, were 
less patriarchal prior to European missionary interventions, colonialism, 
and the subsequent collusion of African male elders.69 However, while 
gender relations have been transformed over the past two hundred years 
or so, they have not converged with the experiences of women in other 
parts of the world. Ifi Amadiume, for example, has argued that there 
is a structural and historically significant difference in the way that 
motherhood is experienced and valued in Western and African settings. 
While Western feminists have often seen motherhood and marriage as 
undermining their efforts for recognition in the public sphere, African 
women’s roles as wives and mothers might be better understood as cen-
tral to their empowerment.70
 The situations of Africans who identify as LGBTQ+ complicate the 
oppositional stance that women’s advocates can take vis-à-vis Western 
interventionism and caution against the blanket romanticization of 
local solutions to matters of gender justice. The question of whether 
or not LGBTQ+ identities, relationships, and sexual practices can be 
considered “African” is a live one in many African countries today, even 
if scholars have long since debunked the idea of Africa as a heterosexual 
continent.71 A rich anthropological and historical literature unsettles 
contemporary political debates by illuminating older conceptions and 
vernacular understandings of sexuality, as well as explicating more recent 
dynamics, complicated by religious ideologies and nationalist agendas.72 
It is all too easy to lose sight of justice in the midst of debates over what 
is foreign and what belongs in Africa.
 Awareness of the historically constituted and presently lived texture 
of gender relations in Africa, and the great diversity of experience, ex-
pectations, and aspirations found across the continent, has to be a first 
step in efforts to think about gender justice. It is also a vital reminder that 
gender justice is unlikely to be something specifiable in general terms 
like the items on a list of international standards. Nevertheless, an argu-
ment for the multiplicity of forms that gender justice might take must 
not entail denial or obfuscation of injustice and violence. Several stud-
ies in this volume point to times and places where gendered injustices 
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have prevailed, including gender-based violence and rape. Here we see 
conflicting senses of what has happened, what ought to have happened, 
and how best to shape the future in light of the past. Firsthand expe-
riences of gender and sexual injustice, and competing aspirations for 
gender justice, take center stage in these chapters, illustrating how the 
search for gender justice is often marked by tensions between local and 
external actors, as well as state and nonstate processes.
 The quest for justice for gender and sexual minorities in Africa is the 
focus of Alan Msosa’s chapter. By examining the heated debates that 
have erupted in Malawi since 2009 over the rights of LGBTQ+ people, 
he shows that the challenge facing the Malawian LGBTQ+ community 
is not limited to overcoming essentialist arguments about African culture 
and sexuality, but also includes addressing widespread confusion over 
what is meant by LGBT rights. This confusion is compounded by the 
multiple and conflicting understandings of the term “human rights” that 
stem, in part, from the different Chichewa translations of the term. For 
Msosa, however, all is not lost. He shows that the laws that criminalize 
same-sex relationships contravene the provisions of Malawi’s constitu-
tion, and that the existing legal and policy frameworks can be interpreted 
in ways that advance the quest for justice for LGBTQ+ people. In addi-
tion, he sees a need to reframe the debate by employing locally resonant 
concepts such as chilungamo, the Chichewa word for justice. While he 
concedes that chilungamo cannot replace ideas of human rights, Msosa 
nevertheless argues that it serves a critical purpose in drawing the con-
cept of human rights toward locally legitimate principles.
 Patrick Hoenig’s chapter directs our focus onto efforts to administer 
gender justice in the midst of armed conflict. He examines the opera-
tions of mobile gender courts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the objective of which is to increase women’s access to justice while 
fostering greater confidence in the rule of law. Through an examination 
of the trial of Congolese soldiers for rape in the town of Baraka in 
2011, Hoenig finds several problems with these donor-driven efforts to 
deliver justice. In the first instance, donor pressure for high conviction 
rates risks jeopardizing due process, by encouraging judges to curtail 
the rights of the defense, and undermining the principle of the pre-
sumption of innocence. More important, however, was the fact that the 
criminal justice handed down by the courts failed to meet the needs and 
expectations of the survivors of sexual violence, especially with respect 
to witness protection and reparations. In some instances, it left them 
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vulnerable to future victimization. Consequently, women testifying in 
the Baraka trial dismissed the court as just another “foreign tribunal.” 
In this regard, Hoenig’s findings resonate strongly with Adam Branch’s 
arguments about the “violence of justice.” Ill-conceived justice interven-
tions are not simply harmless mistakes, they carry the risk of exposing 
victims to further abuse or reinforcing structural violence.
 Ngeyi Kanyongolo and Bernadette Malunga’s chapter returns the 
discussion to Malawi, where they focus on cases of defilement, or sexual 
intercourse with girls under the age of sixteen. Kanyongolo and Malunga 
examine discrepancies between the conceptions of justice articulated by 
ordinary citizens and those that inform formal legal proceedings, and 
they show that these differences have an adverse effect on efforts to 
deal with child sexual abuse. The chapter highlights the underreport-
ing of sexual abuse of young girls as a significant impediment to the 
pursuit of justice and considers a variety of causes of underreporting, 
from situations in which intercourse is not condemned because it occurs 
in culturally sanctioned settings, such as initiation camps, to mistrust 
of the police and the ongoing economic dependence of victims on per-
petrators. What is clear is that the achievement of justice for victims 
of defilement requires coordinated efforts across the divisions between 
formal and informal authorities and state and “traditional” legal forums.
 Holly Porter’s contribution to this volume focuses on the experiences 
of rape victims seeking justice in Acholiland, Uganda. Her chapter re-
minds us that local approaches to justice are not always equal to the 
task of providing justice to victims, especially in contexts where long 
periods of violent conflict have disrupted the sociocultural, economic, 
and political landscape. Porter shows that most women continue the 
longstanding practice of seeking assistance from their relatives, who 
ultimately exert the most important influence on the course of justice 
after rape. However, in this way, women’s access to justice is dependent 
on their relatives’ approach. Customary views about appropriate sexual-
ity in Acholiland tend not to be sympathetic to women who have been 
raped. In addition, the considerations that relatives prioritize after rape, 
such as social harmony or the avoidance of cosmological sanction, often 
work against the interests of women who have been raped. Of particu-
lar importance is the way that the war has undermined the ability of 
relatives to intervene. Central to Porter’s chapter is the argument that 
interventions to assist victims of rape in accessing justice need to take 
account of the important roles that relatives play.
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Resources, Conflict, and Justice
Some of the most contentious debates about (in)justice in Africa have 
been about the distribution of resources. In particular, precious minerals 
such as oil and diamonds have been at the center of conflicts that have 
pitched state and capital against aggrieved communities’ demands for a 
just share of the income derived from minerals taken from their lands. 
Grievances about resources have, in some cases, led to violent conflicts 
and insurgencies.73 However, a series of studies that draw on quantita-
tive methods and rational choice theory have challenged the idea that 
violent conflicts in Africa have been primarily fueled by grievances. Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, for example, contend that economic motives 
are central to explaining armed conflict.74 The roots of conflict, they 
argue, lie not in grievances over specific injustices but in rebels’ assess-
ments of the opportunity costs of insurgency. Therefore, the existence 
of high-value primary commodity exports makes an insurgency more 
likely. According to this view, it is greed, not grievance, that is important 
in triggering armed conflict.
 However, it has become increasingly clear that this approach to 
understanding conflict in Africa is both empirically and conceptu-
ally flawed. In the first instance, it is reductionist to view the causes of 
conflict in terms of the greed-grievance binary as the drivers of violent 
conflicts are often complex and are transformed over time. The rational 
choice approach also fails to take into account structural factors that 
constrain individual choices.75 In addition, the proxies relied on in these 
studies are often ambiguous. Historical studies of armed conflicts have 
also demonstrated the empirical shortcomings of materialist interpreta-
tions of conflict. Research on the armed insurgency in the Niger Delta, 
for example, demonstrates how longstanding grievances over resource 
injustices were an important driver of the conflict. The declining share 
of oil revenues distributed by the central government to local communi-
ties from the 1960s, as well as the destruction of the local environment, 
led to growing calls for a fairer distribution of oil money. These griev-
ances were at the heart of the Ogoni Bill of Rights of 1990, issued by 
the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, as well as the Ijaw 
Youth Council’s Kaiama Declaration of 1998.76 As Ukoha Ukiwo shows, 
the insurgency initiated by the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta in 2005–6 was a consequence of earlier failed efforts to 
elicit a positive response to their grievances from the government and 
oil companies through peaceful means.77
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 Land is another key resource around which concerns about distribu-
tive justice have coalesced in Africa in recent years. This is partly due to 
the increasing incidence of “land grabbing” across the continent. Global 
crises related to food, energy, finance, and the environment have led 
to large-scale purchases of “empty” fertile land in Africa for fuel and 
food production by local and international capital as a means of hedging 
against future price spikes. A study by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute estimates that, between 2005 and 2009, about twenty 
million hectares of land exchanged hands by way of these land grabs.78 
Much of this has taken place in those African countries where buyers 
can take advantage of weak or corrupt governments that do not have 
legislation in place to protect their citizens from land dispossession. As 
a consequence, the last decade has witnessed increasingly violent pro-
tests by local communities over land dispossession in countries such as 
Uganda, Senegal, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Kenya.
 Recent struggles for land justice have also been connected to much 
older experiences of dispossession. Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Re-
form Programme, initiated in 2000, stands out among these, both in 
terms of scale and in the way it has been deeply implicated in the coun-
try’s economic and political crisis. Scholars have nevertheless been di-
vided over how to explain the land occupations. On the one hand, Sam 
Moyo, Paris Yeros, and others take the view that the land occupations 
were the culmination of mobilization by a “land occupation movement” 
composed of the rural semiproletariat, the urban poor, and the urban 
petty bourgeoisie, united under the leadership of war veterans.79 On the 
other hand, the land reform process has been seen by other scholars as 
a calculated political move designed to shore up ZANU (PF)’s waning 
political fortunes in the face of a challenge from the Movement for 
Democratic Change.80 Whether one sees land reform in Zimbabwe as 
the result of the activities of an organic grassroots social movement or 
as a consequence of top-down manipulation by politicians, at its heart 
lies a historic injustice. The unresolved nature of this injustice rendered 
it available as a basis for mobilization by both political entrepreneurs 
and disenfranchised individuals.
 Thinking about these struggles over resources shifts the focus onto 
justice’s opposite, injustice. This, in turn, fixes scholarly attention more 
firmly onto concrete instances of injustice and efforts to alleviate them, 
as opposed to the abstract contemplation of justice.81 It also throws into 
sharp relief the complex nexus of justice and conflict, a theme with which 
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the chapters in this section grapple. Whereas research into transitional 
justice focuses on justice processes that emerge out of conflicts, studies 
of resource struggles illuminate the process of conflict emerging out of 
injustice. The chapters in this section also illustrate the ways in which 
conflict reshapes ideas about justice, as well as the practices around it. In 
so doing they challenge an implicit assumption that often lurks behind 
the search for local approaches to transitional justice, namely, that local 
rituals and practices remain static, even as war disrupts the very social 
and economic foundations of the communities in question.
 Stacey Hynd’s chapter speaks to a key silence in the literature on 
conflict and justice: the voices of children. Their perspectives, she shows, 
have all too often been silenced in domestic and international law, as 
well as in transitional justice agendas. What is more, in those instances 
where their voices have been heard, they have often been appropriated 
to serve the agendas of ICC prosecutors or the humanitarian goals of 
international NGOs. Invariably, both groups tend to portray child sol-
diers as simple victims of conflict. For Hynd, such an approach misses 
the engaged and complex relationship between children and justice 
and weakens transitional justice efforts. Drawing on her research with 
former Lord’s Resistance Army abductees in Northern Uganda, Hynd 
makes the case for a more meaningful incorporation of children’s per-
spectives into domestic and international law in postconflict contexts, 
one that is more nuanced and moves beyond the standard international 
position that does not recognize the legal accountability of anyone 
under eighteen and, above all, one which acknowledges that children 
can be more than simple victims in conflict. Age, Hynd argues, needs 
“to be taken more seriously as a vector of, and for, justice.”
 Fred Ikanda’s chapter examines the quest for justice among Somali 
refugees in the Dagahaley camp in Kenya. He demonstrates the central-
ity of maslaha talks as a means of resolving disputes, while acknowledg-
ing the important role played by other dispute resolution fora provided 
by the Kenyan state and international agencies such as the UNHCR. 
Chief among the contributions Ikanda’s chapter makes to the study of 
justice is the way it highlights the centrality of sentiment to efforts to 
achieve justice. Significantly, he shows that it is not just “positive” senti-
ments, such as the indignation provoked by injustice, that are integral 
to the pursuit of justice, but also less well-regarded sentiments, such as 
the desire for “vengeance.” However, he makes clear that maslaha is not 
a fixed practice, and nor is it universally adhered to. Efforts to initiate 
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maslaha proceedings were not always welcomed, and aggrieved parties 
sometimes resolved to take vengeance instead. At the same time, the 
presence of alternative avenues of recourse, and the pressure brought 
to bear by Al Shabaab’s strict views about Islamic practices, were also 
reshaping dispute resolution processes in the camp.
 Efforts to resolve historical injustices related to land dispossession 
are at the center of Olaf Zenker’s chapter. He examines the continued 
efforts of the South African government to implement land justice by 
reopening the land restitution process in 2014. This effort, he shows, has 
been complicated by national politics as well global economic processes. 
On the one hand, the desire to appease traditional leaders has seen 
a progressive strengthening of their authority over land, a move that 
goes against an earlier position that emphasized individual rights to 
land. Zenker argues that neotraditionalist legislation has resulted in the 
transformation of South Africans “from rights bearing citizens to lease-
holding subjects in perpetuity.” He also demonstrates that the focus on 
the productive value of land, which undergirds the government’s vision 
for land justice, is out of step with the desires and expectations of South 
African citizens, many of whom have elected to receive financial com-
pensation as opposed to land. He thus suggests that the future of land 
justice in South Africa might lie in focusing more on the “distributive 
value” of land as opposed to its “production value.”
 Anna Macdonald’s chapter focuses on land disputes in Northern 
Uganda in the aftermath of conflict and investigates the ways in which 
they are resolved. Macdonald challenges two false dichotomies that 
have tended to dominate debates about transitional justice in North-
ern Uganda, namely, local versus international, and restorative versus 
retributive approaches to justice. For parties embroiled in disputes over 
land, Macdonald shows, decisions about whom to turn to were not so 
much shaped by the desire to adhere to cultural norms as by the need 
to find adjudicators who possessed the relevant knowledge. Contrary 
to the position advanced in some of the literature, Acholi were not 
permanently wedded to “traditional” practices when it came to seeking 
justice. Rather, their decisions were shaped by pragmatic considerations. 
As Macdonald points out, “the hybrid nature of the public authorities 
that people draw on and the highly contingent nature of their justice 
decisions . . . are not based on the norms espoused in transitional justice 
debates but rather on the most pragmatic and effective means by which 
to restore balance and meaning to postconflict social relations.”
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 This volume brings together work that takes justice seriously. Many 
of the chapters illustrate that this is not only a subject of reflection for 
scholars and students of Africa. African citizens, from rural villagers to 
educated elites, also often find themselves confronting questions of jus-
tice as they reflect on the past and contemplate the future. In addition, 
a great deal of applied work is being carried out across the continent by 
lawyers, humanitarian workers, and international donor representatives, 
among others. We hope that this volume will provide fresh impetus, as 
well as food for thought, for such actors. If there is one argument that 
cuts across a number of the chapters that might be of practical use in 
the realm of development interventions, it is the importance of paying 
attention to local social and historical contexts. An appreciation of local 
realities, concerns, and priorities can only improve efforts to help bring 
about “justice,” whatever that might look like. While emphasis is often 
placed on the doing of development, the chapters of this volume suggest 
that it may be by listening that the greatest difference can be made.
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Competing Conceptions of  
Justice in Colonial Buganda
J o n at H o n  L .  e a r L e
T h I S  C h A P T E R  E x P L O R E S  T h E  I N T E L L E C T U A L  h I S T O R Y  O F  J U S T I C E 
in the colonial eastern African kingdom of Buganda. It begins by ex-
amining the genealogies of justice in modern history to argue that the 
logic of international justice in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
was tied to larger reconfigurations of global power and, in the case of sub-
Saharan Africa, the emergence of racialized hierarchies that accompanied 
the expansion of colonial empires. It then shows how Protestant Baganda 
used folktales and historical argumentation in the early 1900s to create 
forms of justice that legitimized the kingdom’s Protestant order. Protes-
tant articulations of justice often underscored the importance of executive 
authority in legal and social adjudication. Justice was a highly contentious 
ideal, though, in colonial southern Uganda. Catholic intellectuals in the 
1900s complicated Protestant claims by defining justice as the practice of 
dissenting parties gathering to resolve disputes (-bwenkanya). In doing 
so, Catholics sought to equalize power in a state structured principally 
around the authority of Buganda’s Protestant monarchy and chieftaincies. 
The chapter concludes by exploring the political thought of Uganda’s first 
elected prime minister, the Catholic activist Benedicto Kiwanuka. To 
castigate Uganda’s Protestant elite, Kiwanuka drew from both classical 
liberal and Catholic sources to shape larger vernacular debates about the 
purported meaning and function of justice in colonial society.
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 While this chapter recognizes that Protestant and Catholic com-
munities in colonial Buganda were not homogenous, it makes par-
ticular claims about competing etymological classifications of justice 
throughout the twentieth century to explore the extent to which colo-
nial knowledge was reworked into local political argumentation. Where 
previous scholars have tended to focus their studies on 1950s Uganda 
by emphasizing the impact of postwar democratization movements 
or the force of religious claims, I use the recently unearthed library of 
Benedicto Kiwanuka to argue that textual practices among late colonial 
intellectuals blurred European literary classifications. These readings 
complicate contemporary scholarship on literacy in Africa, which has 
tended to focus on either religious or secular literacy. Moving beyond 
this dichotomy allows us to think in more complicated ways about 
shifting conceptions of justice in colonial eastern Africa. This piece also 
recognizes that debates regarding justice were unfolding beyond central 
Uganda. These processes, however, are beyond the current scope of this 
study, which is concerned with Buganda’s ideational arena.
Genealogies of International Justice
By the early nineteenth century, the standardization of internationally 
recognizable forms of justice was tied to emerging understandings of 
territorial sovereignty. As the legal scholar Gerry Simpson has argued, 
early global classifications of war criminals, international outlaws, and 
terrorists were first described as perpetrators of crimes against the law 
of nations.1 The emergence of industrial economies by the mid-1800s 
resulted in the reformulation of these emerging constructions of justice—
and how justice would become commonly talked about in international 
politics. The transition toward colonial empires resulted in a noticeable 
shift in how legal relations were negotiated across national borders. 
Building on the earlier work of Charles H. Alexandrowicz,2 for example, 
Partha Chatterjee has shown how trade practices between European 
states and India and South East Asia had been largely equitable prior 
to the nineteenth century. Even as Indian rulers surrendered territories 
in Bengal, Karnataka, and Maratha to the East India Company, notes 
Chatterjee, they did so as sovereign state builders through international 
treaties.3
 as european traders and governments sought to increasingly control 
the regulatory apparatuses of global flows, international law and jus-
tice were recast in the language of positivist legal theory. Where earlier 
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revolutionaries in europe and the new World sought to use natural law 
to imbue the historical world with universal or inalienable rights in the 
1700s, later positivist approaches were used by the intellectual architects 
of emerging empires in asia and africa to argue that local political 
rulers and communities possessed recognizable legal rights only to the 
extent that their respective territories maintained european formula-
tions of statutory law. it was argued that unruly regions needed, if not 
welcomed all together, newfound partnerships to administer local rule 
and expanding economies. Commenting on this transition, historians 
such as Kenneth Pomeranz and Christopher bayly have shown how 
economic developments in modern China resulted in new trade regula-
tions that were protected by european legal institutions.4 the governor 
of india, Sir John malcolm, concluded that among indians “the very 
permanency of usurpation was a blessing; and it was natural for them to 
forget their prejudices against their european masters in a contempla-
tion of that superior regard to justice, good faith, and civilization, by 
which they saw their rule accompanied.”5
 in eastern africa, where communities’ fluctuating purchasing habits 
impacted textile production in massachusetts and bombay,6 similar 
arguments were made. early colonial administrators asserted that pre-
colonial kings were unwilling—if not entirely unable—to create and 
maintain just societies without external compulsion. in the late 1800s, 
the british mercenary frederick Lugard used military force to compel 
the monarch of buganda, Kabaka mwanga, one who “had been found 
incapable of doing justice,”7 to sign a treaty that placed political power 
under the control of the region’s Christian chieftaincy. in doing so, 
Lugard sought to control trade routes that connected central uganda 
with the zanzibari coast, whose enslaved communities and citizens 
must “appreciate the advantages of equal laws and of a justice of which, 
till now, they have had no experience or conception.”8 the argument 
that social fairness within and between local “tribes” did not exist was 
used to reinforce the validity of empire in public debates across europe.9 
indeed, advocates for international colonization were often compelled 
to present their work as being about the business of creating and sup-
porting ostensibly just polities to legitimize imperial strategy within the 
context of politics at home.10
 but from the 1880s until the postwar period, the institutionaliza-
tion of international justice was suspect. as the historian mark Lewis 
has argued, the first and Second World Wars showed just how far 
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the language of “violations of the laws of humanity,” “crimes against 
humanity,” “crimes against peace,” and “crimes against international 
peace and security” were adapted to reinforce shifting power dynamics 
in global politics.11 among Soviet state builders and historians in the 
early to mid-twentieth century, for instance, the language of justice was 
used to legitimize the expansion of Soviet interests throughout eurasia 
and, in time, Cold War africa.12 in postwar Japan, the invention and 
implementation of international justice was no less controversial. His-
torians such as John dower have convincingly argued that the tokyo 
tribunals pivoted around the production and performance of american 
jurisprudence. in a trial that took nearly three times as long to conclude 
as the nuremburg prosecutions, eleven justices, the majority of whom 
were american, deliberated over cases during which attorneys argued 
that Japanese aggression demonstrated “criminal act without provo-
cation, without parallel, and almost entirely without context.”13 the 
chief prosecutor, george Keenan, in a courtroom setting that Japanese 
litigants suggested had “the lighting of Hollywood,”14 concluded that 
the Japanese had “determined to destroy democracy and its essential 
basis—freedom and the respect of human personality.”15 american em-
bargoes and europe’s broader military involvement in the region were 
not discussed. Japanese communities were challenged to talk about jus-
tice—seigi or kōsei (public correctness)—in ways that made sense out of 
postwar economies and evolving governance throughout the occupation. 
Japanese historians sought to talk about social order and justice in ways 
that elicited idyllic pasts and alternative futures: possibilities beyond mili-
tarized cultures governed by meiji generals or truman’s bureaucrats.16
 that ideas of justice were tied to broader expressions of national-
ism, sovereignty, and the regulation of economies following the Second 
World War meant that africa’s first generation of academic historians 
in the 1960s were challenged to adapt the language of justice and human 
rights. it was contended that newly formed states would transition into 
democracies to the extent that activists reworked localized legal frame-
works to conform to the standards of modern human rights.17 the 
burden to create societies governed by both statutory law and suppos-
edly independent judiciaries was part of a much older historical process, 
the origins of which dated to abolitionist debates in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.18 the transition from transatlantic trade in 
human cargo toward “legitimate” commerce accompanied the institu-
tionalization of comprehensive legal measures that sought to civilize 
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african communities trapped in an ahistorical,19 Hobbesian world. 
the invention of justice in colonial africa was driven by much deeper 
claims being made about racial and cultural hierarchies. as i indicate in 
this chapter’s conclusion, there is continuity between these nineteenth- 
century discourses and popular reflections on justice or human rights—
or their alleged absences—in twenty-first century uganda.
Protestant Historical Vision and Justice in Early Colonial Buganda
The Buganda kingdom in southern Uganda was a highly sophisticated state 
by the mid-nineteenth century.20 Through the development and regulation 
of power between kings and clans, Ganda societies had developed differ-
ent ways of talking about and practicing justice prior to the emergence of 
long-distance trade in the mid-nineteenth century. This resulted in numer-
ous proverbs and songs about the supposed functions of justice in society.21 
In time, this large body of discourse provided an extensive archive from 
which Baganda could articulate different conceptions or characteristics of 
justice throughout the colonial period. As groups throughout the king-
dom interacted with Zanzibari and European missionaries and exchanged 
goods and ideas, they worked to reinforce and recast older beliefs about 
the organization of fair societies. Throughout the colonial period, Ganda 
historians operating from different religious frameworks employed liter-
ary practices to show how their respective communities were supposedly 
influential in stabilizing the kingdom during a period of territorial expan-
sion and religious conflict during the 1880s and 1890s. Protestant chiefs 
and British cartographers by the early 1900s had used military technolo-
gies to restructure Buganda’s precolonial counties and courts according to 
religious devotion. Buganda’s Muslim king, Kabaka Kalema (r. 1889–1890), 
was removed from power during a Christian coup. And chieftaincies and 
land were redistributed according to new-fangled religious allegiances; 
Muslim and Catholic communities received far fewer government posts 
and land titles than their Protestant counterparts.
 Following the ousting of Buganda’s Muslim administration, whose 
chiefs had deeply affected kingdom politics for approximately fifty years, 
Protestant intellectuals, who worked alongside British administrators, 
incorporated missionary literacy to rewrite Buganda’s past and imagine 
new forms of jurisprudence that required the state’s Christian chiefs. 
No Ganda historian utilized Arabic and English literacy more effec-
tively than Apolo Kaggwa, who helped govern Buganda from the late 
1800s until the mid-1920s. In the late nineteenth century, Kaggwa began 
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writing the most influential political history of Buganda in the twentieth 
century, Bassekabaka be Buganda, “The History of the Deceased Kings 
of Buganda.” Kaggwa’s history was the cornerstone of Protestant histo-
riography in colonial Uganda. In it he presented a past that legitimized 
military intervention to remove Buganda’s Muslim chiefs and kings from 
power. As Michael Twaddle has shown, “the imposition of colonial rule 
is rewritten in Bassekabaka, not only to heighten the importance of the 
military contributions of Kaggwa and his associates, but to Christianize 
retrospectively the whole anti-Muslim campaign as a kind of holy cru-
sade.”22 Kaggwa’s work presented a series of historical claims that writers 
and activists were challenged to address throughout decolonization.
 Two years following the signing of the 1900 agreement that codified 
Protestant control of the state, Kaggwa published Engero za Baganda, 
“Folktales of the Baganda.” In the collection, he produced eighteen 
stories that were selected “for all our young people in Uganda to read 
and learn.”23 Kaggwa’s stories were politically instructive; each tale was 
designed to produce “some helpful lesson” that called readers to “think 
out carefully what it all means, and what it should teach.”24 In his col-
lection, Kaggwa reimagined justice in Ganda society. He did this by 
recounting the story of Lunzi, one who journeyed “from village lad to 
judge.” One day, recounted Kaggwa’s story, Lunzi the woodcutter was 
chopping trees in a forest. After a hard day’s work, he traveled home 
with a piece of timber. But along the way, Lunzi passed the home of 
a friend, which he entered after placing his log against a banana tree. 
While inside, a hunter walked past the compound with his dogs, which 
frightened a sheep that was tied near the leaning timber. This caused the 
animal’s rope to break, allowing the sheep to slam into the log, which 
then collapsed onto and killed a young child.
 Members of the community apprehended Lunzi, whom they accused 
of murder. The child’s death instigated a complicated debate: Lunzi 
blamed the owner of the sheep; and the owner of the sheep accused the 
hunter, whose dogs triggered the chain of events that resulted in the 
child’s death. The three men were brought before a local court, whose 
chief was unable to reach a verdict. It was then decided that the trial 
should be moved to the king’s high court in the capital city of Mmengo. 
As the party traveled to present their case before the king, a young man, 
Kalali, asked the delegation about the nature of their journey. After the 
log cutter and dog owner narrated their respective stories, Kalali con-
cluded that all of the objects and animals in question were responsible 
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for the child’s death: “If I had to judge the case, I should take the log, 
and the sheep, and the dogs, and burn them all: they are the wizards 
who have killed the child.” Without giving Kalali much consideration, 
however, the party continued toward the court of the king, who, after 
listening to the case, was unable to “come to any fair decision.” After 
the court failed to offer “just judgment,” the king learned about Kalali, 
whose “good judgment” impressed the court.
 For his ability to “cut” the case with discernment, the king placed the 
county of Busujju under the governance of Kalali, who now judged “all 
matters concerning the princes and princesses of the land.” In Kaggwa’s 
story, Buganda’s king handed his court over to Kalali, whose arbitra-
tion mesmerized the jury. By demonstrating superior judgment, Kalali 
quickly ascended the state’s hierarchy; the kingdom’s future kings and 
princesses were placed firmly under his authority.
 Kaggwa’s story was autobiographical. By recounting nineteenth-
century folktales, he sought to demonstrate that—like Kalali—he was 
both able and willing to “cut cases” in a way that was sanctioned by 
the state’s rulers. Indeed, public discussions regarding justice and social 
order during this period were intertwined with local arguments being 
made about the institution and health of Buganda’s monarchy. In the 
early 1900s, one dictionary defined peace, mirembe, as the “duration of 
[a] king’s reign.”25 As protectors of social welfare, respectable kings were 
believed to be able adjudicators and willing to execute subjects who 
instigated instability in the state. “The king is not the one who kills,” 
suggested one proverb, “but the unjust accuser.”26 Kaggwa presented 
himself as the guardian of this conjured tradition.
 Kaggwa’s historical vision bolstered claims about justice that were 
being made by a number of Protestant chiefs. The Christian chief Jemusi 
Miti suggested that Buganda’s precolonial hierarchy was comprised of a 
complicated series of courts that were designed to facilitate an optimal 
“administration of justice to all classes.”27 The Protestant elder Batolo-
mayo Zimbe, in his comprehensive history Buganda ne Kabaka, noted 
that Buganda’s earliest kings had been divinely endowed to administer 
justice.28 The prominent chief and historian Hamu Mukasa suggested 
that the kings of Buganda were proverbially addressed, “Segulu ligamba 
enjuba tegana munyazi,” “Heaven’s word is not final, sunlight cannot 
prevent thieves.”29 This implied that while the sun effused light to ev-
eryone, rulers could not be as indiscriminate. For social order to exist, 
pernicious subjects had to be judged. The responsibility of cutting cases, 
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it was argued, now belonged to Buganda’s Protestant rulers, who, like 
Kalali, had acquired control of the state’s courts.
 Protestant intellectuals emphasized the place of executive authority 
within the practice of adjudication to legitimize control of the state’s 
courts. Protestants recalled a fictitious period when the state held ab-
solute power to administer justice. This argument was developed by 
constructing precise vocabulary. Prior to the religious wars of the 1890s, 
the Protestant missionary and linguist Reverend C. T. Wilson “began 
collecting vocabularies of words from the natives with whom [he] came 
in contact”30 and suggested that -mazima expressed “justice,”31 a phrase 
that was increasingly associated with Catholic understandings of social 
equity by the 1940s. The infinitive form of the verb “to judge” or its cog-
nate, “judgment,” by contrast, derived from msala or msangu.32 In 1899 
the translator George L. Pilkington expounded on Wilson’s entry and 
noted that Protestant interlocutors used sala ‘musango to describe the 
process of giving a verdict during a case, derived from sala, meaning to 
“cut (as with saw or knife).”33 From the early to mid-twentieth century, 
Protestant dictionaries and grammars consistently categorized “justice” 
and its derivatives as sala (o)musango.34 “Justice” accentuated the legal 
qualities of juridical execution and decisiveness, an authoritarian process 
of cutting and dividing off.35 Justice was to be decided and given by a party 
in authority,36 not negotiated. Similarly, the Protestant intellectual e. m.  K. 
mulira in 1952 defined “justice” as èby’ênsonga or èby-obutuukìrìvu;37 the 
former derived its meaning from an earlier usage of the transitive verb 
-kusonga, meaning to “prod, poke, pierce,”38 or òkugoba ensonga, to “stick 
to the point.”39 by adopting the metaphors of saws and poking irons, 
Protestants used political language that reinforced the boundaries of 
colonial jurisprudence: those with saws and prodding sticks to regulate 
justice (Protestants), and those without (Muslims and Catholics).
Catholic Interpretations of Justice (-kkaanya)
The standardization of Protestant justice resulted in the marginalization 
of Muslim and Catholic communities in Buganda. By the early 1900s, 
Catholics argued, the state’s Protestant rulers were not exhibiting justice 
in ways that were consistent with the past. It was asserted that forms of 
justice that underscored the place of negotiation were eroding. For Catho-
lic activists, inequities driven by Protestant justice were compounded by 
a disproportionate allocation of land and the practice of withholding 
government employment based on religious devotion. While Catholics 
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constituted the majority of Buganda’s early twentieth-century popula-
tion, they were apportioned only 37.4 percent of general land in Buganda, 
whereas 61.7 percent was allotted to Protestant counties.40 Administrative 
appointments and salaries were also considerably less for Catholic chiefs. 
One report suggested that whereas Catholics constituted 14 percent more 
of Buganda’s general population by 1934, they occupied 22 percent fewer 
chieftaincies, resulting in 35 percent less in salary distribution.41
 In the early twentieth century, dissenting Catholics argued that Bu-
ganda’s Protestant order created political chaos, especially in the king-
dom’s courts. Catholics asserted that Kaggwa was a purveyor of confusion 
in the state’s legislative bodies. And to critique Protestant courts, dissent-
ers authored songs that highlighted Kaggwa’s inability to adjudicate:
my friends, people confuse me,
they have that man
they call him ‘kaggwa’ (thorn)
What type of (thorn) kaggwa?
the one used to remove jiggers!42
Among Catholics, Kaggwa was called Gulemye, a phrase that Kaggwa al-
legedly used in court to describe a case that could not be easily settled.43 
One proverb asserted, “Gulemye: eyalemera e Mmengo,” “A trial unable to 
be settled: so says the one who can’t settle it at Mmengo.”44 If Kaggwa’s 
earlier folktale was largely autobiographical, in that it told the story of a 
king who turned his courts over to an allegedly competent adjudicator, 
Catholic song production now showed that Kalali (Kaggwa or Gule-
mye) was incompetent.
 Catholics praised their chief minister, Stanislas Mugwanya, by con-
trast, for his ability to arbitrate through discussion and negotiation.45 
He was compared to a proverbial rope that could be used to tie the one 
who could not oversee justice in Buganda’s capital, Kaggwa (Gulemye):
We have a man here
i don’t announce his name
i call him a strong ‘mugwa’ (rope)
the woven mugwa (rope)
Which will tie gulemye.46
Prior to the early 1900s, Catholic intellectuals concluded, difficult cases 
were solved through extensive conversations in the court. Like a long 
woven rope, hearings were purported to be lengthy and involved multiple 
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parties (or strands). By eliciting the language of long and braided plies, 
Catholics recalled a past where competing claimants discussed matters 
with chiefs who did not discriminate or rush due process. Legitimate 
forms of justice, it was stated, entailed prolonged mediation and drawn-
out conversations between various interest groups. As one Luganda 
proverb recalled, “Embozi teba nkadde,” “A conversation does not grow 
old.” Gulemye’s vision of justice was skewed precisely because it under-
cut power sharing and conversational forms of justice.
 During the interwar and postwar periods, Catholics had begun to 
employ the language of -bwenkanya to talk about social and politi-
cal justice, a gloss that starkly contrasted the general meaning of sala 
‘musango. Before the early 1940s, Catholic and Protestant publications 
indicated that -bwenkanya (-kkaanya) was not extensively used to talk 
about legal or political justice.47 It did not begin to appear extensively 
in the vernacular press until the early 1940s. Consistent with the then 
definition of -kkaanya, which meant “to discuss or to agree,” writers 
used -bwenkanya to emphasize the interactive qualities of political jus-
tice. Obwenkanya simply meant to be in “the state in which” -kkaanya 
was observable. Okukkaanya (to agree, be agreed) implied togetherness, 
and in its reflective use meant “to observe or to pay attention.”48 Earlier 
definitions interpreted -kkaanya as “recognize by careful scrutiny,”49 or 
more generally to “discuss matters or words.”50 It defined “justice” as two 
parties on equal footing coming together to discuss common concern. 
In a society governed by -bwenkanya, opposing parties were guaranteed 
equal representation, a practice politically withheld from Buganda’s 
Catholic community throughout the early to mid-twentieth century. 
The language of Catholic pluralism derived its significance from the 
discriminating character of Uganda’s peculiar religious order, not the 
stipulations of colonial law, which Catholics suggested had obstructed 
older forms of stabilization in society. Muslim historians were making 
similar arguments during this period.51
Political Theology and Classical Liberalism Reconsidered:  
The Political Imagination of Benedicto Kiwanuka
Catholic nationalists by the end of the 1950s had begun to incorporate 
the language of -bwenkanya or justice to vocalize the public agenda of 
the Democratic Party (DP), the country’s foremost Catholic movement 
throughout decolonization. The party’s motto was “Truth and Justice,” 
amazima n’obwekanya. Like other anticolonial national parties in eastern 
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Africa, the DP emerged during a period when constitutional arrange-
ments were beginning to be renegotiated within both Buganda and 
Uganda. The impact of the Kabaka Crisis of the 1950s—during which 
Buganda’s king lived in exile for two years in London—intensified these 
debates. Earlier scholars maintained that the party’s ethos was developed 
either in response to the demands of modernization and democratization 
sweeping across postwar Africa or to simply challenge the state’s Prot-
estant order. In the 1960s, for example, the American political scientist 
David Apter argued that the DP was the only organization in Uganda 
that considered questions fundamental to the nation’s political future and 
the practice of civil rights.52 Similarly, historians such as Michael Twaddle 
challenged scholars in the 1970s to think about the DP in ways that were 
not strictly driven by confessional politics.53 By contrast, Carol Summers 
has convincingly shown how Catholic individuals and communities in 
the mid-1900s adapted catechetical literature to formulate social dissent 
and organization. For Summers, the Catholic antecedents of Uganda’s 
party politics in the 1950s complicates histories that have interpreted the 
late colonial period strictly within the context of class or nationalism.54
 The recent unearthing of private papers and libraries from the period, 
including the personal papers of Benedicto Kiwanuka, now shows that 
Catholic intellectuals in the 1950s drew both from the canons of classi-
cal liberalism and Catholic theology with remarkable ease and fluidity. 
Political thinkers in late colonial Uganda did not place their texts into 
mutually exclusive registers. As Catholic dissenters articulated differ-
ent visions of social and political justice on the eve of independence, 
they coterminously used Catholic writings and the language of classical 
liberalism to rethink arguments that were already being made about 
political fairness within their communities by the late 1940s.
 Benedicto Kiwanuka (1922–1972) was the DP’s foremost activist in 
the late 1950s and Uganda’s first elected prime minister in the early 
1960s. Kiwanuka was an austere Catholic whose spiritual formation 
was shaped by the mentorship of Archbishop Joseph Kiwanuka,55 the 
first sub-Saharan African Catholic bishop to be ordained. Following his 
Catholic training in Uganda and Lesotho, Benedicto Kiwanuka studied 
law at the University of London between 1952 and 1956. Through his 
Catholic and legal training, Kiwanuka became intimately familiar with 
Catholic theology and early modern European liberalism. Kiwanuka’s 
personal library and papers include thousands of documents, annotated 
volumes, and notebooks. These sources show that Kiwanuka mined the 
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writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Oxford Tractarian John 
Henry Newman to develop a political vocabulary with which to imag-
ine social justice in late colonial Buganda.
 Shortly after assuming the presidency of the DP, Kiwanuka devoted 
several weeks toward scrutinizing Rousseau in his private study. In his 
notes on The Social Contract, which Rousseau drafted to contest in-
equitable kingship in seventeenth-century France,56 Kiwanuka noted 
that Europe’s early modern kings and landed bureaucrats “had taken 
too much power and enslaved people,” which legitimized the necessity 
of protest.57 To redress social injustice, Kiwanuka observed, Rousseau 
advocated for “liberty, equality, and universal suffrage,”58 a vision that 
resulted in Rousseau’s banishment from France.59
 Rousseau translated easily enough for Kiwanuka in Buganda’s royal-
ist politics. When he defined his “cardinal principles to observe,” he 
concluded both that “Kings should never and should be prevented, by 
force if necessary, to meddle in politics,”60 and that it is “better to get 
rid of Kings then have them who interfere with the smooth running of 
democracy.”61 As he was studying Rousseau, in October 1958, Kiwanuka 
drafted a lengthy denunciation against the kingdom’s Protestant prime 
minister (katikkiro), Mikaeri Kintu. In his letter, Kiwanuka argued that 
Buganda’s Protestant chiefs exploited their subjects through burden-
some taxation and corruption. “So that the Katikkiro may understand 
better,” began Kiwanuka, the “common people are those the Katikkiro’s 
lot mistreats day and night, making them kneel in puddles of mud to 
greet the nobility; they are the people they overtax or imprison for 
failure to pay; the ones they retrench from their jobs in favor of their 
relatives.”62 For Kiwanuka, Buganda’s kingdom had become a state 
where its citizens “were not heard,” a place where activists were “de-
tained without trial.” In Kintu’s Buganda, Protestant authority was used 
to confiscate property and exploit Catholics and Muslims, “whom you 
regard as worthless and whose tax you use in sending your own people 
for studies overseas.” Drawing from Rousseau, Kiwanuka argued that 
social justice and conversation, -kkaanya, was no longer evident in the 
kingdom’s colonial order.
 Kiwanuka began reading Newman’s seminal work, Apologia Pro Vita 
Sua, by the mid-1950s. He used Newman’s theology and social com-
mentary to develop political essays throughout the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Kiwanuka’s existing copy of Apologia contains extensive under-
scored sections and annotations, which cannot be fully explored here. 
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Following the election of 1962, during which the patriotic party Kabaka 
Yekka (KY) (the King Only party) and Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s 
Congress (UPC) developed a coalition that prevented the DP from con-
trolling Uganda’s postcolonial government, Kiwanuka drafted a 37,000-
word analysis of the election. The piece argued that the KY/UPC alliance 
was organized to prevent Catholics from controlling national politics. In 
Apologia, Newman had contended that Anglican communities in the 
nineteenth century had failed to demonstrate courage and “openness,” or 
a willingness to discuss social discontent in the state.63 Borrowing from 
Newman, Kiwanuka now asked his Protestant and Catholic colleagues 
to question the extent to which the recently appointed government 
would continue to obstruct social equity because of religious loyalties. 
Like Newman, Kiwanuka argued that political equality was predicated 
on one’s “openness” to God’s redemptive purposes on earth. By failing 
to engage in discursive forms of justice, Uganda’s Protestant rulers were 
violating God’s intended order. Drawing from Newman, who is directly 
cited in the inquiry, Kiwanuka invited his Anglican colleagues to practice 
inclusive and “open” politics: “But now where is this openness? Where is 
consistency in policy? Where is truth in ordinary dealings? . . . If we are 
to have democracy, let us have it in full.”64
 Kiwanuka’s textual practices show that late colonial intellectuals used 
multiple genres of colonial literacy to imagine different types of justice. 
Kiwanuka comfortably drew from both Catholic sources and secular 
political theory, but in ways that were largely consistent with a particu-
lar articulation of justice in Buganda’s colonial society. The relationship 
between justice and authority and the connection between justice and 
conversational forms of governance were central to these debates. Activ-
ists such as Kiwanuka argued that executive forms of justice—embod-
ied in the politics of two of the state’s foremost Protestants, Katikkiro 
Kintu and Prime Minister Obote—resulted in the marginalization of 
the kingdom’s largest religious demographic (Catholics). Through the 
processes of textual exegesis, Kiwanuka expounded on a different con-
ception of justice than his rival Protestants, the etymology of which 
emphasized inclusivity and the leveling of power.
Justice in Postcolonial Uganda
The intellectual history of justice in colonial Buganda is important 
because it shows that international conceptions of justice and colonial 
knowledge were malleable in modern eastern Africa and easily reworked 
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to suit local arguments. Where previous scholarship on justice in both 
Africa and Uganda has tended to emphasize the categories of classical 
liberalism or Catholic theology, often at the exclusion of each other, 
this study shows that intellectuals such as Kiwanuka recast disciplinary 
classifications and textual arenas by borrowing from both to engage in 
broader vernacular conversations and the larger work of local knowl-
edge production.
 Throughout the late twentieth century, more broadly, justice remained 
a highly contentious ideal in central Uganda, used by competing activ-
ists to reinforce and reconstitute different types of political authority. 
During the period of Uganda’s postcolonial tumult—which included 
the constitutional abrogation of the state’s precolonial kingdoms—state 
builders, military presidents, and rural patriots continued to debate the 
production of politically sustainable, inclusive definitions of justice. 
Today, in the early twenty-first century, international discourses con-
cerning institutional and social justice in Uganda have been shaped 
by three contingencies. First, the history of instability and transitional 
justice in northern Uganda in the late 1980s and 1990s has resulted in 
an extensive body of political science literature.65 Second, the influence 
of Al-Shabaab throughout eastern Africa—including the World Cup 
bombings in Kampala and the role of Uganda’s military in Somalia—
has raised larger questions about securitization in the region.66 Last, 
international human rights activists and evangelical organizations have 
built on American and European sensibilities to evaluate Uganda’s 
controversial antihomosexual legislation, often overlooking vernacular 
historiographies and local knowledge production.67 In each of these 
fields, however, scholars of political science, activists, and policymak-
ers have yet to recognize the continuities that exist between current, 
local frameworks and older practices of colonial jurisprudence: a pe-
riod during which European governments and imperial architects were 
compelled to assert and regulate internationally recognizable forms of 
justice among ostensibly “backward” or “traditional” societies. The con-
tinuities between European arguments during the colonial period and, 
again, European and American arguments concerning human rights 
in the contemporary period are remarkably similar. Both are funda-
mentally preoccupied with the task of social and moral engineering or 
legislation. But as this chapter has shown, local debates about justice 
in southern Uganda constituted a dynamic moral economy throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And if the international and 
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academic question of (in)justice in contemporary Uganda—or Africa in 
general—is to move beyond its current Eurocentric foci, it must begin 
with policymakers and scholars interrogating local historiographies and 
vernacular landscapes.
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Legal Pluralism and the Pursuit of a Just Life
Muslim Views on Law and Justice in East Africa
f e l i c i t a s  b e c k e r
A S  D I S C U S S E D  I N  T h E  I N T R O D U C T I O N  T O  T h I S  v O L U M E ,  T h E R E  h A S 
been trenchant criticism of “rights-based” development agendas in Africa. 
Harri Englund, in particular, has shown that the practice of rights-based 
NGOs can easily undermine what they preach, and that their constant 
invocation of rights risks gaining very little traction in the lives of the 
poor.1 The notion of universal equal rights, in other words, can be ir-
relevant or even counterproductive in contexts where different sorts of 
people are routinely assumed to have, and do in fact enjoy, different sets of 
entitlements and needs. Another metacriticism of the concept of human 
rights comes from historians, such as Lynn Hunt, who have examined 
their contingent, and from the outset conflicted, evolution in Europe.2
 By contrast, the notion of “justice” would seem to have the advantage 
of accommodating the notion of different rights and needs for differ-
ent people. Its examination forms part of the fraught and complicated 
search for concepts around which to mobilize poor African communi-
ties for their own interests, whose antecedents stretch back to debates 
about, for instance, empowerment and participation.3 Unlike “rights,” 
“justice” suggests everyone being given their “just” due, even if that may 
be quite different for different people. This greater flexibility, and the 
greater ease of finding emic language equivalents for the term “justice” 
in the Chichewa context, animate Jessica Johnson’s interest in the 
term.4 This paper adds to the examination of the notion of justice in 
52
Felicitas Becker
a different linguistic context: that of Tanzanian, and especially Muslim 
Tanzanian, Swahili speakers.
 For better or worse, my findings suggest that it would be hard to 
make the term “justice” serviceable as a more flexible and more emic 
alternative to rights-based rhetoric in Swahili-language political dis-
course. The linguistic field in which both terms participate is quite 
crowded but does not contain a term with a meaning closely aligned 
with the English “justice.” Ironically, the term most online dictionaries 
give for justice in Swahili is haki, which more commonly is translated as 
“right” (as in haki ya kwenda shuleni, “the right to attend school,” or haki 
za binadamu, “human rights”). Unlike the English counterpart, the term 
does not overlap with “[factually] correct,” though it shades into “righ-
teous” in the adjectival construction wa haki, “of right.” This does not 
mean that notions of justice are absent, of course. But different aspects 
of the meaning of the English term are distributed among different 
terms, and the notions of “right” and “justice” are difficult to separate 
out. Moreover, these meanings are positioned unstably in contexts of 
shifting, and at times very adversarial, political rhetoric.5
 I hope to show that besides the wide use of the term haki, the notion 
most closely equivalent to “justice” is often rendered through usawa, 
literally “equality,” and its derivations. But at the present moment (un-
like the period around independence), this is more often understood 
as a relationship between communities—in particular, the Muslim and 
Christian communities—than between individuals. Meanwhile uadilifu, 
a term that actually is typically translated as “justice,” can be used to 
describe relationships between individuals but is at least as likely to refer 
to justice as a quality inherent in individuals who respect and practice 
divine commandment. It denotes the quality of the just man or woman, 
someone who seeks to live righteously in the eyes of God. Arguably, 
these slippages in the notion of justice are part of the reason why Mus-
lims’ widespread sense of being unjustly treated as a community does 
not (urban Zanzibar aside) lead to a more pervasively confrontational 
style of activism. If the pursuit of justice in society at large is blocked, at 
least Muslims can pursue justice in the way they live among themselves.
 This chapter proceeds by first examining a handful of Swahili terms 
that approximate the English “justice,” showing the different topography 
of the Swahili linguistic field as compared with its English analogue. I 
then examine the political and social uses of haki (rights), usawa (equal-
ity), and uadilifu (the virtue known as justice) in greater detail, seeking 
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to show how they reflect the grievances and ambitions of Tanzanian 
Muslims. The material used includes newspapers, interviews about the 
history and current state of the Muslim community in Tanzania, and a 
close examination of claims about justice in Swahili-language sermons 
by Muslim preachers. The conclusion reflects on the implications of the 
findings for understanding the uneasy yet fairly stable coexistence of 
religious communities in Tanzania. It also relates them to the aim of 
making rights-based agendas more relevant and effective. It suggests 
that more important than the precise term used may be the way in 
which it is arrived at and deployed.
Looking for Justice in Contemporary Swahili Vocabulary
The term “justice” is surprisingly hard to find in Swahili-language public 
discourse. This is partly because invocations of development, maende-
leo, and of the political and juridical terminology of donor-instigated 
reform, remain dominant in government pronouncements and jour-
nalistic commentary: terms like democracy (demokrasi), the free market 
(soko huria), and anticorruption initiatives (kuzuia rushwa).6 The closest 
analogue to justice in this discourse is haki, which literally means “right” 
or “entitlement.” Related terms and slogans are widespread: haki za bi-
nadamu are human rights; haki ya kupata elimu is the right to education.
 One case where haki literally denoted justice was in an anticorruption 
slogan very widespread in the form of wall posters in the 2000s: rushwa 
ni adui ya haki, “corruption is the enemy of justice (or right, or the rule 
of law).” In this case, the distinction between rights and justice is hard to 
maintain. This is also true of what is probably the most widespread use 
of the term haki in colloquial language: as part of the expression haki ya 
Mungu, meaning “God’s right,” or indeed “God’s justice.” It is used to 
express emphasis, similar to an English speaker exclaiming “for God’s 
sake,” and it can be used in the most mundane of contexts, such as when 
telling off a child or arguing in the market.
 This failure of terms to translate easily is only to be expected. After 
all, in English too, the linguistic field comprising the terms “justice” and 
“rights” is complex. Besides the (more or less) legally enforceable rights 
we hold through the “laws of the land,” there are many rights we con-
sider ourselves to hold by dint of what in colonial Africa would have been 
called “custom”: for instance, not to be cheated on by a romantic partner, 
or to be included in our friends’ gossip circuits. As for “justice,” the term 
denotes very different things when we talk about “the justice system,” on 
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the one hand, and, say, “divine justice,” on the other. Slipperiness, in other 
words, is normal for such complex terms, and it bears the traces of history: 
we talk about “the justice system” because of the way judicial and penal 
institutions have coalesced over centuries into what we now call a system.7
 To be clear, debates on justice in Swahili are not isolated from 
English-language ones. In part, they reflect the influence of attempts 
to “bring to justice” perpetrators in the continent’s many conflicts. At-
tempts to pursue justice in a way that does not deepen the social divides 
that resulted in injustice, in the spirit of South Africa’s Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission, are carefully noted, with Burundi and Rwanda 
next door.8 Moreover, drawing on the spirit of South African activist 
approaches to law and community justice, some nongovernmental or-
ganizations in Tanzania explicitly seek to both use and critique existing 
law in order to achieve aims of fairness and justice. Their names make 
this aim clear enough: hakiardhi, “right-land,” is one of them, another 
is hakielimu, “right-education.” With some international financing and 
support from critical intellectuals, such as the indefatigable Issa Shivji, 
hakiardhi has accompanied recent reforms in land law in Tanzania with 
critical commentary.9 Hakielimu similarly seeks to uphold the right of 
children to education whatever their circumstances, opposing, in par-
ticular, the ban on pregnant girls from continuing their education.
 Even more, though, debates on justice draw on the lively popular 
political rhetoric decrying the decline of virtue in the political class. 
This rhetoric, found in conversations with taxi drivers as well as in po-
litical weeklies, also has international antecedents in donors’ concerns 
with “good governance,” but it does not depend on them. It turns above 
all on condemning selfishness: leaders are accused of “thinking only 
of themselves,” of wanting “to eat by themselves” and not with others. 
The implicit positive contrast, often elaborated with reference to Julius 
Nyerere, is with leaders who show qualities such as huruma, literally 
“compassion” but perhaps here better translated as “solidarity,” and up-
endo, or “(brotherly) love.”10
 This popular critical discourse also draws on another term, whose 
meaning straddles the legal and moral aspects of “justice” as used by 
English-language campaigners: usawa, or “equality.” It combines the 
meanings of “individual rights inhering in a person” and “justice as a 
matter of relations between people.” Since the 1990s, the term’s great-
est currency in Tanzanian politics has been as part of the slogan haki 
sawa kwa wote, “equal rights for all,” the motto of the opposition party 
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known as Civic United Front or CUF. As I elaborate below, despite its 
universalist ring reminiscent of Western rights rhetoric, this slogan is 
typically heard as a protest against unequal relations between communi-
ties: Zanzibar islanders versus mainlanders, Muslims versus Christians.
 But the notion of usawa has a long pedigree in postcolonial Tan-
zanian political discourse, which positions it closer to the rhetoric of 
universal individual rights that it evokes in Europe (“freedom, equality, 
fraternity”). Almost everyone from the “independence generation” in 
Tanzania can quote one of Julius Nyerere’s most insistent slogans from 
when he led Tanzania’s independence campaign: watu wote sawa, “all 
people are equal.”11 As we know from recent studies of the evolution of 
Nyerere’s thought, this claim had many meanings for him; one of his 
concerns was the inequality in workload between women and men that 
he had witnessed growing up.12
 In the context of the independence campaign, though, it denoted, 
in the first place, the equality between Tanzanian Africans and their 
colonial rulers: as the former were the equals of the latter, the latter 
had no business limiting their political rights. As the equals of Euro-
peans, Africans were capable of governing themselves. That said, differ-
ent Tanzanians already heard the words quite differently by that point. 
Among interview respondents, Shehan Zaina, descendant of a slave-
owning family and, by his own understanding, an aristocrat, recalled the 
words with contempt: they had undercut his claim to heshima, honor 
or elevated status.13 Down the road from his home in Lindi town, in 
Mingoyo, where many people have slave ancestry, Rajabu Feruzi Ismaili 
remembered the phrase fondly, precisely for this reason: it attributed 
equal claims to heshima to everyone.14
 It is likely that CUF’s call for haki sawa kwa wote resonates in Tanzania 
partly because of this history of the notion of usawa. It was mediated dif-
ferently, though, in Zanzibar, CUF’s place of origin: Nyerere mattered a lot 
less here until the unification of Zanzibar with Tanganyika in 1964 (and 
afterward he mattered in a much more negative way).15 Instead, it was 
secular nationalists with socialist sympathies, inspired partly by the Arab 
nationalism of the era, who propagated the term.16 As Jonathon Glassman 
has shown, rhetoric around equality was, in independence-era Zanzibar, 
closely tied to the politics of competing ethnic nationalisms and, in 1964, 
the violence of the revolution.17 Although he treads carefully around this 
issue, Islam, too, was implicated in these contestations. Claims to superior 
religious knowledge underpinned Arabs’ assertions of status.18
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 In this manner, the term usawa is tangled up in the history of social 
inequality within a postslavery society and its constant renegotiation 
throughout the twentieth century. It resonates with the ethnic, religious, 
and ritual distinctions through which these negotiations were worked 
out. Its universalist, emancipatory appeal was not therefore absent; 
Nyerere elaborated it at length and to great effect. But in his discourse, 
too, the invocation of equality, elaborated into communalism, could 
acquire overtones of threat. As James Brennan has shown, Indians in 
Nyerere’s Tanzania faced constant intimations that they were trying to 
be “more equal than others,” refusing to pitch in and become part of the 
nation.19 The important point to take away from this discussion is that 
the meaning of usawa very much depends on context and is as likely to 
be divisive as connective. Similar considerations apply to related terms. 
The next section further considers them in the contemporary socio-
political context.
Irreconcilable Demands for Justice  
in Contemporary Tanzanian Political Rhetoric
The reemergence of the notion of usawa in CUF’s slogan haki sawa kwa 
wote is tied to the postrevolutionary evolution of the communal politics 
of status. When supporters of CUF were being chased back and forth 
on Kilwa Kivinje’s waterfront by police in 2000, one observer com-
mented that CUF “wanted to bring back the Arabs.” He was referring 
to the period of Arab planters’ dominance in the Kilwa region in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, a period of intense inequality 
based on slave versus free status, urban versus rural culture, skin color 
and race.20 In other words, he heard their call for equal rights for all as a 
call for the reinstatement of Arab privilege.
 Similar views can be found in comment threads for articles in the 
Swahili political weekly Raia Mwema (“The Good Citizen”) that call 
for the renegotiation of the union between Zanzibar and mainland 
Tanzania on a more equal footing.21 Raia Mwema’s main commentator 
on this issue is Ahmed Rajab, a political journalist and activist who has 
been following Zanzibari politics from British exile for many years.22 
He argues for the pursuit of constitutional reform by introducing a third 
separate government to the political structure, so as to make the union 
government separate from the mainland and islands regional governments 
(currently, the mainland government is also the union government, with 
the Zanzibari government’s authority limited to the isles).23
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 How loaded this topic is with long-standing ideas of cultural in-
equality can be gauged from the reactions to an article that Ahmed 
Rajab published on May 30, 2012. Entitled “Patriotism and the Way 
to Save Oneself,” it seems innocuous enough: it sets aside Zanzibar’s 
troubles and, after deploring the parlous state of African politics and 
economies and the venality of the continent’s leaders, calls on patriots 
across the continent to unite with those in the diaspora to come up 
with a plan to realize Africa’s great economic potential. The views ex-
pressed, in other words, are fairly conventional, close to the analyses of 
World Bank officials, political scientists, and journalists that lay Africa’s 
problems at the doors above all of its politicians.24 Nevertheless, the 
comments below the article refer back to the author’s association with 
a Zanzibari political agenda perceived by many as separatist (or, as the 
comments reveal, worse).
 One comment addressed to the author states, “After burning churches 
in Zanzibar, you show off here (unajidai kuvunga) with news from 
Zambia [which the article cited as an example of anticorruption mea-
sures]. Go on bringing us news of uamsho [the most radical wing of 
Zanzibar’s separatist movement, closely aligned with political Islam] 
and of your terrorism. I don’t know why the editor goes on giving space 
to [literally kufuga, keep or breed] terrorists like you.” This comment 
provoked a response from yet another reader, entitled “Makonde”; the 
name of a mainland Tanzanian ethnic group that Glassman found as-
sociated with mainland “backwardness” in 1950s Zanzibar. It reads, “You 
show stupidity, ignorance and a lack of civilization. You are still in the 
age of the wilderness and your thought is weak. I don’t know if you 
participate in skinning people and cutting off the limbs of albinos [both 
references to acts of witchcraft that occurred recently in mainland Tan-
zania]. Teach yourself civilized ways, or come to Zanzibar to be cooked 
[apparently a reference to supposed mainland rumors about cannibalism 
in the islands].”
 In different ways, both these commentaries draw on widespread 
tropes, albeit of very different provenance: the current discourse of the 
association of Islam with terrorism on the one hand, and on the other, 
notions of mainland backwardness versus island civilization that predate 
colonialism, became intensely virulent in the late colonial period, and, 
as the example shows, continue to be toxic. Under the cover of online 
anonymity, these two commentators, in their mutual vilification, show 
the persistence and transformation of strongly hostile and defamatory 
58
Felicitas Becker
clichés about mainlanders, on the one hand, and islanders, on the other 
(unlike an earlier period, the cliché about the islander no longer associ-
ates him with the age of slavery but rather with that of “Islamic” terror).
 These are the tensions that surround CUF’s demand for usawa. 
Some commentators see the island as having lost its sovereign rights 
and sacrificed its economic interests to the union with the mainland.25 
For them, usawa denotes the restitution of economic and political status 
to indigenous (“true” or “real”) Zanzibaris, even if that means taking 
assets or rights, such as property in Zanzibar town and jobs in the tour-
ism industry, away from recent immigrants from the mainland.26 Owing 
to the CUF’s political maneuvering since entering a unity government 
with the postrevolutionary ruling party, it is no longer the undisputed 
political home of this faction. On the other hand, Zanzibaris who sup-
port the postrevolutionary ruling party will cite its land distribution 
program (ekari tatu, “three acres”) as a sign of its commitment to equal-
ity, whereas recent immigrants hear calls for a restitution of indigenous 
islanders’ rights as a threat to their own equal status.27
 Similarly irreconcilable positions can be found in mainland Tanza-
nia surrounding the issue of mahakama ya kadhi, “Kadhis’ courts,” that 
is, courts that apply Islamic law. Such courts existed in Zanzibar until 
the revolution; they dominated the Zanzibari justice system, as well as 
that of those parts of the Kenyan mainland that retained political ties 
with Zanzibar.28 The British administration of Tanganyika (mainland 
Tanzania) also experimented with them but ultimately let the office of 
the kadhi, the judge applying Islamic law, lapse. Settlements of divorces 
and inheritances under Islamic law could and can nevertheless be ob-
tained from a shehe or sheikh. According to Tanzania’s system of legal 
pluralism, sheikhs (like Christian pastors) can contract legally binding 
marriages.29 But if a plaintiff in a divorce or inheritance case is unhappy 
with a settlement reached by a sheikh, he or she can challenge it in 
the secular “government” court, which may agree to apply a different, 
areligious set of rules.30
 Muslim critics, including representatives of the government-founded 
Central Council of Tanzanian Muslims (Baraza Kuu ya Waislamu Tan-
zania, or Bakwata), deplore this situation as marginalizing Islamic law. 
For some years now, they have run a campaign for the introduction 
of official Kadhis’ Courts to apply a version of Islamic law (sharia ya 
Kiislamu) to personal status (divorce, marriage, and inheritance) cases 
involving Muslim parties, with judgments as binding as those of secular 
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“government” courts.31 They view this aim as part of an agenda to uplift 
and emancipate Muslims—in a sense, to restore justice to a Muslim 
community that has long felt its educational and political disadvantages, 
compared to Christians, strongly. Muslims have lagged behind Chris-
tians in secondary and higher education since the colonial period and 
are consequently underrepresented in the levels of administration and 
government that draw on graduates. A subset of Muslim activists has 
elaborated a narrative of Christian conspiracy and Muslim marginaliza-
tion around this undeniable fact.32
 Much of the opposition to this project, meanwhile, has come from 
Christian groups who, in their turn, view the project of introducing Ka-
dhis’ Courts as unjust. Initially, their objection was to the fact that, if such 
courts were made part of the government-run justice system, they would 
also receive government funding. This, they argued, would bestow an 
unjust privilege on Muslims, as there would be no equivalent Christian 
courts. Why should the government fund dispute settlement for only 
one of its religious constituencies? More recently, activist Christian lead-
ers have also vociferously opposed a compromise proposal for a law that 
would have permitted Muslim organizations to run their own Kadhis’ 
Courts, with their use not obligatory even for confessing Muslims. Even 
so, the proposal’s Christian opponents held that legislating such courts 
would break the government’s commitment to secularism.33 Muslim 
activists, then, think it is unjust that they cannot enforce their religious 
laws through government-endorsed Kadhis’ Courts; their Christian op-
ponents argue that it would be unjust for the government to fund, ad-
minister, or even just endorse courts for the exclusive use of one religious 
constituency. It is hard to see a way these two perspectives could meet.
 Overall, then, it is evident that the notions of justice at play here are 
polyvalent and polysemous. They are closely tied to both long-term and 
recent social and political history and involved in ongoing political con-
testation. In particular, there is tension here between notions of justice 
focused on the ability of Muslims to apply religious laws and a secular 
political tradition that holds that the state should “justly” refrain from 
endorsing any religious tradition. Both claims are more problematic than 
is immediately apparent. Christian activists’ insistence on official reli-
gious neutrality elides the fact that Christian churches regularly consult 
and cooperate with the government.34 On the other hand, Muslim de-
mands for Islamic courts elide the thorny question of who gets to define 
and interpret what passes as the authoritative version of Islamic law.35
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 Notions of justice do not, therefore, easily provide a common ground 
on which different marginalized groups could meet to construct shared 
claims on the polity they inhabit. At the same time, though, these no-
tions do not exhaust themselves in adversarial political activism. They 
interact with ongoing conversations on how to live rightly and well 
under the difficult conditions of contemporary Tanzania, which are 
sometimes contained within, and sometimes cross the boundaries of, 
the different activist constituencies. I will explore this further by exam-
ining notions of justice as they appear in Swahili Muslim sermons.
Law and Justice in Contemporary Muslim Preaching
As sermons are by their nature exhortations, they provide predominantly 
normative statements: “oughts” that do not necessarily describe the “is.” 
Where they purport to describe the “is,” moreover, they tend toward the 
polemical. Nevertheless, because of their more overtly programmatic, 
activist, and political nature, these statements offer insights into the 
horizon of possibilities within which individuals operate and into the 
concerns and constraints that cause that horizon to change. Combined 
with interviews, they provide at least a glimpse into the compromises 
made when seeking to square the many “oughts” with the “ises” of indi-
vidual lives.
 Let me first explain the nature of the recorded sources further. Mus-
lim “preachers” perform at Friday prayers at mosques, or more often at 
mihadhara, religious-educational public gatherings. They have become 
increasingly common in recent years in the Swahili-speaking world 
and are documented on widely traded tapes and (increasingly) DVDs. 
The DVDs used here were recorded and acquired in locations in Kenya 
and Tanzania and, as far as they can be dated, document the last two 
decades. Increasingly, the material from these DVDs is also available, 
often in better quality, via YouTube. In addition to listening to these 
recordings, I have also conducted informal discussions with their pur-
veyors and users. For practical reasons, I have relied on three Tanzanian 
research assistants, all of them themselves Muslim, for the conduct of 
more extensive interviews in 2012 and 2014.36
 The popularity of recorded sermons among Tanzanian Muslims 
forms part of a wider trend in Muslim-majority countries.37 There are 
dozens of different preachers now available on tape, DVD, and YouTube, 
and they differ greatly in their personal habitus, style of delivery, themes 
addressed, ways of reasoning, and level of erudition. Nevertheless, there 
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is a relatively small number of speakers who are the most commonly 
traded and whose names were by far the most likely to be mentioned 
by interviewees when asked about their preferences. Even this handful, 
though, differ greatly among themselves. To bring out the variety, it is 
helpful to give short characterizations of the most prominent ones.
 First, Nassor Bachu, who died in 2013, is rarely mentioned by ordi-
nary sermon listeners but was a major influence on the development 
of reformist preaching and sermon recording in Zanzibar. He was 
traded on tape well before DVDs became available. YouTube record-
ings show a very self-possessed, calm, and erudite speaker, sitting 
down, handling books, and explaining, not haranguing. His closest 
and best-known disciple in Zanzibar, by contrast, Sheikh Msellem, 
has moved on from preaching to political activism and speech making. 
The de facto leader of the network of preachers known as uamsho who 
campaign for Zanzibari independence, he was imprisoned at the time 
of writing on charges of inciting violence in the aftermath of street 
violence in Zanzibar that was partly fueled by rumors of extrajudicial 
abductions of preachers like him.
 Another influential disciple of Bachu is Nuruddin Kishk, who oper-
ates out of a complex offering various religious and educational services 
in Dar es Salaam and combines rigid moral stances with abstinence 
from political questions. A competitor of sorts to Bachu’s network is 
the Mombasa-trained Othman Maalim, who operates out of a private-
sponsored mosque in Zanzibar and has a reputation as a “government-
friendly” sheikh in Zanzibar’s polarized politics. The most recent arrival 
on this scene is Hassan Hussein Nyundo. Like Maalim he is an individ-
ual actor, not connected to Bachu’s network or uamsho. The polar oppo-
site to Bachu and highly polarizing, he performs in trousers and combat 
vest and has a reputation for chiding women. To some reform-minded 
Muslims, he is an embarrassment because of these idiosyncrasies and 
his lack of a traceable educational pedigree. His judgmental stances 
notwithstanding, Nyundo is popular with a fair few female listeners, for 
reasons that will become clearer below.
 The diversity of the speakers notwithstanding, the sermons are, by and 
large, united in their rejection of universally equal legal entitlements for 
all. In particular, they insist on the differences in rights and obligations 
between men and women. Concomitantly, they also present highly criti-
cal views on the kind of human rights discourse common among donors, 
development organizations, and the Tanzanian political establishment. 
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A common trope in this context is to oppose “man-made” (Western) and 
“divine” (Muslim) law and insist on the primacy of the latter.
 This dichotomy permeates, for example, the sermon that Hassan 
Nyundo gave to an audience of women, entitled “the three things that 
send women to hell.” With some venom, he quotes what he says is a 
common complaint of women: tunanyimwa haki zetu! “we are deprived 
of our rights!” Though the phrase echoes the kind of criticism made by 
rights NGOs, he refers to women making this claim during domestic 
disputes, such as when a husband is impatient or critical about his wife’s 
cooking, or demands she account more carefully for time spent outside 
the home. By the standards of Islamic law, Nyundo insists, it is men, 
not women, who are deprived of their rights by wives failing to live up 
to their marital obligations. Notwithstanding their many differences, 
Nassor Bachu, too, used a sermon on the marital rights of wives and 
husbands to criticize the 1995 Beijing meeting and convention on the 
rights of women along similar lines.
 In a context of lively debate about the meaning of the much-repeated 
official claim that serikali haina dini, “the government has no religion” 
(as the state’s secularism is typically paraphrased), this positioning of 
divinely sanctioned rules as marginalized by a hubristic this-worldly 
government is unsurprising. Nevertheless, it is equally unsurprising that 
defenders of the secular order and of women’s rights are disconcerted 
by, for example, Nyundo’s pronouncements.38 This is not only because 
they challenge the established legal order. They also appear to presup-
pose a thoroughly rigid, inflexible, and unforgiving understanding of 
Islamic legal rules, as well as an absolute clarity about the way they 
apply in complicated everyday situations that the salience of marital dis-
putes in religious courts throughout the Muslim world clearly gives the 
lie to.39 For these reasons, and because of their insistence on women’s 
legal subordination, they are difficult to engage with for proponents of 
“grassroots justice” approaches.
 At close sight, though, this rigid legalism is not the only thing going 
on in the sermons, even Nyundo’s. A recurrent theme in Bachu’s above-
mentioned sermon is how forgiving God is, and how much husbands 
are called on to be forgiving of their wives. Moreover, preachers often 
emphasize that the divine commandments, far from random, are in 
tune with human needs and characteristics. It is said, for instance, that 
men need more wives than wives husbands because they have stronger 
sexual urges. The sermons also have much to say on human fallibility; on 
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how difficult it is for people to live by the law—to live just lives. When 
such passages are taken into account, the sermons present a much more 
complex perspective on the issue of justice in human relationships than 
merely deploring secular meddling with a rigidly defined divine order.
 These issues can be traced in one of very few recordings to have the 
term uadilifu (justice as a virtue) in its title, which is also, among hun-
dreds I have seen, the only one with a woman speaker. Its full title is 
given as ujumbe kwa wanawake kukubali uke wenza na uadilifu, “message 
to women to accept polygyny and justice.” The speaker’s name is given 
as Bi Fatma; the location as Madrasa-tul Mtoni (Madrasa by the River), 
in Zanzibar town. Since I bought my first copy in 2003, it is at least 
fifteen years old. The fact that I was able to obtain another copy in 2010 
and the recording was uploaded to YouTube in December 2012 suggests 
that it has retained some currency for more than a decade after it was 
made. By October 2015, the video had been viewed over twenty-five 
thousand times.
 The awkward ring of the English translation of the title (“accept 
polygyny and justice”) is a reminder that uadilifu does not map neatly 
onto the English term “justice.” The root in the word is adili, typically 
heard in the plural maadili, meaning, approximately, “virtue,” especially 
“religious virtue.” Neither term is heard much, although there is a ser-
mon discussing maadili kupotea, “the decline [literally the “getting lost”] 
of religious virtue.” Similar constructions with the -fu at the end, which 
denotes a state in a person or object closely related to the meaning of 
the main root, include mtiifu, meaning “obedient” and deriving from 
kutii, “to heed, obey,” and a much more common word, ukosefu, meaning 
“lack, absence” and deriving from kukosa, “to lack, be absent.”
 Further consideration of Bi Fatma’s discourse indicates what uadilifu 
is doing in its title. She elaborates a vision of polygynous marriage 
where all parties involved are given and do their due; not only the hus-
band and each individual wife, but also the wives among themselves, 
and their friends and family. Uadilifu, the sermon suggests, is very much 
a relational thing, practiced between people—in this sense, Bi Fatma’s 
perspective aligns well with that on justice that Johnson has identified 
among Malawian Chichewa speakers. But by doing one’s duty, one also 
shows maadili, religious virtue, and becomes a “just” person: justice is 
about the individual’s relationship to God as much as to others.
 Living justly in this sense is in no way exhausted by sticking to the 
law, but the law provides a framework for it. Thus Bi Fatma stresses 
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that a polygynous marriage is set up by a contract between one woman 
and one man, not a man and a group of women: each wife contracts 
her marriage separately; each one of them, as an individual, has her 
attributed rights and obligations. As mentioned above, moreover, she 
describes polygynous marriage as in keeping with what a Western tradi-
tion would call “the law of nature”: men are different from women in 
that they have greater sexual urges; therefore marriage is different for 
them.40
 Much of the sermon, though, is taken up with discussing the dif-
ficulty of polygynous marriage, from the point of view of the women 
involved. Early on, Bi Fatma observes that many women who take their 
religious commitments seriously have told her that they nevertheless 
find the prospect of acquiring a cowife heartbreaking. She explores the 
widespread dysfunction in relations between cowives from many angles. 
As she puts it, “many people think that polygyny means enmity [among 
the wives; uke wenza ni uadui] but it is not that, polygyny is what the 
prophet (blessed be he) ordained, and nothing else.”
 With this sentence, Bi Fatma follows the common rhetorical pattern 
of opposing divinely ordained law to the human tendency to diverge 
from it. But it is set in the context of an extended discussion of the 
things cowives do to each other, and the way husbands do not help 
matters. The most common thing to go wrong among wives is what 
Bi Fatma calls kusengenya: talking badly about somebody behind their 
back. But no less a problem is the lack of cooperation between wives. In 
particular, they should pool their labor in looking after their husband’s 
children. But instead, you often find that a woman will entrust her child 
to a neighbor, friend, or relative before turning to her cowife.
 Men, Bi Fatma avers, increase tension between cowives by kusengenya, 
gossiping, about one wife with another. Here, Bi Fatma cites prophetic 
example: once when his favorite wife, Aisha, had prepared food for him 
and his guest, it ended up on the floor because of a miscommunication 
between her and her servant. The prophet picked it up and served it 
to his guests, keeping the mishap quiet. Today’s husbands, by contrast, 
would go off and serve up the whole story to another wife, feeding it 
into all the gossip circuits. Husbands, like wives, should learn to keep 
the siri za nyumbani, the secrets of the home.
 Men, moreover, are at fault for marrying without proper warning 
to existing wives, and by marrying their wives’ household helps. These 
women’s intimate knowledge of the longer-standing wife’s ways, and 
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their transition out of subordinate status, are bound to be galling for 
first wives. She warns women against leaving small, friendly, intimate 
tasks, such as the pouring of uji, gruel, or the fetching of sandals, to 
their household helps: it is by carrying out these tasks that they win the 
husband’s heart, for men wamepambiwa kupenda wanawake, have been 
created to love women. In this passage, Bi Fatma appears to come close 
to advising wives on how to avoid acquiring cowives. Loving attention 
is the way to keep a husband’s heart.
 Concomitantly, one of only two occasions when the term uadilifu 
actually appears in the text is the sentence tusiwe nyuma kuwafanyia 
mapenzi na uadilifu, which translates as “let us not be remiss in mak-
ing love and [doing] justice to them [our husbands].” “Make love” here 
stands for “treat lovingly,” as in the old-fashioned English usage of the 
term to denote courtship. But the phrase vividly evokes how closely a 
Godly, just way of life is tied up, in this account, with the intimate yet 
mundane details of married life—with things like fetching shoes.
 The second occasion where the term uadilifu occurs, in turn, high-
lights how closely respect for the provisions of the law is tied up with 
just living. Delivered as part of a discussion of women’s anger at their 
husbands’ further marriage and envy of single wives, it reads,
Ramadhan is coming and we are not ready for it, we go about . . . 
bad-mouthing people, especially bad-mouthing cowives. Muslims, 
it is necessary for us to practice justice (uadilifu) also in this law/
right [haki, of the husband to take another wife]. This is everyone’s 
right. . . . If a woman finds herself [amepatwa na, a term most 
commonly heard of contracting an illness] in polygyny, well, this 
is within rights, . . . for don’t come along and observe a fellow wife 
who has no cowife, you cannot know, there is no mind that can 
know what [desire or decision] will befall him [the husband] . . . 
and it is everyone’s right. If it has been ordained that this matter 
[the desire for another wife] befall him, well, it will befall him, and 
there is no way to avoid it (lit. no ujanja, cleverness).41
This passage is interesting in several ways, not least how it calls on 
women to practice self-control in the face of the apparently uncontrol-
lable moods that may induce a husband to marry again. In its insistence 
that contracting extra marriages is every man’s right, it also disregards 
those stipulations in Islamic marriage law that, based on a passage from 
the Quran, insist that a man limit himself to the number of wives he 
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can properly support.42 But it also implies a close identification of just 
living with both respect for the law and respect for one’s neighbors and 
cowives: all those people one might be tempted to gossip about.
 It may appear at this stage that translating uadilifu as justice is simply 
misleading. But Nassor Bachu uses the term when calling on husbands 
to treat their wives equally despite the inevitable differences in his emo-
tional relationships with them. Having different feelings for different 
wives is not sinful but inevitable, he asserts. But all the same, men are 
called on to treat all wives equally. “If you feed one well one day, feed the 
other equally another day,” with “feeding” apparently denoting bringing 
supplies from the market for the woman in question to cook. The same 
goes for clothing and every kind of material provision, but also for kind 
words and attention. Polygamous men, in other words, have to watch 
themselves and to consciously steer their behavior so as to minimize 
the inequalities between wives that their hearts may induce them to 
practice.
 Like Bi Fatma, who much deplores the pervasiveness of kusengenya 
and similar faults, Bachu, too, suggests that marriages typically fall short. 
Arguably, against such exacting standards, it would be difficult for them 
not to. But both also present a much more complex and human portrayal 
of the pursuit of just living in the context of marriage than mere insistence 
on the letter of the law would produce. They portray the pursuit of justice 
as a question of forbearance, compassion, generosity, and patience, as well 
as obedience toward God and his law. Clearly, they share with those who 
discuss rights and justice in the context of development an interest in how 
to enable people to live well. But their answers involve concepts that do 
not typically occur in the language of development.
Evidently, the notion of “justice” covers a great variety of virtues, social 
projects, and political stances among Swahili speakers, as anywhere 
else. Considering some of these meanings together brings to the fore 
how situated and context-dependent they are. It is clear that some 
of these meanings are more technical and institution-bound, whereas 
others can be described as popular. Despite a recurrent emphasis on 
mutual obligation and communalism in the latter, they are as far from 
uniform as the former, and the dialogue between both is ongoing, as 
is evident in the diverse meanings different communities attach to 
the debate on sharia courts. This variety serves as a caution against 
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thinking of any of these meanings as particularly “authentic” or as the 
one to grab onto in order to make popular concerns speak to those of 
politics or the aid world.
 At the same time, the discussion of notions of justice presented above 
contains two marked contrasts. On one hand, in the political arena, differ-
ent constructions of justice for different political constituencies face each 
other across deep social divides, posing a constant challenge to the main-
tenance of peace. On the other, preachers’ calls for Muslims to live justly 
contain an intriguing mixture of rigid religious norms and calls for patience, 
compassion, and pragmatic accommodation between fellow believers.
 With their focus on differential entitlements and on justice as an at-
tribute of relations between people (as well as God), the notions of jus-
tice explored above arguably inhabit common ground with less legalistic 
ones found elsewhere in Africa. Whether “rights NGOs” and similar 
organizations could build bridges with Muslim leaders and communi-
ties through these notions is nevertheless questionable. At the very least, 
such NGO workers would have to take the leap of accepting Muslim 
legal experts’ refusal to accord equal rights to husbands and wives, sons 
and daughters, and possibly also men and women not bound by such 
ties of relatedness. On the other side, many Muslims mistrust the type 
of organization involved in rights activism, whatever the specifics of 
their programs, and would have to set this mistrust aside.
 There is also the question of how much the programmatic statements 
explored above tell us about the way everyday life is negotiated among 
Muslims. Two points are important here: first, Muslims who listen to 
preachers such as the ones discussed here are part of Muslim congrega-
tions, but not their sum total. Many people identify as Muslim and 
have little to no interest in the preachers. For these people, who may 
position their Muslim allegiance as less central to their identity, tensions 
between the notions of justice expounded by activists and preachers, and 
attempts to invoke notions of law and justice for socially progressive 
aims, are likely to be less salient.
 Second, much of what the preachers say is, I think, taken as a state-
ment of identity and aspiration by their listeners rather than as a concrete 
guideline for daily living. In other words, people who endorse these ser-
mons without living by them are not well described as hypocrites. Rather, 
they are people who accept the fact that they have to live in an imperfect 
world, not an ideal one. Listeners, after all, pick and choose between dif-
ferent preachers and consider the aesthetic and entertainment aspects of 
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their work as well as the content. Sermon listening is a layered experience 
and part of the constant negotiation between religious aspiration and the 
mundane constraints of daily living. This again suggests that there may be 
more scope for reconciling an interest in preachers’ sermons with grass-
roots justice approaches than is immediately evident.
 Nevertheless, the terms at play—human rights, Islamic law, justice—
are all tied to specific social and institutional settings, and they unfold their 
specific powers (in Leander Schneider’s terms, their “authority effects”) 
within these settings.43 The specificity and complexity of the Muslim case 
arises from the evocativeness of the notion of Islamic law, tied as it is to an 
idealized past and far-reaching ambitions for the future, from the difficul-
ties Muslim institutions experience defining their place in the Tanzanian 
state, and from the difficulties of ordinary Muslims’ lives. Islamic political 
mobilization, which further charges these terms, is itself partly a response 
to these difficulties. Similarly, the ramifications of rights agendas are tied 
to the institutional configurations of aid and development.
 Against this background, the replacement of “rights” agendas with 
“justice” agendas may make those agendas more accessible and more 
open to genuine engagement and debate. But it will not change the 
institutional structures. This is not to say that terminology does not 
matter; it can express dramatically different analyses. Whether rural 
African developmental failures are parsed in terms of governance or of 
environmental constraint, for instance, will make a great difference to 
the resulting policy recommendations. But the question then arises why 
one or the other form of analysis is used, and that question leads back to 
the politics of the institutions that propose these analyses.
 Ultimately, notions of both “rights” and “justice” are clearly active and 
productive among Tanzanian Muslims (as among other East Africans, 
or Africans, or people). To involve them productively in development 
processes would, arguably, require above all one thing that so far has been 
achieved very rarely: experts meeting their targets at eye level. Perhaps 
seeking to understand how the concepts of haki, usawa, and uadilifu 
hang together in, say, Zanzibaris’ minds, is a step in that direction. But 
it is not likely to be sufficient in itself; the institutional structures and 
practices of the development world would also need to change.
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Western world unknown in so-called primitive societies. The reality 
of cancer as an increasing public health concern in both Africa and 
the West began to emerge in the 1990s. The disease is now rapidly 
becoming a global epidemic with rising numbers of cases in low- and 
middle-income countries (LMICs). Epidemiologists predict that 
there will be 17 million new cases of cancer globally every year by 
2020, and 60 percent of these will be in developing countries.1 Af-
rica is experiencing the threat of cancer related to bacterial and viral 
infections, which seems to compensate for a lower incidence of other 
cancers that are more common elsewhere in the world.2 However, sub-
Saharan African governments, much like those of LMICs elsewhere, 
are inadequately prepared for the growing cancer burden. Cancer sur-
vival rates are often less than half those of more developed countries.3 
Epidemiologists predict that of 260 million cases worldwide by 2020, 
150 million will be in developing countries, where 80 to 90 percent of 
cancers are currently incurable at presentation. Similarly, less than 5 
percent of cancers in developing countries are deemed preventable as 
compared with one-third of cases in the developed world. Only about 
one-third of cancer cases in developed countries are incurable,4 and up 
to half of patients are “cured.”5
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 The increasing prevalence of noncommunicable diseases, such as can-
cer, in the context of fragile livelihoods, health systems, and low political 
commitment to their control exposes the complex connection between 
morbidity and the challenges of justice in sub-Saharan Africa. Disease 
and illness evoke consciousness about moral obligations or sentiments 
of mutual well-wishing.6 As we shall see, acute and chronic illness bring 
to the fore norms of reciprocity, social exchange, and altruism that shape 
an ethos of care.
 Drawing on hospital ethnography, this chapter explores the cancer 
care situation in Kenya from a social justice perspective. The increasing 
cancer burden in Kenya reflects national and global disparities in the 
management of cancer and other noncommunicable diseases. Cancer 
care in the resource-poor Kenyan health system draws on moral con-
siderations as hospital practitioners attempt to balance care with the 
obligation to sustain hope and protect patients’ rights. This chapter ex-
amines the link between cancer care struggles in a Kenyan public hos-
pital and social justice in the wider society. Cancer care in the context 
of the country’s limited health care resources calls for stronger govern-
ment commitment to facilitating citizens’ rights to care and mitigating 
the social injustices manifested in the health system. Unequal access 
to essential medical services shapes improvisations of cancer care in 
public hospitals in view of widely recognized moral obligations of care, 
yet therapeutic practices may also compromise patients’ rights. Public 
hospital cancer care settings therefore constitute both social and moral 
spaces for safeguarding hope and contemplating patients’ rights. While 
the enactment of the Cancer Prevention and Control Act of 2012 ex-
pressed the government’s intention to ensure justice in cancer manage-
ment, it is yet to be supported by the provision of adequate resources 
for quality treatment and care. Sustainable political commitment to 
social justice in health care would entail the mobilization of operational 
resources for cancer care as a moral duty toward the poor. This chapter 
underscores the need for increased international health cooperation to 
facilitate global health care justice and help ease the cancer care burden 
in Kenya and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ethnography in a Kenyan Cancer Ward
I conducted hospital ethnography in the cancer ward and treatment 
center of Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH) between July 2005 and 
August 2006. I made return visits in 2007 and carried out follow-up 
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key informant interviews in 2010. KNH is Kenya’s largest teaching and 
national public referral hospital; it is located in Nairobi and caters to 
patients referred from both private and public hospitals all over the 
country. My ethnographic research entailed informal conversations and 
observation of cancer therapy and care practices in the adult cancer 
ward, where both men and women are treated. Additional qualitative 
data were collected at the Cancer Treatment Centre clinic and in the 
radiotherapy department. Kenyatta National Hospital/University of 
Nairobi Ethics and Research Committee approved the research.
 Follow-up visits to ten purposively selected patients provided insight 
into how they coped with cancer after or in-between hospital treatment 
sessions. Conversational interviews and observation transcripts were 
analyzed thematically. Content analysis of current media reports and 
literature on the cancer crisis in Kenya complements the ethnographic 
data. The critical medical anthropology (CMA) paradigm provides the 
theoretical framework for the discussion of the wider social, cultural, 
and political context of current cancer care practice in Kenya.7 CMA 
is an important theory for the analysis of the culture of medical care 
beyond individual, community, and clinical setting experiences. The 
aim of this perspective is to include an understanding of the impact 
of the wider political economy of health on the situation and experi-
ences of hospital care for cancer patients. CMA theory emphasizes that 
social and political factors such as poverty, social inequality, exclusion, 
and structural violence are important for understanding and analysis of 
health care experiences in local care settings.
 The concept of social justice from the vantage point of fairness, and 
the mitigation of harm inflicted by economic exploitation, oppression, 
discrimination, or inequality,8 apply to the discourse on cancer suffering 
and care in Kenya. The emerging cancer epidemic reveals concerns about 
disparities in local allocation of livelihood and health care resources and 
the implications of this phenomenon for overall societal well-being. In 
addition, local and international commercial considerations in the pro-
duction and provision of essential supplies for the management of the 
disease constrain fairness in access to cancer care and treatment resources 
among the poor in developing countries. Underfunding of public health 
services, and inadequate cancer care expertise among public health pro-
fessionals, worsen the burden of cancer among the poor. Nevertheless, 
actual cancer care practices in resource-poor settings often belie a prin-
ciple of justice, that is, to provide similar treatment to similar cases.9
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The Pursuit of Cancer Care Justice in Kenya
Mr. Khasi10 was sixty-five years old during the hospital ethnography in 
2006. His help-seeking trajectory through the Kenyan health system for 
cancer diagnosis, treatment, and recovery was protracted. He recounted 
his experience of cancer care, which is characteristic of low-income 
patients in Kenya:
I tried many places since 1999 when I felt that I was suffering. . . . 
I went to my doctor, in the hospital at home [in Western Kenya]. 
They would tell me, “Oh, [it is] malaria” . . . then they referred me 
to the district hospital where the doctor told me, “Oh [you are 
suffering from] typhoid.” . . . It was more distinct in 2004 and they 
[doctors] told me . . . to go and check it with the bone specialist 
who used to work here [the hospital ethnography site]. I went to 
him and he wrote me an X-ray note to the government hospital in 
Bungoma, [a local district]. . . . The doctor in Bungoma said there 
was a problem on the bone and he wondered how a bone could 
have a disease. He referred me up to Eldoret . . . Moi teaching and 
referral [Hospital] [in the neighboring district]. When I arrived 
there . . . the doctor who was attending to me said, “No, this Mau-
mooki is a qualified doctor! The way he has written is adequate; 
there is no other thing to add.” So . . . he did not help me. He 
said . . . let him [Dr. Maumooki] do the way he has decided, be-
cause he taught me in Nairobi University!” (Mr. Khasi, 65-year-old 
patient, June 13, 2006).
Mr. Khasi’s case is typical of protracted trajectories of cancer diagnosis, 
treatment, and care in Kenya. This points to the scarcity of medical tech-
nology and expertise in both rural and urban areas. Intercounty referrals 
are often futile because of delayed and inaccurate diagnosis and inappro-
priate treatment advice. Mr. Khasi, for instance, said, “I wanted him [the 
doctor] even to see what is required, or merely send me for examine me 
on the machine.” The doctor instead referred him to other doctors back in 
his home county, who lacked appropriate expertise and technology.
 Trajectories of cancer care in Kenya, particularly among low-income 
patients, typically follow varying paths of futile multiple referrals in the 
local health system. From the low-level dispensaries or health centers, 
patients dither between at least two county hospitals. Inaccurate or 
missed diagnoses result in protracted delays in reaching suitable cancer 
treatment facilities and receiving appropriate care. Disparities in the 
distribution of cancer technology and expertise in rural and urban areas 
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account for what patients, family caregivers, and hospital staff dubbed 
the “invisibility” of the disease or inability of actors located at the dif-
ferent levels of the health system “to see the disease.” In addition to 
treatment delays, some patients, like Mr. Khasi, experienced additional 
suffering owing to either inappropriate or unnecessary interventions, 
especially surgery, amputations, or mastectomies.
 The government fails to facilitate the fair distribution of public goods 
and to fulfil its moral responsibility for citizens’ equal access to health 
services. The low priority historically accorded to cancer management 
and its unique matrix—the cultural, social, and political environment 
of care—shapes social justice concerns with respect to cancer care in 
Kenya and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Diagnostic and treat-
ment technology is scarce across the country, and the available machines 
at the national referral hospital are both unreliable and overused. The 
negligible budgetary allocation to cancer management in Kenya may 
be attributed to a general lack of awareness among policy makers, the 
public, and international private or public health agencies concerning 
the magnitude of the cancer burden and its economic impact.11
Livelihood Context of Cancer Care Injustices
Thirty-two of the forty-two cancer patients who participated in the 
ethnography as principal informants were either married or had been 
married. Two women were divorced and three of the informants (two 
women and one man) had been widowed. Ten of the informants were 
single and dependent on their parents and other relatives. Most de-
pendent patients were still students, though some had completed their 
studies before commencing regular hospital treatment.
 A majority of the patients referred to the national referral hospi-
tal had neither formal wage employment nor other sources of regular 
income. The patients’ narratives and those of their family caregivers 
pointed to their struggles to overcome the disruption that cancer diag-
nosis and treatment cause to small-scale entrepreneurship and informal 
livelihoods. A few of the patients who were formally employed earned 
low wages as primary school teachers, clerks, secretaries, low-grade tech-
nicians, and artisans. Overall, the ethnographic material indicates that 
cancer diagnosis and treatment trajectories often portend an irreversible 
path toward livelihood insecurity and destitution.
 Small-scale cash crop production and subsistence farming supple-
mented the livelihoods of most study participants. Families relying on 
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subsistence farming often experienced crop failure and famine, exac-
erbating the strain of the cancer care burden. In these circumstances, 
a view of the cancer care liability in a Kenyan public hospital reveals 
only a small portion of the suffering that poor patients and their fami-
lies bear as they seek medical assistance. This precarious section of the 
population continues to grow as inflation and unemployment rise with 
an increasing number of citizens lacking the kinds of skills that might 
generate greater economic security. Cancer diagnosis and care trajec-
tories therefore mark the beginning of a journey that entails physical, 
emotional, social, and material stress.
 The majority of self-employed or unemployed people in Kenya are 
not covered by the National Health Insurance Fund or other health 
insurance schemes. In the absence of cancer care subsidies from the 
government or other sources, help seeking among the poor involves 
trade-offs between daily survival struggles and the quest for proper and 
timely diagnosis and treatment. Cancer care experiences often feature 
poverty-stricken families facing the further threat of increasing liveli-
hood insecurity. My informants’ accounts of their help-seeking trajec-
tories typified how the poorest members of society incur catastrophic 
expenses in the face of cancer-associated chronic illness.12 Many of the 
cancer patients who arrive for referral at KNH soon face social and fi-
nancial strains. Very few of the patients interviewed had a fixed monthly 
income or sustainable social support.
 The demands of cancer care and treatment among poor people in 
Kenya coincide with extant livelihood fragility, which exacerbates social 
and economic instability. Families are all the more devastated when the 
cancer patient is a principal wage earner, such as a divorced, widowed, or 
unmarried single mother. Care fatigue within existing social networks 
can render such cancer patients and their immediate dependents ever 
more isolated, left to “fight their own battles,” as one informant put it. 
Conversely, cancer patients from relatively elite backgrounds in Kenya 
are distinguished by their privileged access to exclusive care in private 
hospitals, either abroad or within KNH.
Inequality and Exclusive Cancer Care
While preferential treatment may be subtle in acts of triage and thera-
peutic negotiations, some practices in public hospitals perpetuate elitism 
in cancer care. Patients from economically or politically privileged back-
grounds have the chance to receive more attention than those from less 
78
Benson A.  MuleMi
privileged backgrounds. Some middle-class patients and their families 
seeking treatment at the national referral hospital, for instance, begin 
their care trajectory in the “Private Wing” (or Amenity Wards). These 
“private wards” are established within public hospitals to attract fee-paying, 
high-income patients who enhance revenue generation.13 A revenue 
generation policy in this regard targets corporate clientele through more 
personalized and higher-quality specialized care, comparable to that 
provided in private hospitals.14 The amenity ward and clinics are a post-
colonial development that supports privileged access to social amenities 
and health services in Kenya. Access may be guaranteed by political or 
civil service privileges and is also available to commercial elites.
 In both the colonial and postindependence health systems in Kenya, 
exclusive care has entailed the treatment of top political and civil service 
figures outside the country at public expense.15 Preferential treatment of 
the elite in the Kenyan health system has also involved informal medical 
provision plans at specific public or private health facilities that guar-
antee prioritized allocation of amenity wards and clinics.16 Well-to-do 
Kenyans may also seek medical care from private hospitals, where they 
are cared for by personnel who may be taking time out of their regular 
contractual care duties in public hospitals. A referral to the amenity 
wards or private wing at KNH contributes to the substantial financial 
burden of cancer care. Many cancer patients relocate to the public cancer 
ward when the cost of care in the private wing becomes unmanageable. 
Transfer to the public cancer ward and review clinic is often aimed at 
preventing increasing impoverishment because of the high cost of care 
in both private facilities and the exclusive wing at the hospital.
 Cancer patients from the middle class and financially well-off fami-
lies may request admission to the private wing wards, oblivious of the 
cumulative financial costs of care. Similarly, some cancer treatment con-
sultants endorse further care either in local private hospitals or abroad, 
despite the fact that such care is more expensive and thus inaccessible 
to a large proportion of cancer patients. Their referrals may be futile, but 
consultants recommend them as a compromise in order to uphold the 
ethical principle of respecting a patient’s right to self-determination in 
determining their care. Relatively few citizens enjoy the full benefits of 
effective medical technology or medical care because of financial and 
geographical limitations that place particular restrictions on the rural 
poor.17 The adult cancer ward at KNH is different from other general 
wards owing to the patients’ special needs, yet it is not as high quality 
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and comfortable as the amenity wards. The latter are an attractive option 
for family members who can access them as a means of fulfilling moral 
values and obligations of care, especially for relatives faced with acute 
and chronic illnesses.
The Accessibility of Cancer Care Resources
The role of public hospitals in meeting cancer care needs in Kenya is 
persistently undermined by generalized poverty and limited access to 
appropriate facilities and expertise. Because of high levels of poverty 
in Kenya, 40 percent of the rural population has no access to health 
services. In addition, 25 percent of households in the country have lim-
ited physical access to health facilities, which are located more than 
eight kilometers away.18 Peripheral public health facilities in the country 
lack the capacity to provide proper and timely medical care because of 
limited financial and human resources as well as insufficient medical 
equipment. Cancer diagnosis, treatment, and referrals within lower-
level government and private facilities are often inadequate. The brunt 
of the cancer care burden in this context is borne by the poorest patients 
and their families as compared with those in higher income strata.
 A scarcity of pathologists and lack of essential cancer diagnosis and 
treatment facilities contribute to the problems of late diagnosis. While 
Kenya has two national public referral hospitals, KNH is the only one 
that is fully equipped for public cancer treatment. Most cancer patients 
are referred in the late, advanced stages of the disease, and their bleak 
prospects for successful care are worsened by the scarcity of cancer man-
agement experts and technology. In recent years, the Cancer Treatment 
Centre at KNH has employed only four medical oncologists, yet the 
volume of new patients per week is between fifty and sixty, in addition 
to those already being attended to. The cancer unit at Kenyatta National 
Hospital alone is estimated to require fifteen to twenty clinical oncolo-
gists.19 However, the distribution of about five clinical oncologists, four 
medical oncologists, and eight hematologists in the whole country, 95 
percent of whom practice in various facilities in Nairobi, belies the staff-
ing expectations for effective care.20 In addition, consultation time and 
interactions with patients arriving at the hospital are limited owing to 
long queues and a backlog of patients waiting for diagnosis, reviews, 
and treatment. Moreover, the concentration of more efficient cancer 
care facilities and expertise at the national referral and private hospitals 
in Nairobi leads to the exclusion of rural citizens from prompt quality 
80
Benson A.  MuleMi
care. Residents of distant counties have only limited access to what 
little state-of-the-art cancer care technology exists in Kenya because it 
is concentrated in the capital city. With an ever-increasing number of 
cancer patients requiring personalized care, the situation in the Kenyan 
health system is dismal even at KNH because of the shortage of medical 
personnel.21
 Frequent shortages of cancer medicines and treatment technology 
exacerbate the difficulties of accessing effective care both at KNH and 
throughout the public hospital system. Cancer patients and their fami-
lies typically follow long therapeutic paths and approach the appropriate 
facilities for proper medical interventions very late. The hospital spaces 
in this sense portray microcosms of the social (in)justice realities that 
are perceptible in narratives of cancer care inequalities and enacted in 
public hospitals. Clinical spaces in resource-poor public hospitals often 
manifest injustice, violation of human rights, generalized poverty, vio-
lence, discrimination, and intolerance in the wider society.22 Narratives 
of social and medical histories of etiologies, treatment, and care related 
to different cancers presented at the national referral hospital often re-
flect these experiences of injustice.
 KNH procured and commissioned the only gamma camera machine 
available to the public health sector in late 2005. Prior to this, low-
income patients could not easily access the facility in private hospitals. 
The machine serves all the units in the hospital, and this contributes to 
diagnostic backlogs and treatment delays. Both the purchase and the 
repair of cancer diagnosis and treatment equipment are prohibitively 
expensive. A radiographer who participated in the hospital ethnogra-
phy reported that the repair of a treatment planning simulator that had 
broken down would cost slightly over ten million Kenyan shillings (ap-
proximately $288,739). The radiographer also said that a representative of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency recommended that “it would 
be more economical” to buy a C-arm X-ray machine as a substitute for 
the broken-down simulator. The radiotherapy department had in the 
meantime “borrowed” a C-arm X-ray imaging machine from the X-ray 
department, as the hospital sought funds for a new simulator. The senior 
radiographer estimated its cost at thirty to forty million Kenyan shillings. 
Problems related to cancer treatment also extend to the brachytherapy 
and cobalt-60 machines, which are too few in number and prone to fre-
quent breakdowns. The collapse of some machines leads to protracted 
care delays, which are made worse by the shortage of skilled technicians 
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to operate and maintain the machines.23 The shortage of treatment ma-
chines exacerbates cancer care difficulties owing to the widespread delay 
in the presentation and confirmation of diagnoses.24 In what follows, 
I discuss how cancer caregivers in this resource-poor context strive to 
safeguard hope in hospital care through therapeutic improvisations that 
aim to humanize oncology by drawing on a cultural ethos of care.25
Care Ethos and the Hospital as Moral Space
A pharmacist narrated the challenge of sustaining patients’ hope despite 
perennial shortages of cancer medicines. Scarcity of essential cancer 
drugs, combined with the high cost of drugs and slow procurement pro-
cesses, significantly constrain cancer treatment at KNH and other pub-
lic hospitals in Kenya. The pharmacist has to understand each patient’s 
drug prescriptions and “their quantities in terms of the pharmaceutical 
products,” yet this may be a mere formality owing to drug shortages and 
prohibitive costs in private pharmacies. Subsidized drugs and treatment 
regimens, along with alternative choices, may be unavailable in the hos-
pital pharmacy. A pharmacist may calculate price variations depending 
on different combinations and their perceived affordability for particular 
patients and their families. All patients are told of the likely outcomes 
of drugs that are not available in the hospital, whether or not they can 
afford to source them from elsewhere. The prolonged inaccessibility of 
essential drugs contributes to treatment delays, interruption, and even 
abandonment among poor cancer patients referred to KNH.
 The public hospital constitutes an arena for the invention of ways of 
“assisting patients” to cope in the face of scarce care resources. Medical 
personnel attempt to fulfil their moral obligation to ease suffering. They 
seek to balance hope for hospital cancer care against the experience of 
poor therapy outcomes and prognoses. According to a doctor on the 
cancer ward, medical staff strive to help patients, especially “when a 
patient has come once, twice . . . thrice . . . and every time they raise 
concerns of affordability, lack of bus fare.” Thus, cancer care entails 
caregivers’ emotional labor and involvement in patients’ suffering. This 
reflects the significance of a sense of human and professional moral ob-
ligation to ameliorate desolate circumstances as an expression of aware-
ness of the imperative of justice in cancer care. At least five dimensions 
of cancer treatment and care improvisations emerged from the hospital 
ethnography in Kenya in relation to the moral obligation and contextual 
ethos of care.
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 Instances of care improvisation could entail flexibility in either the 
drug regimen combination or the sequences of therapy administered. 
The concept of radiochemotherapy provided a justifiable framework 
for care flexibility and more improvised approaches to treatment. This 
occasionally involved an individual clinician’s decision about medicine 
combinations or sequential therapies. Such improvisation by doctors 
may be part of desperate initiatives to help them “see the response.” 
Eclectic therapy combinations were partly motivated by the fact that 
many patients were unable to consistently afford standard regimens. This 
necessitated the practice of admitting patients for about three courses 
of chemotherapy, followed by radiotherapy with unprecedented pauses 
in treatment courses. Radiotherapy followed cheaper chemotherapy 
preparations as a coping strategy “to help or do something for destitute 
patients.”
 The second aspect of cancer care ethos and improvisation entailed 
inventive ways of having some patients “share available chemotherapy 
drugs.” Doctors improvised with whatever machines and medicines were 
available to treat patients and referred those who could afford further 
help to Uganda, South Africa, or India. In the absence of this option, 
cancer caregivers in the Kenyan referral hospital would resort to a third 
form of improvisation: a limited degree of triage. Social workers helped 
identify the poorest of the poor among the patients and recommended 
priority consideration for them when the hospital acquired subsidized 
drugs.
 Retaining patients on the cancer ward or outpatient treatment 
schedules for “supportive management” constitutes the fourth care im-
provisation. This supplements the creative therapy combinations and 
drug sharing. “Supportive management” is a variant of palliative care, 
to ease patients’ physical suffering in the absence of means to procure 
the recommended treatment. In addition, a fifth form of cancer care 
improvisation in the Kenyan health system is often couched in maxims 
of hope. Hospital caregivers feel morally bound to sustain hope among 
patients and their family members despite impending hopelessness. 
This is thought to promote the patients’ self-determination and the 
hospital practitioners’ obligation to safeguard both patients’ and their 
family caregivers’ confidence in hospital care.
 Persistence with respect to disease-directed cancer treatment and 
hope-instilling activities often coincides with catastrophic financial 
costs, as well as emotional and social exhaustion at the end of the patient’s 
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life. Conversely, oncologists and other cancer caregivers are aware that 
some forms of cancer, or the disease at particular stages, are incurable. 
They may even be able to predict when further disease-directed therapy 
will be futile, yet this may not be disclosed, particularly to patients. The 
moral dilemma in this experience relates to whether to continue with 
curative therapies or to spare patients the drug toxicity, financial ex-
pense, and false hope associated with such treatment.26 Nondisclosure 
of prognosis and the realities of cancer treatment limitations in Kenyan 
hospitals obscures the need for palliative care that might enhance pa-
tients’ quality of life. Persistence in offering arduous, yet futile, cancer 
therapies, such as chemotherapy, until the patients’ last days increases 
livelihood insecurity and undermines quality of life.
 Nondisclosure of cancer prognosis in Kenyan care practice entails a 
moral dilemma regarding “reporting bad news to patients.” Care providers 
both at home and in clinical settings struggle with the desire to balance 
hope with initiatives that would elicit therapeutic endurance or treatment 
acquiescence. This balance between hope, adversity, and poor progno-
sis in cancer care creates space for patients’ self-determination, that is, 
their freedom to determine care practices that affect their well-being. 
Avoidance of explicit disclosure of likely cancer treatment outcomes is 
a strategy aimed at justifying improvisation in the face of the injustices 
that contribute to cancer care resource scarcity and therapeutic futility. 
The resource-poor context of cancer treatment in the Kenyan health 
system necessitates a trade-off between the moral duty of humanizing 
oncology and safeguarding patients’ rights.
 Cancer patients and their relatives may be informed about their 
treatment options, yet they are often limited to chemotherapy and ra-
diotherapy. Up to 70 percent of patients require radiation therapy in the 
course of their treatment, “but they still have a right to say yes or no to 
that treatment,” as a radiation oncologist explained. He observed that 
while patients are “not forced to accept treatment,” they are persuaded 
to “think about it.” Ideally, patients are expected to sign if they refuse to 
continue with treatment, “so that they don’t hold the doctor responsible 
for their refusal.”27 Cancer management in the Kenyan referral hospital 
therefore involves the redefinition of therapy, care, and patients’ rights 
in view of the scarcity of resources and a local ethos of care. This consti-
tutes contextualized care and improvised justice, aiming to help patients 
by redefining their rights in relation to principles of dignity and au-
tonomy, and through efforts to attend promptly to their care needs. The 
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public hospital in Kenya typifies resource-poor African health systems 
where cancer care clinical settings constitute moral spaces and places to 
encourage hope through sociomedical activities.28
Public Health Justice and the Status of Cancer Care
Several public health justice issues shape the current status of cancer 
care service delivery in Kenya. Exploration of different forms of justice 
that relate closely to conceptualizations of the social justice perspec-
tive underscores an understanding of health justice issues in cancer care. 
First, corrective justice is necessary in order to address disparities in the 
utilization and distribution of cancer management resources, both lo-
cally and internationally. Corrective justice in the context of the cancer 
care burden among the poor would entail mechanisms by which in-
surance schemes and tax regimes targeting high-income groups could 
“trickle down” to channel health care advantages to vulnerable groups. 
Self-employed and unemployed citizens, for instance, could pay modest 
contributions for the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF) for 
service equivalent to that enjoyed by those who pay higher rates owing 
to their higher income. Unfortunately, the prohibitive cost of hospital 
treatment for cancer, coupled with the general scarcity of cancer drugs, 
technology, and expertise, negates this initiative at present. Corrective 
justice in this sense denotes the idea that liability rectifies the injustice 
inflicted by one person on another.29 Arguably, the process of individual 
or collective betterment despite stark socioeconomic inequalities im-
plies either direct or indirect injustice that produces disadvantaged 
groups in African health systems in the first place and calls for a form 
of corrective justice. Drawing tax from the better-off in society in this 
regard can alleviate the suffering of poorer cancer patients. This social 
commitment can be equated to payment of a quantity of damages that 
corrective justice requires in order to establish equality.30 Central to this 
conceptualization of justice is the need to address the historic and con-
temporary dynamics that shape the low priority given to the manage-
ment of cancer and other noncommunicable diseases in Kenya and the 
rest of sub-Saharan Africa.
 Second, redistributive justice can remedy the poor status of cancer 
care as well as more general health system inequalities, which contribute 
to the political invisibility of the disease. Distributive justice entails the 
distribution of whatever is divisible, including goods and resources for 
human dignity and honors among members bound to the same state 
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by the social contract.31 In addition, redistributive justice denotes the 
need to remedy skewed distributions of goods and services that have 
implications for societal well-being. This form of justice entails attempts 
to equalize material goods and wealth ownership through political in-
terventions. Like corrective justice, redistributive justice would include 
levies intended to facilitate economic empowerment through the trans-
fer of wealth from one sector of the population to another. It is possible 
that the implementation of the new, 2010 constitution of Kenya will 
have far-reaching consequences for redistributive justice, which may al-
leviate the health care burden among the poor. The devolution of health 
care, in particular, may ease the suffering cancer patients experience by 
seeking treatment centralized in major urban centers and especially in 
the capital city. The envisaged reparation of historical injustices might 
enhance well-being nationwide through the promotion of equality in 
wealth and health production, which have a reciprocal influence on 
societal well-being.32 Social justice is therefore an aspect of the concep-
tualization of health justice in its broad sense. 
 Social justice underpins the fair distribution of common advantages 
and the sharing of collective burdens. This perspective captures the 
twofold moral considerations in public health practice, especially im-
provement of health. The first moral concern of social justice is about 
advancing human well-being by improving health, while the second 
is about achieving the former by paying attention to the needs of the 
most disadvantaged.33 Part of this should entail redistributive justice 
in integrated palliative care for cancer patients. The dire status of care 
for terminally ill patients draws attention to the moral duty to relieve 
suffering through beneficence, compassion, and nonabandonment.34 
However, the cancer care infrastructure in Kenya reflects operations of 
“market justice” or political influence, which favor the rich, powerful, 
and socially connected over and above the poor.35 There is a dispropor-
tionate concentration of high-quality care technology and expertise in 
the oncology units of private hospitals as compared with those in major 
public hospitals. Services in the private hospitals—including the private 
wing or amenity wards of the public hospital—contradict the essence 
of social justice in public health. From the perspective of market jus-
tice, provision of quality cancer treatment and care in private hospitals 
and private wings of public hospitals is not determined by need, but 
by ability to pay. This approach to the allocation of goods and services 
poses a moral dilemma as it draws on moralities of individualism. This 
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includes the right to self-interested profit making, quests for rewards for 
personal investors or creators, as well as benefits for intellectual labor.36
 The cancer situation in Kenya raises concerns about the moral ob-
ligation of public health to support all members of society to access 
health care and avoid premature death and preventable morbidity.37 This 
may take a while to materialize with regard to cancer control challenges 
owing to widening socioeconomic inequalities, the limited political 
visibility of cancer, and low government commitment to providing 
funds to mitigate the care burden. The wider socioeconomic context of 
cancer management in Kenya’s main referral hospital reveals a growing 
political economy of exclusion in cancer care. This matrix characterizes 
decreased access to health care services, comprehensive insurance poli-
cies and coverage, and safety-net systems for the poor.38
Government Stewardship and Care Coverage
Kenya is among the few African countries with legislation and insti-
tutionalized organization for cancer care.39 The Cancer Prevention and 
Control Act of 2012 was an important step toward political visibility for 
the disease. The Kenyan government also expressed commitment to can-
cer control by formulating the National Cancer Control Strategy 2011–
201640 and the 2013 National Guidelines for Cancer Management.41 These 
initiatives resonate with the cancer care vision of other African countries, 
including Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria, and Algeria. However, health care 
justice for cancer patients through institutionalized programs remains 
uncertain because of inadequate political and social will to finance them. 
The disparities between rural and urban cancer management resources 
form one obvious challenge to the devolved model of health care.
 The 2012 Cancer Prevention and Control Act mandates the National 
Cancer Institute of Kenya (NCI-K) to coordinate all care and treatment 
services. However, there are concerns about how this will be implemented 
in the context of the devolution of health care functions. Despite reserva-
tions about implementation, however, the act was a gesture of political 
will for government stewardship in the pursuit of cancer care justice. This 
positive step toward the organization of cancer management may be hin-
dered by a new phase of waiting for quality care owing to insufficient 
resources. Cancer care legislation processes, from the drafting of the bill 
to the enactment of the act and its eventual operationalization, are a new 
kind of delay with respect to the government’s responsibility for cancer 
prevention, early diagnosis, treatment, and palliative care services.
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 Cancer remains politically invisible among the poorest people in 
rural areas who lack health care infrastructure. Private-sector players 
continue to invest millions of shillings in state-of-the-art cancer care 
expertise, equipment, and infrastructure in the main urban areas. Inter-
nationally accredited and highly trained experts support these exclusive 
private sector cancer care initiatives, while patients in the public sector 
continue to wait for a year or more for equivalent care.42 This implies 
that the government ought to be more proactive in turning the stipula-
tions of the Cancer Prevention and Control Act into reality.43 In a few 
exceptional instances in March 2015, the government negotiated for a 
discount with private hospitals to treat patients from public hospitals 
after both of the machines available to them at KNH broke down for 
about a week. The government demonstrated responsibility for its citi-
zens, but the partnering private hospitals offered cancer care framed by 
the market justice principle of charitable behavior. New approaches to 
integrating social justice values for equitable access to quality cancer care 
call for sustainable government support and commitment.44 However, 
as the following section demonstrates, efforts toward equity in cancer 
care in Kenya are mediated by global health injustices.
The Global Health Justice Context for Local Cancer Care
Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) have very limited bud-
getary allocations for cancer control, yet only about 5 percent of global 
health spending on cancer is directed at these countries.45 Developed 
countries register higher rates of cancer prevention and successful cure 
and care compared to LMICs. Less than one-third of cancer patients 
in developing countries have access to either cancer screening or proper 
treatment and care services. Whereas developed countries such as 
Austria have a radiotherapy machine for every two hundred thousand 
citizens, LMICs may have only one for more than five million people, 
and the poorest countries may have none at all.46 Cancer care disparities 
between developed and developing countries are also manifested in dif-
ferential access to (and affordability of ) drugs, effective analgesics, and 
qualified care personnel.
 Critical medical anthropology (CMA) theory provides a framework 
for situating cancer care in Africa within the context of international 
economic and health justice systems.47 The national public referral hos-
pital in Kenya, for instance, is linked to the state, which in turn seeks 
the services of other national and international actors in health care.48 
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Some of these actors, such as international pharmaceutical companies, 
have an interest in the health care sector that is geared toward financial 
profit. Similarly, the business practices of drug firms as well as medical 
technology producers and suppliers, which intersect with government 
budgeting and hospital procurement processes, have implications for 
patients’ well-being. Nevertheless, global and national disparities in 
health care might be bridged through a balance between market jus-
tice and social justice. Market justice supports the supply of health care 
resources on the basis of market rates, which may conflict with moral 
obligations to support universal access to health services and technol-
ogy. Typically, market justice underscores individual responsibility, 
downplaying collective action and emphasizing freedom from collective 
obligations, except where that conflicts with other people’s fundamental 
rights.49 The challenge of cancer in both the global North and South 
calls for attention to the ethos of burden sharing, alleviating human 
suffering, and the protection of vulnerable lives.
improvising Health Justice and Cancer Care in Local Hospital Spaces
Cancer treatment in the Kenyan national referral hospital reflects pro-
tracted trajectories of just care seeking and moral dilemmas faced by 
medical professionals. The dire cancer care situation, particularly among 
the rural poor, is a product of socioeconomic disparities and the politi-
cal invisibility of noncommunicable diseases. Personnel in the national 
public hospital strive to improvise justice by balancing medical impro-
visations with their obligation to safeguard hope and confidence in con-
textualized oncology. The pursuit of health justice and cancer care calls 
for deliberate government efforts to reduce local social and economic 
disparities that limit equity in the health system. Attention to health 
care disparities within developing countries and between low- and 
high-income countries is also imperative. However, a concern for rights 
to health for cancer patients may contradict the tenets of market justice. 
A plea for commensurate reward for cancer care service, products, and 
expertise should be balanced against the imperative of attending to the 
needs of all patients. Conversely, attempts at humanizing cancer care are 
in line with the justice principle of fair disbursement of common gains 
and the sharing of health care burdens.50 The current cancer care crisis 
in Kenya and beyond indicates the need to pursue global health justice 
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and increased cooperation between the global South and North. In 
addition, centralization of cancer care technology and expertise in the 
national public referral hospital and other public hospitals and private 
facilities in the main cities of Kenya entails the exclusion of the poor. 
Cancer control efforts seem to be taking too long to elicit the requisite 
political and social will. There is clear need to provide adequate budget-
ary allocation for devolved cancer prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and 
palliative care services.
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F O U R
Relational Justice and Transformation  
in Postapartheid South Africa
d u n C a n  S C o t t
v I O L E N C E  I S  A N  E N D U R I N G  F E AT U R E  O F  S O U T h  A F R I C A N  S O C I E T Y.  A S 
the authors of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion (TRC) report noted in 1998, “Violence has been the single most 
determining factor in South African political history.”1 It was widely 
expected that the end of conflict and the establishment of democracy 
would lower levels of violence, but annual crime figures confirm that 
South Africa consistently exceeds the global average murder rate of 6.2 
per 100,000 people—by a factor of five.2 Moreover, the interpersonal 
violence of murder and aggravated robbery has been accompanied by 
the state-on-citizen violence of police brutality such that there has been 
a “breakdown in relations” between the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) as a state institution and the citizens it serves.3
 When South Africa entered the democratic era, the TRC was con-
ceived as a mechanism to encourage reconciliation and forgiveness by 
providing victims the opportunity to narrate their experiences and giv-
ing perpetrators a platform to make apologies and seek forgiveness.4 
The significance of the current reality is that the TRC’s high-profile 
promise to build a peaceful postapartheid South Africa based on the 
relational principles of ubuntu and reconciliation seems to have failed: 
violence persists in old and new forms. Certain commentators contend 
not only that these relational ethics have been unsuccessful but also that 
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they have helped legitimize economic injustices in the postapartheid 
era.5 Ingie Hovland in particular has argued strongly that macrolevel 
economic structures that perpetuate poverty and inequality also fuel 
interpersonal tensions at the microlevel. She claims that these tensions 
ultimately emerge as the “individual acts of violence” captured annually 
in the country’s crime statistics.6
The Warehouse
In a climate of manifest injustice characterized by violent interpersonal 
and institutional disrespect, this paper responds to the allegations that 
otherwise noble ideas of reconciliation and ubuntu have been reduced to 
mere rhetoric while exacerbating power differences in society. Unlike the 
mainly theory-driven material produced on ubuntu and reconciliation, 
whether it be positive or negative, this chapter adds a unique angle to the 
discussion of the future of relational ethics in South Africa by drawing on 
empirical qualitative research conducted between August and December 
2013 in Cape Town, South Africa. It examines how The Warehouse, a 
Christian nongovernmental organization (NGO) with a relational world-
view, is mobilizing discourses of transformation and relationship building 
to take action against material poverty, inequality, and racial division.7
 The Warehouse, which as of 2013 had fifteen part- and full-time staff 
members, grew out of a racially mixed Anglican parish’s 1998 community 
development initiative to respond to the devastating effect of HIV and 
AIDS in Cape Town. Following several years of organizational plan-
ning and after securing a centrally located rental property—a former 
fish and chip warehouse in Wetton, a semi-industrial neighborhood just 
off a major transport route—The Warehouse became independent in 
2003, adopting a nondenominational character in the process. Its loca-
tion in Wetton established the organization as a node within the city, a 
meeting point for training and discussion and a space for receiving and 
storing food and clothes for the purposes of emergency relief. One of 
the original organizers explained in an interview that prior to becoming 
independent from the parish, the project directors had envisioned work-
ing in the “gray spaces” of the city, by which he meant that they wanted 
to encourage social change without having too conspicuous a hand in 
the process. They settled on The Warehouse as a name that was suitably 
nondescript so as to foster a discreet organizational character.
 The small Christian organization, which emphasizes relationship 
building as the foundation for tackling social and economic injustices 
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in the city, comprises four men and eleven women—the higher num-
bers of women may be due to The Warehouse’s historical emphasis on 
social work, a profession dominated by women in South Africa.8 Of 
the fifteen employees, five are black, two are Coloured (in the local ter-
minology), and eight are white. Although it originally ran a variety of 
social assistance projects at churches throughout the city—including a 
project for young HIV/AIDS orphans, as well as a program that helped 
school leavers access further education and jobs—and the provision of 
emergency relief for flood- or fire-affected township communities, the 
organization decided in 2010, following a review of its programs, to take 
an increasingly facilitative approach to development.
 Since making the move away from a programmatic approach to a 
facilitative one, The Warehouse has focused on building relationships 
with church leaders by visiting them individually and helping them 
develop plans to respond to local community needs. Although The 
Warehouse does not have a list of members or clients, it has built an 
ecumenical network of churches that extends from the wealthy, and pre-
dominantly white, neighborhoods that surround Table Mountain to the 
poorly serviced, almost exclusively black and Coloured townships cre-
ated by the apartheid regime on the outskirts of the city. The organiza-
tion’s hope is that church leaders (from Anglican, Catholic, Evangelical, 
and Charismatic/Apostolic churches) will be able to conduct their own 
community initiatives rather than rely solely on external donors. In the 
process of changing its organizational structure to suit its strategy, The 
Warehouse has created a management position to lead the partnership 
building aspect of its strategy, with the manager coordinating a team of 
four staff members to engage church leaders across Greater Cape Town. 
A second manager oversees another three staff members in the planning 
and execution of training events on community-led development as well 
as discussion forums that bring together diverse church leaderships to 
confront divisions in the city and encourage interdependence between 
churches for development purposes.
 By analyzing fifteen semistructured interviews with Warehouse em-
ployees and approximately fifty-four hours of participant observation 
data, this chapter examines how research participants translate ideas of 
relational justice into social action. Ultimately, this chapter asserts that it 
is unlikely that a small organization will overturn the structural violence 
that is inescapably linked to the physical violence experienced by so many 
in the country. However, it is an instructive example of how relational 
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ideas of justice can challenge oppressive social and political norms, with 
the very real possibility that material transformation will ensue.
 In what follows, I first present a short history of the reconciliation 
and ubuntu projects in postapartheid South Africa and consider some 
of the critiques that have been leveled against them. Second, I describe 
the national transformation project in South Africa and examine The 
Warehouse’s relational ideas and practices as they apply to the organiza-
tion’s intentional transformation strategy. I conclude by discussing how 
the case study’s relational ethics further our understanding of the con-
tinued applicability of ideas of relational justice in South Africa today.
The Troubled History of Relational Ethics  
in Postapartheid South Africa
Relational ethics emphasize that interpersonal connectedness is indi-
visible from personal freedom. Wendy Austin describes this succinctly, 
saying, “If ethics is about how we should live, then it [relational ethics] 
is essentially about how we should live together.”9 This emphasis on re-
spectful, relationship-based action has played a prominent role in South 
Africa’s transitional and postapartheid eras, most notably in the work 
of the TRC. Led by the former archbishop, Desmond Tutu, the TRC 
confronted the violence of the apartheid years with restorative ideas 
of reconciliation—rather than retribution—to restore and sculpt the 
postconflict nation. Indeed, South Africa’s TRC is often discussed as a 
flagship mechanism of restorative justice, a paradigm held by scholars 
of relational theory to be the most appropriate means to restore respect 
to human relationships based on sustained dialogue between all parties 
involved in an injustice.10
 The TRC’s mix of Judeo-Christian ideas of forgiveness and reconcili-
ation combined to promote a strong relational project of nation build-
ing under Nelson Mandela’s presidency. However, a second relational 
ethic, ubuntu, was just as important in this process.11 Ubuntu refers to 
a communitarian worldview, often evoked in South Africa’s postapart-
heid politics. It is commonly explained using the phrase “a person is a 
person through other persons” or “I am because we are,” denoting the 
principle that the achievement of personhood is fundamentally tied to 
harmonious interactions with others.12 The term does not appear in the 
current South African constitution, but the interim constitution of 1993 
explicitly referred to the need for ubuntu in society, and this ultimately 
informed the restorative nature of the TRC.
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 Two years after the TRC’s first hearings in 1996, the final report pre-
sented by the commissioners called for South Africans to foster a “spirit 
of ubuntu” to help in the nation-building project.13 Today, academics and 
politicians continue to celebrate ubuntu as an African, postcolonial ethic 
of human interdependence, which they claim contrasts with Western 
ideas of individualism.14 Yet the positivity surrounding the implemen-
tation of this indigenous moral framework is by no means universal. 
On the one hand, critics have censured the TRC itself for burdening 
individual victims of atrocities with a duty, derived from specific reli-
gious and cultural backgrounds, to forgive their perpetrators. From a 
relational perspective, the goal of this forgiveness is the reparation of 
the essential human relationship between those who committed crimes 
and those who suffered from them. But detractors have argued that the 
conflation of ubuntu principles, reconciliation, human rights discourse, 
and the language of transitional justice resulted in a watered-down form 
of justice for victims of apartheid.15
 Beyond the TRC, critiques of postapartheid South Africa’s ethics 
of reconciliation and ubuntu have extended to business and the econ-
omy. For example, commenting on how ubuntu principles have been 
co-opted by big business, McDonald states that “pro-market ubuntu 
rhetoric is exactly that, rhetoric, serving more to justify postapartheid 
capitalism and neoliberal policy-making, than to provide any serious 
or realistic alternative to economic management in the country.”16 
Somewhat jarringly, a subgenre of research into business management 
proposes not only the ethical viability but also the economic value of an 
ubuntu business model, one paper going so far as to argue explicitly for 
the “competitive advantage” offered by an ubuntu management style.17 
Hovland, meanwhile, asserts that the political focus on reconciliation 
after apartheid allowed big business to maintain and even reinvigorate 
capitalist policies that have perpetuated social strains caused by poverty 
and inequality.18
 Considering that proponents of ubuntu and reconciliation emphasize 
the interconnectivity of human beings and the importance of respectful 
relationships for personal and communal well-being, McDonald and 
Hovland’s allegations highlight the contradictions in how these rela-
tional ethics have been used by the corporate sector and the state to 
further their interests. Matolino and Kwindingwi have ventured so far 
as to proclaim the “end of ubuntu” itself, precisely because they see it as 
an elite-led project that has little bearing on how most South Africans 
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live.19 Hovland, who describes the reconciliation agenda as “opium for 
the people,” argues that as long as the rhetoric of reconciliation detracts 
attention from enduring social and economic injustices, “the notion of 
reconciliation should be laid to rest.”20
 Those who contend that ubuntu and reconciliation projects are not 
only morally compromised but also ill-suited to tackling the country’s 
problems need only refer to the state of South Africa’s economy to 
support their arguments. Since the 2008 global recession, the country’s 
GDP growth rate has been slower than many other emerging economies 
in Africa and beyond.21 Approximately 37 percent of youth in South 
Africa (defined as people aged 15–34) were reported as unemployed 
in mid-2015,22 and the overall unemployment rate in the formal labor 
sector remains high at 25.5 percent of the working-age population.23 
Furthermore, according to the IMF’s calculation of South Africa’s Gini 
Coefficient, which gives a measure of income inequality, South Africa is 
a more unequal society than Brazil, Russia, China, and a host of other 
emerging economies.24 In these circumstances, detractors of relational 
ethics assert that reconciliation “is idealistic, utopian, unlikely to succeed, 
prone to boondoggles, guilty of moral overstretch, and contrasts with a 
more preferable politics that is practical [and] hard-bitten.”25 Ubuntu, 
with its emphasis on forgiveness and communal harmony, as opposed 
to hard-boiled human rights,26 hardly fares better in this regard. Critics 
have argued instead for a rights-based redistributive program, “a vision 
of justice that aims to establish social equality through the redistribu-
tion of goods guaranteeing liberty.”27 As Patrick Bond, the outspoken 
critic of the Mbeki regime’s neoliberal economic policies, states, “No 
peace without justice, no reconciliation without redistribution.”28
 These forthright calls for strong action to eliminate inequality are 
compelling, not least because they seem to confront the power dif-
ferentials in South African society. Moreover, the well-known South 
African Reconciliation Barometer, an annual survey that has traced race 
relations in South Africa for more than a decade, concludes that racial 
interaction correlates with income levels: a black South African earn-
ing a middle or high income is more likely to interact socially with 
a white, Coloured, or Indian South African who has a similarly high 
living standard, and vice versa. In contrast, poorer South Africans, the 
majority of whom are black, are highly unlikely to socialize with other 
racial groups.29 From this evidence it seems that racial divisions are 
materially driven and that a “redistribution first, reconciliation later” 
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approach would suffice to heal the nation. Yet such a conclusion does 
not capture the divisions that persist within class groups. The prominent 
black South African singer Simphiwe Dana describes her experience of 
Cape Town, a city often accused of being racist and not merely racial-
ized, saying, “Cape Town has mastered the art of racism. People see you 
but they look over you. You can feel it. I have exposed prejudices that 
people still have even though they say let’s be friends.”30 In a newsletter 
subtitled “Focus on Racism: Is Cape Town a Racist Hotspot?” published 
by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the same organiza-
tion that produces the Reconciliation Barometer, one of the authors 
writes, “As a young black professional, I have never left Cape Town to 
work elsewhere. Yet in my own experience, the resilient status dynamics 
between white, colored and black African people in the Western Cape 
and Cape Town seems to reflect apartheid’s legacy more than anywhere 
else in South Africa.”31 The experiences of middle-class, black South 
Africans indicate that material equality does not necessarily lead to in-
terracial relationships characterized by mutual respect. At the very least, 
this raises the dilemma of whether it would be wise to discount the role 
of relational ethics such as ubuntu and reconciliation, both of which 
encourage meaningful relationships between people and tie in with a 
notion of justice based on intersubjective respect and recognition.32
 The research that led to this paper took as one of its starting points 
the consensus in postconflict literature that the rebuilding of relation-
ships, respect, and dignity has particular importance in societies emerg-
ing from conflict.33 Considering the deep mistrust between opposing 
parties that characterizes these societies, the empathic process that 
eventually allows members of previously antagonistic groups to imagine 
the social and emotional state of the other can be a protracted one. 
However, the importance of such a process, which prompts individuals 
to change their attitudes toward one another and promotes institutional 
change in the postconflict era, is undeniable. Jennifer Todd draws on 
the example of Northern Ireland’s peace process to remark that “it is 
only when institutional changes are accompanied by changing self-
perceptions that new institutions begin to create new dynamics of in-
teraction; otherwise new institutions and practices become assimilated 
within older meanings and oppositions.”34 More than twenty years after 
apartheid ended, South Africa is caught between institutional intran-
sigence, as black South Africans continue to suffer from exclusionary 
economic and educational structures and the new corruption associated 
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most strongly with President Jacob Zuma’s regime. Poverty, joblessness, 
unequal access to vital resources, and divisions along class and race lines 
characterize the current social climate.
 By contrast with the secularization trend in Western Europe, South 
Africa (like much of Africa and South America) has historically shown 
relatively high levels of religiosity.35 Several nationally representative sur-
veys indicate that South Africans are more likely to trust religious insti-
tutions than other public institutions, including the presidency, national 
and local government, political parties, and the police service.36 Moreover, 
religious institutions played a prominent part in the antiapartheid move-
ment and in the country’s transition to democracy. For example, religious 
leaders constituted a large proportion of the commissioners at the TRC. 
Considering religion’s historical peacebuilding role in South Africa and 
its enduring importance in the private and public sphere, the research on 
which this paper draws focused on how The Warehouse, which explic-
itly pursued transformation in Cape Town communities, might be able 
to contribute to the national transformation project, a social, economic, 
and political program that in recent years has been undermined by a lack 
of political will and widespread corruption at all levels of government. 
Importantly, The Warehouse emphasized a relational ethic in pursuing 
transformation in Cape Town. The following section briefly explains the 
meaning of transformation in South Africa and elaborates on research 
participants’ understanding of the concept, especially as it relates to their 
work. This is the first step in examining how The Warehouse’s relational 
ideas and practices help us think about justice in South Africa today.
Material, Relational, and Individual Transformation:  
Religious Understandings of Transformation
Achille Mbembe has described transformation in postapartheid South 
Africa as a particular form of redistributive justice, namely, “the set of 
policies designed by the government and the private sector to redress 
past racial discriminations and to redistribute wealth and income to pre-
viously disadvantaged groups.”37 With Nelson Mandela as its president, 
the African National Congress (ANC) successfully oversaw full political 
transformation when it won 62 percent of the vote in the historic 1994 
elections. By contrast, economic and social transformation have been 
significantly slower processes and are still to be realized. Affirmative 
action, equal employment, and black economic empowerment poli-
cies have sought, after centuries of colonialism, to normalize access to 
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the labor market and ownership of business. However, these top-down 
redistributive strategies have been plagued by allegations that they are 
ineffective and prone to elite cronyism; large tenders, for example, are ha-
bitually awarded to well-connected businesspeople—or tenderpreneurs, 
as they are colloquially known.38 More than two decades after the advent 
of democracy, “moral questions of justice and equality and pragmatic 
and instrumental questions of power and social engineering” have still 
not been conclusively answered.39 It is against the background of the 
continued need for social and economic transformation within a climate 
of injustice and disrespect, that The Warehouse posits its own, religiously 
inspired transformation agenda based on a relational idea of justice.
 In its strategy, The Warehouse expressed that it wanted to see trans-
formation in communities in Cape Town and to be a transformational 
community itself. It was evident after analyzing interviews conducted 
with staff members that the organization held a particularly relational 
understanding of transformation. Most participants believed that there 
were three elements to transformation, what I have termed material 
transformation, relational transformation, and individual transforma-
tion. According to participants, none of the transformational elements 
exists independently of the others. Moreover, while these elements are 
discernible as different aspects of a holistic notion of transformation, 
they frequently overlap in practice.
 Most strikingly, the inclusion of relational and individual types of 
transformation distinguished the group’s conception of transformation 
from the material, policy-focused transformation pursued by the South 
African government and other development NGOs. The organization 
recognized the need for structural change in the economy, better basic 
education, universal access to sanitation, and job creation. However, it 
insisted the country’s overarching material problems could not be fully 
addressed without also ensuring successful relationship building across 
racial, economic, and spatial divides. That is, relational transformation 
is necessary both to heal the scars of the past and to pave the way for 
future material changes in society. Furthermore, Warehouse participants 
believed individual transformation in the form of self-recognition and 
empowerment through realizing one’s “authentic” identity in a rela-
tionship with God needed to occur in tandem with the other two ele-
ments. One participant concisely captured the character of this idea of 
transformation when he stated that social change occurs by working 
“inwardly outwardly.” It is a religiously inspired process of individual 
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change that occurs in relation to, and with, other South Africans, many 
of whom have vastly different life experiences.
 Sceptics of relational ethics in South Africa may worry that The Ware-
house’s overt focus on establishing respect between people and build-
ing relationships across historical divides in Cape Town (geographic, 
economic, symbolic) is no different from the “old” reconciliation and 
ubuntu projects associated with Nelson Mandela and the TRC. In fact, 
very few of the study participants formulated their idea of transforma-
tion using the rhetoric of reconciliation. Where they invoked a relational 
facet to transformation, they envisioned a more fundamental, relational 
state of being. One of the most telling comments in this regard was 
made by Justine, a white woman in her early thirties who was working 
on a global anticorruption campaign run out of The Warehouse offices. 
When I questioned her on the campaign’s objectives, she answered that 
“the main goal is to tackle [material] systemic issues.” However, she also 
added that a major goal was the “transformation of the individual—so 
their thinking about what it means to be a Christian in the world, how 
my actions affect people and the world affects me, and how important it 
is to see yourself not as an isolated entity, but that we, yah, it’s impossible 
to live without people so therefore we should all work together.”
 Another participant, Emma, who had worked at The Warehouse for 
several years, similarly described the interconnected nature of people’s 
lives. A white, thirty-seven-year-old woman, Emma linked material and 
relational transformation ideals, saying, “There’s the sense that, kind of, 
for the freedom of the whole of society, we all need to do this together. 
We’re not free, none of us are free if you’re not, you know, if you’re still 
under the yoke of injustice. And so, so my involvement with you if 
I’m, I come in with a power dynamic that is, I’m wealthier than you 
materially, but yet I’m just as needy as you are for everything to be [short 
pause] for Shalom to take place.”
 As a consequence of this relationally informed idea of transfor-
mation, participants emphasized that relationship building between 
churches, church members, and development organizations needed to 
take into account the racially based privilege and structural injustices 
that have long defined social interactions in South Africa. Participants 
recognized the power imbalances in society and emphasized what they 
termed “interdependency” as a way of forging more equal relationships. 
They encouraged solidarity with others rather than forgiveness for 
past wrongs. Participants suggested that, whereas many development 
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projects tended to reproduce “dependency” and power relations remi-
niscent of the apartheid and colonial eras, the transformation principles 
they espoused valued equality based on mutual recognition of needs. 
One participant described this as a form of “vulnerability,” a statement 
that “we actually need you and you need us.”
 At the heart of this idea of interdependence is the notion that trans-
formation is fundamentally reciprocal. As a member of The Ware-
house management team expressed, “transformation is something that 
happens to both—there isn’t a transformer and a transformed. We’re 
all transforming.” The following excerpt taken from my field notes de-
scribes a portion of a discussion forum on unity in the church, held at 
The Warehouse’s offices in October 2013: “Standing at the white board, 
Nkosinathi introduced the idea of ‘interdependence’ as an alternative 
to ‘partnership.’ The first, he explained, was a ‘deeper’ kind of relation-
ship—a way whereby churches and Christian organizations could work 
in unity across racial and economic boundaries. In contrast, he described 
a partnership as inevitably being characterised by unequal power rela-
tions. There is ‘a sponsor’ and ‘a beggar,’ he said.”
 Still standing at the front of the hall, Nkosinathi, a thirty-year-old 
black South African and Warehouse staff member, asked the approxi-
mately thirty people in attendance that afternoon to consider the fol-
lowing question: “How do we better build authentic interdependence 
across racial and economic boundaries?” which he wrote on the board 
behind him. Earlier in the afternoon, Warehouse staff members had en-
sured that the five tables in the room were racially diverse and included 
at least one staff member among them. My own group, in which I was 
the only white person, included two township church leaders and two 
Warehouse employees. This reflected the constitution of the remaining 
four tables. After a twenty-minute discussion period, a feedback session 
ensued in which a spokesperson from each table relayed their group’s 
views on the challenges that needed to be surmounted in South Africa 
before interdependence could be possible. One black participant noted 
the perception among affluent, white churches that township residents 
have nothing of value to offer. He recounted an anecdote that clearly 
repudiated this assumption—a story about a white woman whose deep 
distrust was revealed when she had to rely on two black teenagers to help 
her restart her car, which had broken down on a major highway. Within 
a room containing white and black South Africans from vastly different 
backgrounds, the man’s us-and-them story was raw and uncomfortable.
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 The Warehouse intended the two-hour event, and others like it, to 
confront the social effects of racial and economic divisions and encour-
age church leaders to find common ground to address social needs in 
concert with one another. According to Warehouse employees, one of 
the main characteristics of the relational aspect of transformation is that 
people or organizations building relationships should self-consciously 
address the power imbalances in society. Akhona, a forty-seven-year-
old black male Warehouse employee, demonstrated how this relational 
element of transformation intersects with the individual element of 
transformation. He described how The Warehouse attempts to empower 
individual church leaders to respond effectively to their community’s 
needs. “The challenge also is not just helping [church leaders] to fish, 
it’s also to so empower them to be aware that even though there may 
be a fish pond, there may be others who are controlling the fish pond 
[laughs]. So they need to be aware also, how do you deal with those who 
control the fish pond as well.”
 Akhona thus expressed the organization’s view that each person needs 
to realize their potential to effect social change. Warehouse staff mem-
bers envisioned this sort of recognition of one’s agency as a form of self-
in-the-world. By this I refer to their view that self-actualization should 
lead to the realization of one’s interconnectedness in society. As a person 
comes to know their identity in God, what one participant referred to as 
“destination journeys,” they simultaneously realize their duty to pursue 
justice for themselves and wider communities. Onke, a black former staff 
member in his midthirties who had maintained ties to The Warehouse, 
described transformation in the following terms: “Oh, yah, transforma-
tion for me, yah, is to understand yourself first before you engage with 
other people. You must understand yourself, like who you are, who you 
are. And once you know that you can be able to open your hands for 
other people, saying, like, yah, there is my brother. Yah, you know. Yah, 
transformation, yah, to make sure, like, yah, the people they are equal.”
 Onke’s comment illustrates how individual, relational, and material 
transformation are closely related processes. Indeed, many of his former 
colleagues pointed to Onke’s transition from a junior Warehouse staff 
member to a community leader in a nearby informal settlement as a 
perfect example of The Warehouse’s model of transformation in action. 
According to his own and former colleagues’ accounts, since leaving 
The Warehouse Onke had demonstrated a growing self-confidence and 
willingness to engage critically with the City of Cape Town on crucial 
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issues of development affecting his community. He was the epitome 
of the self-in-the-world and demonstrated The Warehouse’s hope that 
church and community leaders across the city would take the initiative 
to pursue social change and confront corruption and lack of political 
will at local and national levels.
 In promoting their idea of transformation and its relationship to 
development in Cape Town, The Warehouse incorporated three main 
activities into its strategy. The first of these involved visiting church 
leaders in surrounding areas to discuss their local situation and help 
churches evaluate and respond to their communities’ needs. Warehouse 
staff members described this as a relational practice, as they strived to 
build facilitative relationships with the network of church leaders they 
had built up over the course of a decade. I did not join Warehouse staff 
members on their visits to individual church leaders as I was wary of 
disrupting The Warehouse’s painstaking efforts to win the confidence 
of church leaders. I chose instead to attend the organization’s various 
“transformational encounters,” which constituted the second branch of 
the organization’s strategy. These included training days and discussion 
forums such as the one described above. Both types of events brought 
together a range of church leaders and Christian development organiza-
tions from across Cape Town. Participating in these events allowed me 
to observe and experience the difficult process of encouraging relation-
ship building between groups of people with common religious beliefs 
(or at least an ecumenical outlook) but vastly different economic realities.
 The third and final means by which The Warehouse attempted to 
promote their idea and practice of transformation was within the or-
ganization itself. Of the fifteen Warehouse staff members interviewed, 
only one expressed concern with the organization’s transformation 
agenda. The staff member in question, a sixty-three-year-old white 
woman and an employee of several years, communicated her frustra-
tion that the transformation process espoused by the organization was 
too vaguely defined to be sure of success. Although she was the only 
staff member to criticize the strategy, her colleagues were nonetheless 
aware of the difficulties involved in implementing their relationally 
based transformation program. One of the ways they acknowledged the 
difficulty of confronting power relations in trying to form relationships 
across divisions in Cape Town, was by insisting that lasting transforma-
tion in South Africa would be realized only through intentional action. 
Participants noted that pursuing the three elements of transformation 
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can involve deep personal discomfort; they underlined this notion of 
discomfort when they described how transformation involves having 
“hard conversations” with coworkers and acquaintances from different 
racial or economic backgrounds.
 Recognizing the challenges involved in undertaking a transforma-
tive development agenda, staff members explained that The Warehouse 
had purposefully decided to live out transformation as an organizational 
community. One longtime staff member, Barbara, described the drive to 
be a transformational community as “a work in progress. It’s a machine 
that’s being built as we go.” A white woman in her early sixties, Barbara 
explained an “exhausting” process that entails continual self-appraisal 
and adjustment as the organization strives to model an alternative com-
munity in Cape Town, one whose relational values will help encourage 
a more just society, which values interpersonal respect and recognition 
of each others’ dignity. One of the ways the organization has tried over 
several years to build this model is by scheduling regular times for staff 
members to tell their life stories. In her interview, Barbara evocatively 
stated that The Warehouse employees are “inching towards each other.” 
As the staff members adopt what is essentially a lifestyle of transforma-
tion, one staff member, a forty-year-old Coloured woman named Lau-
ren, noted that they were able to leave behind “a lifestyle” defined by race, 
in which people associate primarily, sometimes despite their intentions, 
with people from their own racial group. Staff members valued the op-
portunity to experience other people’s lives through listening to their 
stories in a process of self-recognition and recognition of another per-
son’s lived reality. It was one of the first steps in individual transformation 
and relational transformation, as staff members began to recognize their 
own identity in relation to and in relationship with their coworkers.
Pursuing Justice through Transformation:  
Putting Relational Ideas into Practice
It is impossible to speak of justice in South Africa in terms of ideas 
alone. Despite government promises to weed out corruption and ex-
pedite social and economic transformation, much of the country still 
suffers multiple injustices. When we talk of pursuing justice in South 
Africa, we must examine how ideas of justice are put into practice and 
evaluate their potential to generate a more just society. Considering 
that relational ethics such as ubuntu and reconciliation have been criti-
cized during the postapartheid period, there are two natural questions 
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that arise from this paper’s analysis of The Warehouse’s understanding 
and practice of transformation. The first question is, By taking the 
view that transformation is based on relationship building, does The 
Warehouse perpetuate injustice in society, as critics of relational eth-
ics might argue? The second question is, What do The Warehouse’s 
relational practices tell us about pursuing justice in South Africa more 
than twenty years after the democratic transition? To the first ques-
tion I suggest that The Warehouse does not perpetuate injustice by 
obscuring macroissues with microlevel ones. As we have seen, it is 
a multiracial organization that encourages relationship building to 
respond to poverty, injustice, inequality, and division in Cape Town. 
Relationship is not an end in itself but part of the organization’s focus 
on social change, including individual and material transformation 
alongside relational transformation. In contrast to examples of the 
failure of relational ethics in South Africa, The Warehouse’s discourse 
on relationship building and interdependency does not emanate from 
the state or big business. It is a small NGO, based in a middle-ground 
in Cape Town that positions it well to be a meeting place for people 
and ideas. The Warehouse employs a bottom-up rather than top-down 
approach, including multiracial discussions on the future of the church 
and how Christian denominations can work together to initiate locally 
relevant development activities and address the injustices experienced 
by community members.
 With regard to the question of how The Warehouse’s relational 
practices inform the idea and implementation of justice, this chapter 
argues that the answer lies in the way The Warehouse has drawn on its 
religiously inspired beliefs and values to propose an alternative idea of 
transformation. To be sure, it is difficult to measure the success of The 
Warehouse’s transformation strategy. Participants acknowledged that 
the organization’s emphasis on facilitating relationship building and 
encouraging interdependency between like-minded but differently re-
sourced churches is a lengthy process. However, far from seeing the time 
involved as an impediment to success, The Warehouse staff believed that 
anything less than a long-term project was destined to fail. Indeed, the 
national context of violence—a violent democracy, a violent police ser-
vice, the violence of exclusionary economic structures—coupled with 
widespread corruption in business and politics, requires change based on 
a vision of society that differs drastically from the status quo. In the case 
of The Warehouse’s long-term, relational vision of society, continual 
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engagement with others and critical engagement with oneself—a life-
style approach—should encourage mutual respect. In line with the 
principles of relational ethics, establishing this respect is in itself a form 
of justice, which is noninstrumental. Forming respectful relationships 
challenges the unjust interpersonal and institutional disrespect that 
persists in South Africa and recognizes that every person’s life is consti-
tuted by their interactions with others.
 The fact that The Warehouse’s relational idea of justice has led 
staff members to adopt a lifestyle approach to transformation sug-
gests that there is a second, instrumental aspect to the organization’s 
relational ethic. Haenfler, Johnson, and Jones observe that alternative 
lifestyle practices, though not traditionally political in the sense of 
protest movements that target the state for change, “serve to withdraw 
support from structures deemed unjust and/or provide the cultural 
foundations for broader social change.”40 The Warehouse’s relational 
ethic and lifestyle approach might, as scholars have suggested, “pro-
mote and inspire new ideas for daily action” that are taken up by other 
churches in the country, or perhaps by other sectors of civil society.41 
Though The Warehouse and their affiliates seem to take an apoliti-
cal approach by focusing on relationship building to meet the needs 
of people and churches, their connections to more clearly political 
groups such as the interfaith Western Cape Religious Leaders Forum 
could prove valuable as a pathway from individual lifestyle action to a 
more mainline, collective-action approach to pursuing justice. In this 
way, relational ideas of justice are borne out in practice.
 It is self-evident that, on its own, The Warehouse will not be able to 
restructure the economy or pressure government into doing so. Neither 
will it be able to enforce institutional change so that national public 
institutions such as the SAPS treat citizens and other people living in 
South Africa in a manner that respects their dignity. There is neverthe-
less the possibility within The Warehouse’s alternative relational ethic, 
independent of the state or big business, for bottom-up, community-led 
justice initiatives focusing on relational as well as material change. Ingie 
Hovland, cited in this paper as a fierce critic of the national reconcilia-
tion project, sums up her assessment of relationally based justice initia-
tives in the following terms: “The point here is not to say that micro-
level forgiveness and development projects should not be initiated by 
NGOs; but that, if one of their aims is to work on reconciliation rather 
than simply in the reconciliation flow, they should aim to incorporate a 
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concern for the macro/micro dynamic. This includes a concern for the 
continuing issues of division, exclusion, reproduction of poverty, uneven 
access to the means of production and uneven access to decision-making 
processes.”42
 The evidence from The Warehouse’s understanding and practice of 
transformation is that the organization does indeed take poverty, injus-
tice, division, and inequality into account as it conducts its work in Cape 
Town. The organization’s transformation work gives us insight into how 
the idea of relational justice, which in the form of ubuntu and reconcili-
ation has received criticism in South Africa, can be put into practice so 
that justice is actively pursued.
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Chilungamo and the Question of  
LGBTQ+ Rights in Malawi
a L a n  m S o S a
h O w  M I G h T  T h E  I D E A  O F  J U S T I C E  h E L P  A D D R E S S  T h E  C h A L L E N G E S 
that Malawians confront in debates over whether or not to recog-
nize and respect LGBTQ+ rights? I argue that the idea of LGBTQ+ 
rights falls short of persuading many Malawians because the concept 
of human rights lacks local legitimacy in terms of its political origins, 
local meanings, and usage in daily life. In this chapter I argue that a 
framework grounded in the idea of justice, based on locally resonant 
terms, would reduce the exoticness that the concept of human rights 
carries, offer well-established and locally identifiable meanings, and 
therefore enhance the likelihood that ordinary Malawians would de-
ploy it as a means of demanding protection. This chapter is divided into 
three key sections. First, I establish the way in which the concepts of 
sexuality, human rights, and justice are understood in Chichewa, Ma-
lawi’s national language and lingua franca, to identify the challenges 
associated with the use of human rights rhetoric in daily undertakings 
by ordinary people. Second, I discuss the history of the debate sur-
rounding LGBTQ+ rights in Malawi to demonstrate that rejection of 
LGBTQ+ rights is more of a rejection of the concept of rights than of 
the actual protection of LGBTQ+ persons. Third, I propose an alterna-
tive framework in which the idea of justice (chilungamo) might enrich 
local advocacy of LGBTQ+ rights by speaking in terms that ordinary 
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Malawians find relatable. Overall, I suggest that the assumption that 
human rights are universally valid and applicable has led us to overlook 
the possibility that the idea of justice might better facilitate a locally 
resonant framework through which to effectively guarantee the protec-
tion of LGBTQ+ persons.
What Do (Homo)Sexuality, Human Rights,  
and Justice Mean to Ordinary Malawians?
A key achievement of social scientists over the last century in relation to 
the understanding of sexuality has been the overthrow of nineteenth-
century theories of medicine (sexology) that took sexuality as a biologi-
cal instinct based on genetics and hormones for the ultimate purpose of 
procreation.1 Early sexuality researchers such as Mary McIntosh, Ken 
Plummer, and Jeffrey Weeks pioneered what are now known as social 
construction theories of sexuality. They argued that homosexuality is a 
social category with varied characteristics, the meanings of which are 
shaped by particular histories and social contexts.2 McIntosh, for exam-
ple, argued that homosexuality, as it existed in Britain at that time, could 
not be assumed to exist in the same form and with the same meaning 
everywhere else. Plummer, on the other hand, pointed out that the act 
of naming something as sexual is what signifies its sexual nature.3
 Social constructionist theories have opened up new areas of research 
and established that sexualities found outside the West, where most of 
the early theories emerged, do not map exactly onto Western categories. 
The use of English terminologies such as “homosexuality” or “LGBT” 
creates the impression of a universal form of nonheterosexuality. Words 
being “sticky,” they have retained (at least elements of ) the meanings that 
they carry in their context of origin, even if non-Western communities 
might also accord them different meanings.4 The use of English terms 
to describe same-sex identities and sexual conduct has obscured indig-
enous terms that are better placed to describe identities and practices as 
they are understood by local communities. Early European researchers 
labeled as homosexuality everything that they observed as deviant from 
heterosexuality.5 However, Chichewa terms, and the meanings that they 
carry about homosexuality in Malawi, are different. First, there is no 
word for “sexuality.” One can describe sexuality but hardly find a word 
to name it. Homosexuality is locally translated as mathanyula or cha ma-
tonde, both of which are derogatory terms referring to anal sex between 
males.6 Chichewa has no direct translation for same-sex identities or 
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conduct between lesbians, transgender, or intersex persons. For the pur-
poses of this chapter, I have chosen to use the term LGBTQ+ not as 
an acronym (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer) but to signify 
that there is no appropriate term that adequately describes nonheterosex-
uality in the Malawian context. LGBTQ+ indicates the infinite range 
of identities and conduct that falls outside of heterosexual norms.
 People whose identities and sexual conduct fall outside of hetero-
sexual norms are often confronted with the need to negotiate for, or 
explicitly claim, their identity, conduct, and relationship-based rights.7 
Such claims may be formally pursued through international, regional, 
and domestic human rights mechanisms. At the international level, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by all United Nations 
member states, is the basis for treaties that outline sets of rights that 
all human beings ought to be entitled to. Treaties such as the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women have been interpreted as extending human 
rights provisions to cover sexual orientation and gender identity. How-
ever, there is a heated debate among United Nations member states as 
to whether the rights enshrined in such treaties necessarily extend to 
LGBTQ+ persons.
 At the regional level in Africa, the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights is not considered by member states as guaranteeing the 
protection of human rights based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity. At the domestic level in Malawi, section 20 of the constitution 
guarantees equal protection of human rights. In addition, the constitu-
tion recognizes several regional and international human rights treaties 
as part of domestic law.
 In principle, therefore, all persons in Malawi ought to be entitled to 
human rights in accordance with domestic, regional, and international 
human rights law. That all humans are entitled to human rights leads us 
to take for granted that human rights are universal. After all, they are 
defined by prominent scholars as equal rights that each person holds on 
the basis that they are human beings.8 The universality of their defini-
tion, meanings, and terminology is rarely questioned. However, in his 
social construction theory of human rights, Benjamin Gregg expresses 
skepticism about the universality of human rights. “The problem,” he 
argues, “is that the very idea of human rights, as commonly understood, 
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implies a claim to universal validity. How does a community realize the 
potential for universal validity of a cultural construct that is valid only 
locally?”9
 Gregg’s questioning of the universality of human rights must not 
be misinterpreted as an effort to replace human rights. Rather, it rep-
resents a quest to motivate local communities to seek the negotiation 
of a human rights framework based on their own terms. The resulting 
frameworks might well be similar, but that should only be coinciden-
tal. The relevance of Gregg’s intervention is crucial because there are 
societies in which human rights frameworks are approached with the 
suspicion that they have been “copied and pasted” from elsewhere, and, 
as such, that they are inappropriate to the setting in which they are 
encountered. It is possible to compare the ICCPR and the Malawi 
constitution to demonstrate where this suspicion might arise from. Ad-
opted in 1966, article 2(1) of the ICCPR reads, “Each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.”10 This common clause on 
nondiscrimination is also found in most regional and international trea-
ties. Adopted in 1995, section 20(1) of the Malawi Constitution reads, 
“Discrimination of persons in any form is prohibited and all persons are, 
under any law, guaranteed equal and effective protection against dis-
crimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, property, 
birth or other status.”11
 Human rights principles such as nondiscrimination serve a central 
importance that is necessary in legal instruments. However, the resem-
blance of the language in the two treaties makes it possible to see the 
latter as the result of a copy-and-paste project. This suspicion is en-
hanced by the fact the official text of the constitution is available only 
in the English language. The English-Chichewa dictionary does not 
contain a translation for human rights.12 The absence of the word sug-
gests that it is a relatively recent concept in the Chichewa language. In 
a study of Chichewa expressions for human rights among Malawians, 
Harri Englund has noted that ufulu wachibadwidwe is the most com-
mon phrase used to describe human rights.13 He notes that ufulu in 
Chichewa means “freedom,” “liberty,” or “independence.” He also notes 
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that wachibadwidwe means “birthright.”14 Ufulu wachibadwidwe can 
therefore be translated as “a birthright of freedom, liberty, or indepen-
dence.” Over time, since the emergence and flourishing of the language 
of human rights during the advent of multiparty democracy from the 
mid-1990s, ufulu wachibadwidwe has gained prominence as the domi-
nant Chichewa translation for “human rights.” “Human rights” can also 
be translated with the slightly extended form of ufulu wa chibadwidwe 
wa munthu,15 the literal translation of which is “the freedom that a 
human being is born with.”16 This translation offers better qualification 
of the term “human rights” as articulated in the English language as well 
as the English-language legal documents in Malawi.
 While the official Malawi constitution is in English, in 1997 the Na-
tional Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a US insti-
tution, engaged the services of three Malawian consultants to translate 
the document into Chichewa.17 The Chichewa constitution translates 
“human rights” as ufulu wa anthu, “freedom of people.” Although ufulu 
ordinarily translates into English as “freedom,” “right” in article 15(2) 
of the English version of the constitution is translated as ufulu in the 
Chichewa version. It can thus be concluded that ufulu wa anthu should 
be translated as “rights of people.” However, the Chichewa constitution 
also translates the mention of liberty in article 18 as ufulu. In article 40, 
the term ufulu is used interchangeably to translate “right” and “freedom.” 
Ufulu therefore carries multiple meanings in this Chichewa version of 
the constitution.
 It is important to note that the two Chichewa translations of “human 
rights” do not carry precisely the same meaning. Ufulu wa anthu refers to 
more than one person (anthu, people) and may imply collective claims. 
Ufulu wa chibadwidwe wa munthu refers to a single person (munthu, 
person) and connotes individual rights. Ufulu wa anthu may suggest that 
human rights are valid if they advance collective aspirations. It might 
imply that individual interests that do not serve collective aspirations 
fall outside of this ufulu. However, ufulu wa chibadwidwe wa munthu 
specifically connotes that an individual has rights simply by the fact of 
being born human. Thus the English and Chichewa terms do not neces-
sarily encapsulate the same basic ideas about human rights. This leads 
to two conclusions: that the language of human rights among Malawi-
ans is relatively new, and that the meanings understood by Chichewa 
speakers may be varied and distinct from the meanings intended by the 
authors of the original English-language texts.
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 Concurring with Englund that human rights are commonly under-
stood through the concept of ufulu, Alessandra Sarelin noted in her 
research in relation to the right to food in Malawi that meanings about 
human rights continue to evolve as communities negotiate access to 
rights in their everyday lives.18 Through such negotiation, the communi-
ties were giving new meanings to human rights as opposed to utilizing 
predefined concepts.19 While the formal language in the English legal 
documents remains static and changeable only through the courts or 
parliament, local meanings are fluid and flexible, and they evolve in the 
course of daily interactions between citizens.
 Culturally legitimate norms or values are those that are respected and 
observed by members of a particular community on the basis that they 
bring satisfaction or benefit to community members.20 Discrepancies 
between Chichewa and English versions of human rights make it dif-
ficult for human rights to attain such legitimacy. Legitimacy would be 
attained if Malawian citizens felt that they were able to negotiate and 
author their own human-rights framework.21 However, the resemblance 
between the ICCPR and the Malawi constitution raises the specter that 
the latter was not a product of local authorship. Nevertheless, that does 
not mean that human rights should be rescinded in Malawi. Human 
rights have served as an important tool to guarantee concrete improve-
ments in the lives of Malawian citizens. However, an alternative frame-
work has potential to improve the sense of local ownership.
 “Justice” is translated as chilungamo in Chichewa. The term is found 
in the Chichewa dictionary. Unlike the term “human rights,” chilungamo 
is not an alien term. It does not carry varied meanings in the (unoffi-
cial) Chichewa version of the constitution. It is a well-established local 
term. It is also a common term in everyday use. Chilungamo connotes 
righteousness, honesty, fairness, and personal integrity. Chilungamo is 
relational to other persons. It can refer to the singular and the collective. 
One must be honest, fair, righteous, and uphold integrity toward others. 
While ufulu is about securing a person’s freedom from the interference 
of others, one does not need to be righteous, honest, or fair.22 Some 
Malawians have associated ufulu with a lack of respect and insolence 
since it does not necessarily require chilungamo in terms of integrity.23 
For example, a girl-child might demand her ufulu to go to school in-
stead of doing domestic chores and could argue that this was a matter of 
chilungamo in terms of dignity and fairness. On the other hand, a fifty-
year-old man might claim that he has the freedom or right (ufulu) to 
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marry a fourteen-year-old girl, but he would be hard pressed to express 
this in terms of justice (chilungamo). Chilungamo might therefore offer 
an alternative that could be deployed to eliminate injustices and human 
rights violations without the rhetorical backlash that can be unleashed 
against the perceived exotic or alien basis of claims made in the name of 
ufulu. The rest of this chapter elaborates how chilungamo might offer an 
alternative framework for addressing the shortcomings of human rights 
with respect to LGBTQ+ rights in Malawi.
The (Re)Emergence of the Homosexuality Debate in Malawi
Public debate about homosexuality in Malawi emerged in December 
2009 following a national newspaper article about Steven Monjeza Soko 
and Tionge Chimbalanga Kachepa. The two had performed a chinkho-
swe, a traditional marriage ceremony, in Blantyre City. Both Monjeza 
and Chimbalanga were born male. However, Chimbalanga lived as a 
female and was known as such by her community.24 The news of their 
chinkhoswe set off shockwaves of moral panic and disbelief nationwide. 
Monjeza and Chimbalanga were arrested and charged with the criminal 
offences of carnal knowledge against the order of nature and gross inde-
cency under sections 153 and 156 of the Malawi penal code, respectively25 
(section 153 criminalizes “unnatural offences”).26
 They were subjected to involuntary medical examinations, including 
anal examinations to confirm charges of sodomy, and psychiatric tests to 
affirm that they were of sound mind to stand trial.27 They were denied 
bail on the grounds that releasing them would put them at security risk 
from the outraged public.28 Throughout the trial, the two were subjected 
to humiliation and homophobic outbursts from the public galleries at 
the court. According to newspaper reports, for example, at one point 
during the trial Chimbalanga fainted owing to malaria and was sub-
jected to homophobic abuse by the people sitting in the public gallery.29
 In May 2010, the two were found guilty of the offences and sentenced 
to a maximum fourteen years’ imprisonment. In the judgment, the 
magistrate stated that the conclusion of the case secured the course of 
justice by protecting the community. During sentencing, the magistrate 
emphasized the shock experienced by Malawian citizens, concluding 
with a harsh warning to all LGBTQ+ Malawians: “So this case being 
the first of its kind, to me, that becomes the worst of its kind. I cannot 
imagine more aggravated sodomy than where perpetrators go on to seek 
heroism, without any remorse, in public, and think of corrupting the 
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mind of a whole nation with a chinkhoswe ceremony. For that, I shall 
pass a scaring sentence so that the public must also be protected from 
others who may be tempted to emulate their (horrendous) example.”30
 The harsh sentence was widely praised in Malawi, not least by promi-
nent politicians and religious and traditional leaders. For example, chiefs 
in the central region marched to the capital city of Lilongwe in sup-
port of the maximum sentence, proclaiming that cultural norms were 
under threat because of the actions of Chimbalanga and Monjeza.31 
The Presbyterian church was among the many churches that welcomed 
the sentence on the basis that homosexuality was un-African and un-
Christian.32 The government, through its minister of information, also 
stated that it was pleased with the maximum sentence.33 The conviction 
was locally praised as a step toward the eradication of “homosexuality” 
in the country.
 However, in a dramatic turn of events, United Nations Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon visited Malawi. In his speech to parliament he 
called for an end to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
suggesting the repeal of antigay laws.34 At the end of his visit, he ad-
dressed a joint press conference with Malawi’s president at the time, 
Bingu wa Mutharika, who announced that he had pardoned the couple 
unconditionally.35 Nevertheless, he stressed that “these boys committed 
a crime against our culture, our religion, our laws,” further reiterating 
his position that his pardon did not imply support for homosexuality.36 
Although he ordered an end to the discussion of the issue, the case has 
reemerged in heated public debates numerous times since.
 In 2011, in a move that was directly related to the presidential par-
don of Monjeza and Chimbalanga, the Parliament amended the penal 
code to introduce a new section 137(a) aimed at criminalizing same-sex 
conduct between females. The section on indecent practices stated that 
“any female person who, whether in public or private, commits any act 
of gross indecency with another female shall be guilty of an offence 
and liable to a prison term of five years.” In May of the following year, 
incoming president Joyce Banda announced in her maiden state of the 
nation address that her government would repeal all antigay provisions 
in the penal code.37 In response, the leader of the main opposition party 
cautioned her against being dictated to by donors.38 Banda eventu-
ally changed her position following expressions of outrage from many 
Malawians, especially prominent politicians and traditional and reli-
gious leaders.39 During this wave of controversy, the minister of justice 
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declared a moratorium on the use of the three penal code provisions 
(sections 137[a], 153, and 156) that could be employed against LGBTQ+ 
people.
 In February 2015, the Malawi Parliament passed the Marriages, Di-
vorce and Family Relations Bill into law. The new law defined sex, in 
relation to the gender of a person, as the sex assigned at birth. The par-
liamentary memorandum accompanying the bill stated that Malawian 
law presupposes that marriages are heterosexual and as such the sex of a 
person could be only male or female. It went further to emphasize that 
such restrictions were necessary to guarantee nonrecognition of anyone 
who attempts to change their sexual identity. This was the first time that 
Malawian laws had been used to regulate sexual identity, a shift from 
previous laws that targeted only same-sex conduct. While the new law 
received praise for increasing the minimum age of marriage and thereby 
outlawing child marriages, it has been criticized for effectively prohibit-
ing recognition of nonheteronormative sexual and gender identities.
 In December of the same year, Kelvin Gonani and Cuthbert Kule-
mela were arrested and charged with committing “unnatural acts.”40 
While in detention they were subjected to compulsory anal examina-
tions and HIV tests. Their arrest was condemned by two local civil so-
ciety organizations, the Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation 
(CHRR) and the Centre for Development of People (CEDEP), as well 
as the international community. Following domestic and foreign pres-
sure, the minister of justice announced that the state had uncondition-
ally dropped the charges and reiterated the moratorium set in 2012.41
 The following year, in January 2016, two gay Malawians granted a 
local television program an interview to discuss their sexual orientation. 
In the interview, they called on the government to either kill them or 
give them their rights.42 The media coverage triggered public outrage 
and a prominent politician took to social media to call for the killing 
of “homosexuals,” arguing that “the devil has no rights.”43 CEDEP and 
CHRR lodged a criminal lawsuit of incitement to break the law under 
section 124 of the penal code.44 However, the director of public prosecu-
tions (DPP) discontinued the case.45 Currently CEDEP and CHRR 
are challenging the DPP’s decision. While not exhaustive, the account 
of recent debates presented here is sufficient to demonstrate that the 
issue of “homosexuality” is highly contentious in Malawi, and no resolu-
tion has been achieved thus far.
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Why Is “Homosexuality” So Contentious in Malawi?
Many Malawians say that they are opposed to homosexuality because it 
is an alien practice. The prevailing narrative is that “homosexuality” did 
not exist in the country until white “homosexuals” introduced it, thereby 
corrupting indigenous moral values and practices. As mentioned above, 
“homosexuality” is primarily understood by way of the local terminol-
ogy of mathanyula, which implies anal sex between males; it is often 
associated with the capacity of an adult male to molest underage males. 
It is only as a result of the recent debates that “homosexuality” has ac-
crued associations with other nonheterosexual practices and identities.
 Malawians who oppose “homosexuality” tend to cite cultural and 
religious arguments to justify their position. First, they believe that 
Malawian culture is inherently upright and the emergence of homo-
sexuality is a sign of moral degradation. Homosexuality is therefore 
viewed as leading to the erosion of Malawi’s cultural values through the 
domination of alien practices. Second, they insist that the laws of nature 
have no room for nonheterosexual intercourse, citing essentialist argu-
ments that sex is primarily aimed at procreation. Third, “homosexuality” 
is taken as a grave sin and an abomination in the context of the two 
dominant religions of Christianity and Islam. Christians and Muslims 
make up over 90 percent of Malawi’s population. Finally, the equation 
of homosexuality with the act of anal sex has facilitated perceptions of 
it as unhygienic, unhealthy, and disgusting. Criminal laws are thus seen 
as appropriate tools to curb the practice.
 On the other hand, a minority of Malawians who have called for the 
protection of human rights for LGBTQ+ people have cited entitlements 
outlined in the constitution and international human rights treaties that 
Malawi is party to. The main argument presented by those who support 
rights for LGBTQ+ persons is that Malawi’s constitution, which is the 
supreme law of the land, guarantees human rights for everyone with-
out discrimination. They have also argued that Malawi’s international 
human rights obligations require human rights protections for LGBTQ+ 
persons. They see so-called antigay laws as an obstacle to human rights 
guarantees and thus call for their repeal. In 2013, CEDEP and CHRR 
joined a high court confirmation case of three sodomy convictions, where 
the court called for interested parties to join the case in which they would 
also review the constitutionality of section 153(a) of the penal code.46
 Advocates for LGBTQ+ rights also argue that protection of 
LGBTQ+ persons makes for better health policies. For example, 
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CEDEP and CHRR have argued that men who have sex with men 
(MSM) have higher risk of HIV infection and therefore need to have 
their health rights promoted.47 With an HIV prevalence rate of 21.4 
percent,48 which is twice the national average, MSM are deterred from 
accessing health-related HIV services by the unfriendly treatment they 
sometimes receive in public health facilities. They may also avoid going 
to health facilities for fear of being arrested and charged with homo-
sexual crimes under the penal code. Calls based on the need to promote 
the health of LGBTQ+ persons have been supported by stakeholders 
within Malawi and beyond.
 Locally based international partners have repeatedly called for re-
spect for “LGBT rights” or “gay rights.” They have also reiterated that 
human rights protection for LGBTQ+ persons is a positive step in the 
HIV and AIDS response and the popularization of human rights prac-
tices. For example, following the arrest of Monjeza and Chimbalanga in 
2009, donor representatives warned the Malawi government that perse-
cution of homosexuals risks isolating the country from the global com-
munity.49 Following the arrest of Kulemela and Gonani in December 
2015, the international community again expressed concerns, reminding 
the Malawi government to honor its human rights obligations and the 
moratorium on arrests. The issue was also raised by a member of Parlia-
ment in a House of Commons debate in the UK Parliament.50
 However, public attention was aroused when the United States am-
bassador to Malawi, Virginia Palmer, posted a statement on the official 
US embassy Facebook page on December 15, 2015, which read,
I remind the government of its stated policy not to arrest, detain, 
charge, or pursue people engaged in consensual same-sex activ-
ity. The rights of LGBTI persons are human rights. As a matter 
of human rights, public health, and public order, LGBTI persons 
should not be discriminated against in any way.
 I urge the government to make good on its international 
human rights obligations, drop the charges, and resolve this unfor-
tunate incident as quickly as possible.51
Palmer’s post received overwhelming responses from outraged Ma-
lawians who accused her of disrespecting their cultural and religious 
values. They also accused her of interfering in domestic issues. Curi-
ously, none of the posts challenged her proposition that the rights of 
LGBTI persons are human rights. However, the ambassador’s public 
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statement marked a turning point that resulted in the withdrawal of 
charges against the two men.
 Interventions by international actors are perceived by some Mala-
wians as evidence of a conspiracy to impose alien immoral practices. 
Some critics have argued that because most Malawian civil society or-
ganizations—including LGBTQ+ rights organizations—rely on donor 
funding, the agenda of those advocating for LGBTQ+ rights may be 
influenced by their international partners.52 For critics of these donor 
interventions, any calls for human rights in relation to “homosexual-
ity” are perceived as an initiative to validate, legitimate, and proliferate 
the practice of “homosexuality.” If “homosexuals” have human rights, 
they fear that it implies a right to practice their “homosexuality,” which 
is commonly thought to include a right to molest underage males. It 
is also feared that accepting that homosexuals have human rights will 
give way to the legalization of gay marriages. For others, such rights are 
thought likely to popularize a Western “gay culture,” which is said to 
promote activities that conflict with conservative values and dominant 
representations of local ways of life.
 The government has been cautious so as to avoid conflict with the 
electorate. Many state officials have spoken in support of protecting 
LGBTQ+ persons, but they have tended to retract their comments or 
fall silent following public outrage. For example, before the arrest of 
Monjeza and Chimbalanga in 2009, the principal secretary of the Min-
istry of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS said at a public event that Malawi 
must recognize the rights of LGBTQ+ people in order to step up the 
fight against HIV and AIDS. Her remarks provoked a public backlash 
and she later withdrew the statement.53 It is little wonder, as discussed 
earlier, that Joyce Banda retracted her intention to repeal antigay laws 
following public criticism from her potential voters. Similarly, the cur-
rent president, Peter Mutharika, has avoided disclosing his opinion on 
whether LGBTQ+ persons have rights, opting for the safer option of 
suggesting a “yes” or “no” national referendum vote.54 His caution echoes 
the view of the former president of Botswana, Festus Mogae, who pub-
licly stated in a BBC debate in 2011 that during his presidency he could 
not have supported calls for human rights protections for LGBTQ+ 
people because he was not willing to sacrifice his political career for gay 
rights.55
 Where the government has been seen to be progressive regarding 
LGBTQ+ people, the motives are not simply respect for human rights. 
127
Chilungamo and the Question of LGBTQ+ Rights in Malawi
For example, in 2015 Malawi was granted funding from The Global 
Fund amounting to $380 million on the basis of a project proposal 
that included targeted services for LGBTQ+ Malawians. During the 
bidding process, the government exercised moderation in terms of an-
tigay rhetoric. By contrast, at the United Nations Universal Periodic 
Reviews (UPR), Malawi has consistently rejected recommendations 
about the protection of human rights for LGBTQ+ people. During 
Malawi’s review at the 16th Human Rights Council session in 2011, 
government representatives responded to concerns about homophobia 
in the country by rejecting calls for gay rights and urging other UN 
member states to respect the wishes of Malawians.56 Nevertheless, in 
2015 Malawi unprecedentedly accepted one UPR recommendation to 
take effective measures to protect LGBTQ+ people from violence and 
prosecute perpetrators of such violence, as well as to guarantee access to 
health services and HIV/AIDS treatment for LGBTQ+ communities. 
On balance, however, it might be concluded that the government is not 
entirely committed to securing meaningful human rights protections 
for LGBTQ+ persons.
The Legal and Policy Framework
 From 1891 to 1964 Malawi was declared a British territory. It was 
called British Central Africa and later Nyasaland. The laws that were 
introduced by the colonialists favored the interests of colonial settlers. 
The interests of the “natives” were disregarded, and they did not have 
democratic rights.57 It was during this period that Nyasaland inher-
ited laws such as the Offences against the Person Act of 186158 and the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885,59 which included the crimes of 
“buggery” and indecent practices between males, respectively.
 These laws are part of the colonial legacy of the British Empire, 
which introduced antigay laws across its colonial territories. The Brit-
ish Empire first introduced these antigay laws in India’s penal code 
in 1860 through section 377 on unnatural offences, which states that 
“whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature 
with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with imprisonment 
for life, or with imprisonment . . . for a term which may extend to 10 
years, and shall be liable to a fine. Explanation–Penetration is sufficient 
to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described 
in this Section.” This provision has similarities with section 153 of the 
Malawi penal code. Criminalization of same-sex conduct was part of 
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a broader British colonial legacy imposed on its colonial territories to 
“correct and Christianise native custom.”60 While the former colonizer 
has since repealed antigay laws, some of its former colonies such as 
Malawi jealously guard them, claiming that they are the last hope for 
“autochthonous” values. It should however be noted that the laws have 
been inactive until recently, when African leaders began to use antigay 
rhetoric and persecution as a powerful tool to mobilize consensus in the 
face of popular discontent because of economic and political turmoil. 
This includes the rhetoric of the long-serving Zimbabwean president, 
Robert Mugabe, who stated at a book fair in 1995 that homosexuals 
are worse than animals,61 and Gambian president Yahya Jammeh, who 
threatened to behead homosexuals in his country.62
 After years of struggle for freedom and self-rule from the British 
colony, Malawi gained independence in 1964 under the leadership of Dr. 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Dr. Banda was soon crowned life president 
and led the one-party state for thirty years. His reign was characterized 
by political oppression and the abuse of human rights. It was toward the 
end of his rule, in the early 1990s, that movements emerged demanding 
rights and political freedoms, and the concepts and language of human 
rights began to flourish. Following a national referendum in 1993, Ma-
lawi opted to end the one-party system of government, ushering in 
multiparty democracy and a democratically elected government in 1994. 
A comprehensive new constitution was adopted, which contained a bill 
of rights to protect citizens’ freedom and liberties.63
 The 1995 constitution is the supreme law of the land to the extent that 
“any act of Government or any law that is inconsistent with the provi-
sions of this Constitution shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be 
invalid.”64 Application of its principles is without exception, and there 
is a strict test for any justification of limitation of rights in article 44, 
which states that “laws prescribing restrictions or limitations shall not 
negate the essential content of the right or freedom in question.”65
 The bill of rights at the core of the constitution includes rights to life, 
liberty, human dignity and personal freedom, equality, family and mar-
riage, education, culture and language, economic activity, development, 
freedom of association, freedom of conscience, freedom of opinion, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly, as well as guaranteeing 
the rights of children and the rights of women. As we saw above, article 
20(1) of this bill of rights guarantees equality and nondiscrimination. 
Sexual orientation or gender identity is not explicitly mentioned as a 
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prohibited ground for discrimination. This is unlike the South Afri-
can constitution, which is the only African constitution to explicitly 
mention sexual orientation as a ground for equality. However, it can be 
argued that not mentioning sexual orientation or gender identity does 
not necessarily mean that the bill of rights excludes LGBTQ+ persons 
from the enjoyment of the human rights specified therein.66
 The constitution provides for the establishment of independent in-
stitutions such as the Malawi Human Rights Commission (MHRC) 
and the Office of the Ombudsman, which have a mandate to receive 
complaints about human rights abuses. Both MHRC and the ombuds-
man have successfully investigated cases of human rights violations in 
the country.67 These institutions were established with guaranteed inde-
pendence from the state or any other interference. The constitution also 
provides for international law as a source of law in Malawi, prescribing 
different rules for the application of such law.68
 In addition, Malawi is a signatory to many key international and re-
gional treaties that are relevant to the promotion of LGBTQ+ rights.69 
Similar to the equality principle in article 20(1) of Malawi’s constitution, 
these treaties have in common the prohibition of any form of discrimi-
nation that would limit the enjoyment of the human rights defined in 
the bill of rights.70 While sexual orientation is not mentioned in these 
treaties, it can be argued that reference to “other status” alongside fac-
tors such as race, sex, language, and religion implies the inclusion of 
sexual orientation, and by extension gender identity. In the 1994 case of 
Toonen v. Australia,71 the Human Rights Council heard a complaint by 
a Tasmanian resident that Tasmanian laws criminalizing sexual activity 
between consenting adults of the same sex were discriminatory under 
the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee held that states should 
protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.72 Nondiscrimination clauses in domestic and international human 
rights instruments therefore ought to adopt the same principle, inclu-
sive of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity.
 Criminalization of same-sex conduct in sections 137(a), 153, and 156 of 
the penal code and regulation of sexual identities under the Marriages, 
Divorce and Family Relations Act are obstacles to the enjoyment of 
constitutional and international human rights for LGBTQ+ persons in 
Malawi. For example, they cannot freely enjoy their right to liberty or 
dignity in accordance with articles 18 and 19 of the constitution because 
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they face potential public backlash. As a further example, LGBTQ+ 
persons cannot freely access their human right to health for fear that 
they will be reported to the police when they visit health facilities. Simi-
larly, LGBTQ+ persons may also withdraw from school owing to fear of 
arrest. The repeal of such laws is therefore necessary to facilitate access 
to human rights by LGBTQ+ persons.
 It should however be clarified that such rights are discussed in refer-
ence to consensual same-sex conduct between adults, and to nonhet-
eronormative sexual and gender identities. This clarification preempts 
the arguments of critics who fear that calls for LGBTQ+ rights imply 
a passport to the molestation of children. Any molestation of children 
ought to be criminal, whether heterosexual or homosexual. Similarly, all 
nonconsensual sexual conduct ought to be criminal.
 Malawi’s National HIV/AIDS policy was launched at the height 
of the AIDS epidemic in 2003. Long before the homosexuality debate 
emerged in 2009, this policy recognized that persons engaging in same-
sex relationships were vulnerable to the impact of HIV and AIDS. The 
policy stated that LGBTQ+ persons “are often underprivileged so-
cially, culturally, economically or legally, may be less able to fully access 
education, health care, social services and means of HIV prevention; 
to enforce HIV prevention options; and to access needed treatment, 
care and support. They are thus more vulnerable to the risks of HIV 
infection and suffer disproportionately from the economic and social 
consequences of HIV/AIDS.”73 The policy proposed a review of antigay 
laws. So far the government has not initiated any review of the relevant 
sections of the penal code or the Marriage Act, citing that Malawi is not 
ready to review its antigay laws.74 However, the policy remains in force 
and is the basis for the national HIV and AIDS strategy.
 As we have seen, the legal and policy landscape indicates that there 
is potentially a sufficient framework for the protection of human 
rights for LGBTQ+ persons in Malawi. The supreme law of the land, 
which contains a bill of rights and recognizes key international human 
rights instruments, provides a comprehensive list of human rights that 
LGBTQ+ persons ought to be able to access. The constitution renders 
the antigay provisions of the penal code invalid. Criminalization of 
same-sex conduct, at least between males, is a legacy of British colo-
nialism, contrary to the prevailing myth that the laws are indigenous. 
The national HIV/AIDS policy supports decriminalization and human 
rights protection.
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Chilungamo as an Alternative for Protecting LGBTQ+ Persons
In the local debate, the terminology mostly cited about human rights 
in the context of same-sex sexuality is that of “LGBT rights” or “gay 
rights.” Conservatives state that they do not want Malawians to en-
dorse ufulu woti amuna adzikwatirana or ufulu wa anthu ofanana ziwalo, 
literally translating as “freedom that men should marry each other” or 
“freedom for people who have similar sexual organs (to have sex),” re-
spectively. However, such rights do not exist under Malawi’s current 
domestic, regional, and international human rights obligations. The 
Chichewa phrasing suggests that Malawians are rejecting LGBT rights 
or gay rights that are understood narrowly as a right for people of the 
same sex to engage in sexual intercourse, as opposed to the entitlement 
of LGBTQ+ people to all constitutional or international human rights, 
such as access to hospitals (right to health) or entitlement to attend 
public schools (right to education). In principle and practice, the local 
rejection of “LGBT rights” does not necessarily constitute the rejection 
of the latter.
 While there is potential to reframe LGBTQ+ rights by clarifying 
that they represent not a call for an imaginary right for people of the 
same sex to engage in sexual relations but rather a call for recognition 
of the fact that LGBTQ+ persons are equally entitled to human rights, 
restricted interpretations of the concept of human rights remain an 
obstacle to the attainment of local legitimacy. Many Malawians reject 
LGBTQ+ rights because of their negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ 
people. However, their suspicions that the concept of human rights is 
foreign complicates efforts to facilitate protection for a seemingly devi-
ant group whose practices are commonly misinterpreted as alien.
 To put the problem into perspective, it may be useful to draw reflec-
tions from a recent human rights debate that emerged following a spate 
of killings of persons with albinism in the country. Since 2014, Malawi 
has experienced a surge in abductions and gruesome murders of persons 
with albinism. It is believed that the killers are harvesting the victims’ 
body parts for witchcraft rituals. The crisis in Malawi prompted the 
United Nations independent expert on the enjoyment of human rights 
by persons with albinism, Ikponwosa Ero, to visit Malawi for a fact-
finding and consultative mission. Following her visit, she warned that 
persons with albinism faced extinction. All sectors of Malawian society 
have united in calling for an end to the killings and abductions. They 
have called on the government to step up efforts to protect the rights of 
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persons with albinism. It is from these calls that the language of rights 
of persons with albinism emerged. These calls have received so much 
support that even an extreme call by a member of Parliament for the 
resumption of the death penalty for the killers received little criticism.
 The question of whether the rights of persons with albinism were 
new rights did not arise. But what if Malawi was confronted with a per-
son with albinism who was LGBTQ+? Would such a person be entitled 
to human rights? Would such human rights then be “LGBT rights”? If 
not, how can we distinguish LGBT rights from human rights, or indeed 
from the rights of persons with albinism?
 If we refer to Malawi’s policy and legal framework discussed earlier, 
an individual who has albinism and is LGBTQ+ should enjoy entitle-
ment to human rights, rights of persons with albinism, and LGBTQ+ 
rights. However, it would be difficult to claim legitimacy and local valid-
ity for such rights under the banner of LGBT rights. For human rights 
in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity to be acceptable to 
Malawians, there is a need for an alternative, complementary framework.
 The concept of chilungamo offers an alternative that can comple-
ment and support demands for human rights for LGBTQ+ persons, 
even under the banner of LGBT rights or gay rights. Justice presents 
conceptual and practical advantages. Malawians who oppose gay rights 
might intuitively say that an LGBTQ+ person with albinism must not 
have “LGBT rights.” However, such a denial could be said to be lack-
ing in chilungamo. Chilungamo demands fairness and righteousness in 
the entitlement and access to human rights. Chilungamo is a necessary 
extension of human rights.
 In terms of legitimacy, the term chilungamo preexists rights-based 
terminologies in Malawi. Its common usage does not suffer the con-
tamination of prominent international, regional, or domestic legal in-
struments. Principles of righteousness, honesty, fairness, and integrity 
preexisted colonialism. While ufulu as a concept preexisted colonialism, 
its past meaning did not include human rights as understood today. The 
concept of human rights that is used in Malawi was born, at least in 
terms of international human rights law, at a historical time and place 
in 1948 during which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
drafted and disseminated. The concepts of ufulu wa chibadwidwe wa 
munthu and ufulu wa anthu were coined in the post-1948 period and 
popularized only through the 1995 constitution after Malawi attained 
democratic independence. Unlike chilungamo, which already enjoyed 
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local legitimacy, the legitimacy of ufulu wa chibadwidwe wa munthu 
and ufulu wa anthu diminished with the proliferation of the English 
language of human rights. Qualifying ufulu wa chibadwidwe wa munthu 
and ufulu wa anthu with chilungamo would strengthen the relevance of 
human rights as a concept and as a practice.
 It should once again be noted that chilungamo cannot replace ufulu 
wa chibadwidwe wa munthu or ufulu wa anthu in the bill of rights or 
international human rights mechanisms. However, it offers a critical 
alternative to complement the current human rights framework toward 
local legitimacy.
I have argued that the concept of human rights lacks local legitimacy 
in the Malawian context because it does not fully translate into local 
terminology and meanings. Human rights are perceived as an alien 
concept imported from the West. However, the concept of chilungamo 
(justice), which enjoys local legitimacy and consistent meaning, has the 
potential to complement the current human rights framework to extend 
protection to LGBTQ+ persons by highlighting principles of fairness 
and righteousness in relation to entitlements and access to human 
rights. I have discussed the theoretical foundations of the concepts of 
human rights and justice in the human rights context, presented the key 
issues in the debates surrounding LGBTQ+ rights, and signaled the 
relevance of the idea of chilungamo for the protection of human rights 
for LGBTQ+ persons. In conclusion, I call not for the replacement of 
the human rights framework but for an idea of justice that addresses the 
challenges encountered in the application of human rights in Malawi.
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Mobile Courts in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Pat r i C K  H o e n i g
M O b I L E  C O U RT S  b E L O N G  T O  A  N E w  G E N E R AT I O N  O F  N O N M I L I TA RY 
devices introduced in countries of sub-Saharan Africa to extend the 
reach of the state in areas where it has lost control, or where its control 
is being contested. Local judges, accompanied by public prosecutors, 
defense counsels, victims’ attorneys, and clerks, travel from their urban 
bases to remote villages to settle land disputes and inheritance matters 
or to deliver justice in proximity to communities affected by acts of 
violence, often qualifying as crimes against humanity. The law applied in 
such cases is domestic civil or criminal law. In some instances, however, 
when they are being supported, in cash or in kind, by intergovernmental 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), mobile courts have been 
known to directly apply international human rights law. And yet, being 
what they are, namely, regular state institutions, mobile courts come 
with none of the baggage making international legal mechanisms, such 
as the International Criminal Court (ICC), so controversial. Domestic 
actors perform the duties assigned to them by the constitution, thus 
upholding the rule of law, while the international donor community, 
lending mere financial and logistical support, leaves a light footprint. 
The social group standing to benefit most from increased court mobil-
ity are women and girls, an added advantage of mobile courts in the 
eyes of their proponents because women, as voices in transitional justice 
literature point out, are “overrepresented among the poor, the illiterate 
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and those with little information, and overburdened with family-related 
obligations that make traveling large distances a difficult task.”1 Ac-
cording to their supporters, mobile courts are thus minimally invasive, 
conducive to promoting gender equality, and fully compatible with the 
hierarchy of legal enforcement mechanisms for human rights.
 Criticism has been voiced on various grounds. First of all, mobile 
courts are expected to operate under conditions that are often less than 
ideal, within timelines astonishingly short given the complexity of the 
cases to be adjudicated, deprived of access to legal texts and the internet 
to check precedents or facts, and, depending on the season, in sweltering 
heat or heavy rain. In such circumstances, judges are prone to cut pro-
cedures short and arrive at snap judgments. Furthermore, skeptics point 
out that in legal systems that have been notoriously understaffed, over-
burdened, and open to the payment of bribes, such as in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), the introduction of mobile courts may be 
a drop in the ocean of justice-sector reform efforts, bringing to justice 
a few perpetrators of abuse while leaving unaddressed the plight of the 
vast majority of survivors who continue to suffer from the consequences 
of violence-related trauma. As Kamari Maxine Clarke explains in the 
context of the ICC, movements aiming to establish court authority 
through the moral imperative of ending impunity cannot “evade the 
incessant reminder that the capture of a commander, or the deployment 
of command responsibility to reassign guilt, will not end violence.” The 
essence of violence does not lie, she adds, in the ability of a commander 
to order—or prevent—an attack on civilians but in the “banality of the 
everyday and its dramas to control the terms of life and the production 
of death.”2 In other words, criminal justice, or so the argument goes, is 
of no help when violence is systemic and collective.
 The need to refocus attention on the political economy of violence—
and its gendered nature—became clear to me when, in 2014, a local jour-
nalist told me about his observations of a mobile court in Burhinyi, ap-
proximately one hundred kilometers southwest of Bukavu, the capital of 
South Kivu Province. The court traveled on a shoestring budget and relied 
on the village chief for food, accommodation, and local transport. From 
the resulting report, commissioned by a local women’s rights organiza-
tion, I have picked three cases to highlight the nexus of patriarchal family 
structures, competition for scarce resources, and gender-based violence.3
 The first case concerned a woman who had been battered and humili-
ated by her husband and in-laws. “The son of my husband’s little brother 
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was possessed by evil spirits in school. My husband’s family said I had 
bewitched the kid. They pulled me from my bedroom and paraded me 
naked through the streets of the village.” The second case was brought by 
a woman who said her husband had attacked her with a machete before 
throwing her out of the house. “My husband accused me of witchcraft 
after our grandson had suddenly died. He told my son—the father of 
the child—that I was to blame. They ganged up against me and chased 
me from my own land.” In the third case a woman claimed she had been 
abandoned by her husband for another woman. The husband had then 
come to take the children against their will, and now she had three and 
her husband had the remaining three. She said she had no means to 
support herself or the kids and the husband paid her no maintenance.
 The cases from Burhinyi are but a small window into the manifold 
forms of violence and humiliation that darken, disrupt, and destroy the 
lives of women in the eastern DRC. In all three cases, the men were 
convicted by the mobile court for offenses such as causing bodily harm, 
attacking someone’s “modesty,” uttering death threats, defamation, or 
adultery. In all three cases the men were sentenced simultaneously to 
prison terms and the payment of compensation. However, no one on 
the bench of the mobile court seemed to have noticed that one part 
of the judgment canceled out the other because sending those found 
guilty of gender-based violence to jail would bar them from engaging 
in gainful economic activity, resulting not only in financial distress for 
themselves and their dependents but also making the payment of com-
pensation more unlikely than it may have been in the first place. This is 
not a call for letting bygones be bygones, nor do I intend to argue that 
sexual and gender-based violence should not trigger criminal sanction. 
However, looking at the cases from Burhinyi gave me pause and made 
me wonder what good it will do for survivors to be paraded before the 
bandwagon of the fight against impunity.
 This chapter reflects on the idea of bringing justice to the people and 
posits that mobile courts, under the guise of increasing access to justice 
and nurturing confidence in the rule of law, follow trajectories long as-
sociated with interventionist politics. Using material from the Baraka 
trial of 2011, I try to show that mobile courts impose criminal justice 
solutions in line with donor agendas while potentially stymieing re-
storative processes of bringing about atonement for wrongs committed. 
At the same time, it appears to me that testimonies of survivors of sexual 
violence cannot easily be cited in support of one stream of analysis in 
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transitional justice at the expense of another. If we look at what justice 
survivors say they want, there seems to be room for ambiguity and over-
lap at the interstices of discourses revolving around retributive and re-
storative justice concepts. The chapter is based on extensive participant 
observation, focus group discussions, and interviews conducted during 
field trips in five consecutive years (2012–2016). Apart from the vast 
literature on transitional justice interventions in postconflict societies 
of sub-Saharan Africa and campaigns to stop sexual violence in the 
eastern DRC, I have drawn on a range of primary sources, includ-
ing reports from local as well as international civil society groups and 
media outlets.
Contextualizing Mobile Courts in the DRC
Mobile courts have featured on the peacebuilding agenda of intergov-
ernmental organizations and NGOs operating in the Central African 
Republic, Sierra Leone, Somaliland, South Sudan, and, most promi-
nently, in the DRC. Judging from the footprint it leaves in the media, 
in civil society fora, and academic debates, the DRC is a model state for 
justice intervention. Being the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa and 
the second largest in Africa as a whole, after Algeria, the DRC struggles 
with a flailing economy, fragmented infrastructure, poor public services, 
and the consequences of two devastating wars in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, which laid to waste much of the eastern borderlands. The 
repercussions are ever present as people in the DRC continue to suffer 
from the “brutality of armed groups and political instability” as well 
as an “appalling lack of governance.”4 The justice system, in particular, 
is marked by resource scarcity and political interference. According to 
Savage and Kambala wa Kambala, the judiciary in the Congo has been, 
throughout history, “the plaything of political forces.”5
 A sense of how loosely linked ordinary Congolese think the legal 
system is to the idea of justice was conveyed to me in a conversation 
early on in my research in the eastern DRC. “What are you doing in 
Congo?” a local truck driver asked after picking me up from a road 
swirling with dust to give me a lift to the next motorcycle taxi stand. 
When I told him I wanted to find out how mobile courts helped people 
get justice, he burst out laughing. “Justice in the Congo is a field of 
peanuts, my friend. It holds promise for many when you start planting 
but after bringing home the harvest only the farmer eats.” “But who 
is the farmer?” I asked. The truck driver rolled his eyes. “Who do you 
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think I’m talking about? The judge, of course! The judge collects from 
everyone participating in legal proceedings and then gives a judgment 
in favor of the highest bidder.”
 Almost everyone I talked to agreed that the legal system in the DRC 
did not serve all in equal measure but primarily those who could afford 
to pay for services rendered. Analysis shows that the list of shortcomings 
is long.6 Some of the obstacles to justice taking its course include pro-
hibitive court fees and travel costs for survivors to file a case, especially 
when they live in a rural environment. A case may collapse even after it 
has been filed because survivors flinch at the prospect of testifying in a 
possibly hostile court of law. Last but not least, justice may take a course 
other than the one intended by the law because a bribe is offered and 
accepted, or because the military hierarchy has inexplicably arranged 
for the transfer of an officer to a post in a far-flung area just when legal 
proceedings are about to proceed.
 Mobile courts were introduced in independent Congo, then known 
as Zaire, in 1979. They ceased to operate when the first Congo war broke 
out in 1996 and resumed, under the support of international actors, after 
peace was restored and a transitional government was formed in 2003. 
In 2006 general and presidential elections were held in the DRC, and 
from 2009 onward mobile court programs were expanded in the east-
ern provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Maniema, as well as in 
the district of Ituri, which became a province in its own right in 2015. 
Mobile courts have received backing, mostly in terms of logistics, from 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Organization Sta-
bilization Mission in the DRC, named MONUSCO after its French 
acronym. However, the main driving force has been international 
NGOs, such as the American Bar Association (Washington, DC), the 
Open Society Foundation (New York), Avocats sans Frontières (Brus-
sels), People in Need (Prague), and Vivere (Lausanne). It is for the most 
part on their initiative and from their budgets that activities have been 
planned, travel costs reimbursed, and allowances paid for time spent in 
the field.
 Some of the mobile courts set up in the eastern DRC in recent years 
were mandated to look into land and inheritance issues, but the bulk 
of the caseload pertained to particularly shocking incidents of violence 
covered in the international media and a staggering backlog of crimes 
relating to sexual violence. A UNDP report states that 60 percent of 
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the cases taken up by the mobile court system in eastern DRC in the 
period from January 2011 to December 2012 were concerned with sexual 
or gender-based violence.7 The focus in international justice reform 
programs on sexual violence can be explained by the growing influence 
of streams of analysis linking findings of gender and conflict theory. 
Human Rights Watch was the first international NGO to describe 
sexual violence in the eastern DRC as a “weapon of war,” a military 
tactic used by commanders to win and maintain control, not so much 
over land but people.8 Sexual violence as a weapon of war has since 
become a fixture in power-point presentations beamed on the walls 
of lecture halls around the world. The explanatory value of describing 
sexual violence as a tactic of asymmetrical warfare may be limited in 
the face of Congo’s complex political and social realities, but stories of 
rape generate instant attention and are conducive to stirring audiences 
unfamiliar with the intricacies of the conflict into action.9
 Apart from recourse to the language of war, the case for intervention 
is bolstered by the portrayal of the DRC as a “failed state.” International 
NGOs regularly publish meticulously researched reports in which they 
hold the DRC government to task for allowing the country to fray at 
the edges and for failing to provide security and access to justice.10 Such 
detailed stocktaking of public authority failure boosts critical debate 
but may have unintended consequences. The more the DRC is depicted 
as a breeding ground for human rights abuse, arbitrary rule, and serial 
rape, the more justifiable it seems to interfere with the way things are 
and call on external powers to impose a system of checks and balances 
on domestic actors.11
 Meanwhile, it is often overlooked that the introduction of mobile 
court programs, in the name of human rights, sits uneasily with the 
colonial history of such courts. Bérengère Piret reminds us that King 
Leopold II of Belgium, when he took over the Congo as his private 
property following the Berlin Conference in 1885, worked on the as-
sumption that he had to build a legal system from scratch in the newly 
acquired territory. Piret explains that mobile courts, a cost-efficient 
alternative to establishing a comprehensive judicial system, were in-
troduced to give the colonial regime visibility. The reach was limited 
because, as Piret makes clear, European judges had little penchant to 
move around the countryside, but like their counterparts today, itiner-
ant courts planted the idea of a uniformly applicable law in areas that 
otherwise lacked the experience of a central authority.12 However, for 
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all their potential to create spectacle, there was, according to a Congo-
lese historian to whom I spoke privately, something eerily ephemeral 
about the way mobile courts came, meted out their version of justice, 
and left. They seemed like a ploy, a feature of colonial grandeur that 
rolled through village after village, beaming a bright light into the 
night. People were stunned, mesmerized, perhaps electrified by the at-
tention paid, for once, to their rural lives, but when morning broke, the 
court in its tent was gone.
 Similarly, Nancy Rose Hunt describes the dispatch in the 1920s of 
mobile medical teams who carried census books and acted as survey-
ors, messengers, and emissaries to extend “coercive state methods” to 
ever-more-remote regions of the Belgian Congo.13 Seen through that 
lens, the pull of mobile institutions, both in the legal and medical fields, 
may have been—and perhaps today still is—not so much their expedi-
ency as their theatricality. Showing the trappings of the state where 
otherwise it has little presence does not necessarily turn a dysfunctional 
administration into an effective one. However, it serves as a demonstra-
tion of the political will that, as we have seen above, representatives of 
the international community find so conspicuously absent when they 
visit the DRC. As for the light footprint that international actors claim 
they leave when they help organize mobile court programs, it should be 
recalled that any international support to existing national institutions 
in fulfilment of their constitutional mandate, couched as it may be as 
complementary, auxiliary, or secondary, meets the definition of inter-
vention.14 In the next section, I will show that this has consequences 
both for the accused and for the witnesses testifying in internationally 
assisted mobile courts.
The Baraka Trial
International observers point out that mobile court programs in the 
eastern DRC represent a “viable forum in which to try relatively high-
ranking military officials for war crimes”15 and give a fresh impetus to 
initiatives seeking “to finally put an end to impunity and injustice.”16 
However, what emerged from the interviews I conducted with legal 
practitioners in the eastern DRC was something else. Many of my in-
terlocutors asserted that the fast-tracking of trials for sexual violence 
exacerbated many of the problems associated with law enforcement in 
fragile situations. I was told that courts were faced with donor expecta-
tions for high conviction rates, thereby compromising the principle of 
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presumption of innocence. Defendants and defense counsels were given 
insufficient time to apprise themselves of what were often voluminous 
dossiers, resulting in an infringement of the right to a fair trial. The 
well-being of survivors was no more a priority than the rehabilitation of 
anyone found guilty and sent to prison. I learned that survivors of sexual 
violence, despite their fear of retribution, social rejection, and stigma, 
were lured into testifying by locally organized and internationally 
funded outreach and awareness-raising campaigns that combined legal 
counseling with medical and psychosocial assistance for the duration of 
the trial.17 After they had testified, however, survivors lacked support 
and protection in the local community, as well as the means to build a 
new life elsewhere. Compensation—if it was awarded at all—was not 
paid in most cases.
 In what follows I will illustrate the findings of my interviews using 
as an example the proceedings of a mobile court dispatched to a small 
town in the southern part of South Kivu Province to look into the Fizi 
incident, arguably the most widely publicized case brought before a 
mobile court in the eastern DRC. On New Year’s Day 2011, Congolese 
soldiers attached to a unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel 
Daniel Kibibi Mutuare attacked the civilian population in Fizi, two 
hundred kilometers south of Bukavu. According to reports that trick-
led in over the next few days, houses had been broken into, property 
had been looted, civilians had been beaten, and dozens of women had 
been raped. With the discourse on sexual violence as a weapon of war 
well entrenched in the DRC, the incident instantaneously made inter-
national headlines as the “New Year’s rape in Fizi.”18 Conforming to 
expectations expressed by the diplomatic community and supported by 
Open Society Foundations,19 the Congolese authorities expeditiously 
dispatched a military court to try Colonel Kibibi and ten others in 
Baraka, a small town situated on the bank of Lake Tanganyika, a short 
distance from Fizi on a bumpy road.
 Journalist Michelle Faul describes how for three days the court sat 
in closed session to hear the testimony of forty-nine women, referred 
to by numbers to protect their identities. The evidence brought against 
the colonel was conclusive: “One woman said Kibibi raped her for 40 
minutes. She said she knew the colonel because he often bought food 
from her.”20 Once the women had testified the proceedings resumed 
in open court. A large crowd was in attendance. Hundreds gathered to 
hear the additional evidence and listen to the arguments of the defense. 
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Galya Ruffer, a legal scholar observing the trial, recalls that most of the 
bench seating was taken up by local NGOs and journalists. As there was 
not enough space for the audience, some spectators were hanging on the 
walls of the courtroom to get a glimpse of the proceedings. Police of-
ficers were standing guard with their guns at the ready. The atmosphere 
was raucous and the audience, mostly men, had to be reminded of court 
decorum as people erupted in laughter and ridiculed some of the ac-
cused for their lack of education. Soldiers from Kibibi’s unit observed 
the commotion from a truck parked close to where the trial was held.21 
Judgments were delivered on February 21, a mere eleven days after the 
commencement of the trial. Nine of the accused were convicted, one 
was acquitted, and another transferred to a juvenile court because he 
was found to be a minor. Of the nine convicted, four were sentenced to 
twenty years in prison, among them Colonel Kibibi, two more to fifteen 
years, and the remaining three to ten years.22 The verdict was announced 
in the presence of the governor, who returned to Bukavu on board a UN 
helicopter the same day.
 The trial and conviction of Colonel Kibibi were celebrated by inter-
national observers as a victory of what is often called “global justice.” 
In a press conference held in Bukavu the following day, the US ambas-
sador, freshly arrived from Kinshasa, urged the Congolese authorities 
to take all measures necessary to help the victims and bring the perpe-
trators of rape to justice.23 Kelly Askin, in her capacity as senior legal 
officer with the Open Society Justice Initiative, wrote that she and her 
colleagues had been allowed privileged access to a closed session hear-
ing of the “Fizi rape trial,” giving them an opportunity to listen to the 
“heart-wrenching testimony from young girls and elderly women who 
had their lives and families shattered by horrific violence.” When one 
woman said that trials like the one held in Fizi were “a necessary ingre-
dient to bring peace to her country,” Askin noted, she “felt like a proud 
mother, listening to someone praise her baby.”24 Analysts stressed the 
symbolic meaning and preventive effect of punishing an officer of the 
Congolese army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du 
Congo (FARDC), and were impressed with how the judgment, as one 
expert put it, “combined elements of Congolese civil, criminal, and mili-
tary law with the most up-to-date international human rights protec-
tions regarding SGBV [sexual and gender-based violence].”25 However, 




 Legally speaking, there are indications that the court, in pushing 
through a heavy agenda in very little time, failed to uphold the prin-
ciples of fair trial and presumption of innocence. In an interview he 
gave me in his office in Bukavu, Alfred Maisha, the lawyer represent-
ing Colonel Kibibi, stated that on numerous occasions the rights of 
the defense had been infringed in order to bring the trial to a speedy 
conclusion. He noted that on the day prior to his client’s conviction, he 
had submitted a lengthy document raising points that he thought were 
pertinent for ascertaining the guilt of the accused. He wondered how it 
had been possible for the court to consider the submission on its merits 
and reach a verdict the same day. Maisha further claimed that neither 
he nor his client had received the judgment in writing and that he had 
never been notified to appear for a hearing on the appeal he had filed 
after the verdict was announced more than four years ago. Maisha said 
his client had since been transferred to Kinshasa, which made it hard 
to represent him, given the fact that a plane ticket to Kinshasa from 
Bukavu was as expensive as a ticket from Europe.26
 I cross-checked Maisha’s allegations with the lawyers of the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA), who had supported the witnesses testifying 
in the Baraka trial. I was told that the judgment had been issued in 
writing and that if Kibibi’s attorney was not in possession of the docu-
ment, then this could be explained only by negligence on the part of the 
defense. When asked for a copy of the judgment, the lawyers said it was 
not for them but for the court to provide documents pertaining to a trial 
that had reached the appellate stage.27 Confronted with the statement 
of the ABA, Maisha is reported to have replied that he had not seen the 
judgment and was not aware of its existence, but if indeed it had been 
circulated without being communicated to him or his client, it would 
mean that the court had “violated the constitution.”28
 The views expressed by the parties are indicative of a climate of 
distrust and suspicion, which is probably not helped by the biased ap-
proach taken by the very organization that had assisted the authorities 
in getting the proceedings underway. Two years after the trial, Open 
Society published a brochure titled “Justice in DRC” that contained a 
summary of the proceedings in Baraka and their outcome under the 
heading “The Guilt of Soldiers in Fizi.” The brochure correctly stated 
that all but two of the accused were “found guilty.” However, it failed to 
mention that throughout the trial the defendants had insisted that they 
were innocent. Even more glaring was the omission that the sentences 
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had been delivered by the court of first instance and that the defendants 
had filed an appeal, which means that the judgment, at the time the re-
port was written, was not final (the appeal was still pending at the time 
of writing).29 Such blatant misrepresentation of facts notwithstanding, 
the brochure was still available on the web for download when I last 
checked in August 2017.30
 Independent observers cautiously distanced themselves from the role 
of Open Society in, and its representation of, the Baraka trial. A former 
judge at the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Mary McGowan 
Davis, who was invited by Open Society to follow and assess mobile 
court proceedings the year after the Baraka trial, offered the view that 
hearing lower-profile cases that might otherwise escape attention was 
of “equal or, perhaps, greater value” than the proceedings in Baraka. As 
examples of “crimes that beset every community every day,” she cited 
the case of a thirteen-year-old girl who was raped by a relative in her 
bedroom and the case of a ten-year-old who was sexually assaulted by a 
police officer while gathering grass to feed her guinea pigs.31 In a similar 
vein, Galya Ruffer notes that the Open Society report omits some of the 
facts that complicate the local situation. “For example, what sparked the 
incident was a fight over a girl in a bar. One of the soldiers, not wearing 
a uniform, had tried to pick up a local woman. Her boyfriend, angered, 
attacked the soldier, who later died. The soldiers looted the village in 
retaliation for the death of the soldier.”32
 Ruffer points out that on that particular night none of the attackers 
was wearing a uniform, which leads her to conclude that by couching 
the incident in terms of international humanitarian law, the Open Soci-
ety narrative “inscribes only the identities that have to do with war and 
conflict,” ultimately shaping justice in a way that ignores “the experience 
of victims as speakers of their social condition.” Ruffer highlights “the 
need to better understand how local testifiers and actors identify or not 
with the new vocabularies of sexual violence as an atrocity crime” and 
to what extent the qualification of rape as a crime against humanity has 
been able “to give voice to epistemic injustice.” In the case of the Baraka 
trial, the concerns of the women testifying in the proceedings were not 
addressed, she observes, which is why the court was perceived as just 
another “foreign tribunal.”33
 Related to the problem of not listening closely enough to what wit-
nesses say and how they say it are the issues of witness protection and 
reparation. Many of my interlocutors on the ground felt that the Baraka 
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trial had yielded little in terms of compensation, unnecessarily exposing 
the witnesses and, once they had provided testimony, leaving them to 
deal with the consequences. One such critic was Thérèse Kulungu, then 
director of the Panzi Foundation’s Legal Clinic, who formed part of the 
legal team representing the women testifying in the Baraka trial. Inter-
viewed for this research, Kulungu recounted the stories of the women 
who had testified in court. From evening to early morning they had 
been raped by one band of soldiers after another, on orders of Colonel 
Kibibi. There was no escape. Women who tried to hide were pulled from 
their hiding places, and the troops had license to kill those who resisted. 
In the end, she said, Colonel Kibibi and some of his men had been 
convicted and sentenced to prison terms and payment of compensation. 
Was that justice? The prosecutor had asked for the death penalty and 
appealed against the verdict, but so far no hearing had taken place at 
the appellate court.34 Meanwhile, the convicted had been transferred to 
Bukavu Central Prison where, she intimated, jail breaks were the order 
of the day. Kulungu concluded her account on a somber note. “Show 
me the survivor who still has the courage to come forward and bring a 
case when she knows that after the trial she will have no protection and 
she will also not get compensation. And threats are directed not at the 
woman alone but at her whole family and even the lawyers representing 
her. If we [the women’s advocates] are alive after such a trial it’s only by 
God’s mercy.”
 At this point of the interview Kulungu mentioned, almost inciden-
tally, that she had gone to Fizi after the trial, not in her capacity as 
counsel, but as part of a fact-finding mission. She related that she had 
wanted to speak to the women who had testified in court to see how they 
were faring. The ones that the mission was able to locate were restless. 
They said they constantly worried about their safety. Others, according 
to Kulungu, had moved away for fear of reprisal.35 Apparently, the mea-
sures taken to protect the identity of the witnesses, such as the screening 
off of the proceedings during testimony, had not proven to be effective, 
hardly a surprise in a milieu where the comings and goings of people 
are inevitably noticed and routinely talked about. What international 
stakeholders had propagated as the strength of mobile courts, namely, 
the holding of a trial in proximity to the locality where the crime has 
been committed, had in the case of the proceedings in Baraka turned 
out to be a major impediment to ensuring security for the witnesses on 
whose testimonies the convictions had depended in the first place.
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Limitations of Criminal Justice
Bearing in mind the colonial baggage that mobile court programs carry 
and the limited effect they had for rural populations in colonial times, I 
felt that it was imperative to speak with survivors of incidents recently 
taken up in mobile courts. What would they share with me about their 
day in court, what kind of justice would they tell me they had obtained? 
I discussed the possibility of going to Fizi with my local collaborators 
whenever I came to the eastern DRC. However, even before fighting 
broke out in Burundi in 2015 and turned trips to nearby Fizi into a 
logistical challenge, we had doubts about what such a visit would ac-
complish. We wondered whether it was possible for academic research 
to account for death and destruction and whether it was legitimate for 
researchers to cite from accounts provided by survivors of sexual vio-
lence, and if so, in what form.36 We felt that even if we managed to iden-
tify and interview some of the survivors, it would not be safe for them 
to talk to us. We were also not sure what counseling they had received, 
if any, and how our questions might affect the healing process. In 2016, 
we identified a local NGO that provided shelter and psychosocial sup-
port to survivors of sexual violence in the southern parts of South Kivu 
Province where Fizi is located. They offered to explore the possibility 
of calling a meeting with survivors of the attack that had given rise to 
the Baraka trial in 2011. When we learned that the women contacted by 
the organization would welcome an opportunity to speak with us, we 
decided to go to Fizi and meet with them. Eight survivors turned up; 
I met them alone, accompanied only by an interpreter, a person whom 
the survivors knew and trusted. The meeting took place in a safe house 
provided by the organization.
 To my initial surprise, none of the women had much inclination to 
speak about the Baraka trial or, to the extent they had been called as 
witnesses, their experience of taking the stand. This is not to say that the 
way a survivor is treated as a witness in court has no effect on how she 
will be able to heal and recover from potential trauma. To the contrary, 
studies in victimology suggest that respect for a survivor testifying in a 
court of law and regard for her well-being, as part of a concept termed 
“therapeutic jurisprudence,” reduce the risk of retraumatization and may 
boost her self-esteem.37 But why did the proceedings in Baraka hold so 
little meaning for the survivors, who more than anybody needed their 
sense of justice to be restored? Were my interlocutors disappointed with 
the court? Had there been something wrong with its demeanor? Those 
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who had gone to Baraka to give evidence stated that the proceedings 
had been long and the logic of the questioning had not always been 
clear to them but that overall they had been treated with respect and in 
a courteous manner. What was the problem then?
 With time I came to understand the reach and the depth of the dam-
age that had been done. It was not possible for survivors then, and it is 
not possible for them today, to speak about the “Fizi incident” as if it was 
a mere sequence of events that can be adequately or easily described. I 
will not provide details here of the violence these women witnessed and 
endured. There is no need for such an account in this volume on justice. 
I will limit myself to noting the fallout. Common to all my interlocu-
tors was the experience of social exclusion, indicating a splintering of 
societal cohesion following the breakdown of law and order. The sorrows 
articulated by the women in the room were mundane and existential at 
the same time, ranging from raising money for medical treatment to 
maintaining a roof over their head. Mothers talked about how, as a con-
sequence of suffering rape by armed intruders, they had been abandoned 
by their partners and shunned by their families, and how, despite every-
thing, they tried to keep sending their children to school.38 One of the 
survivors said, “When my husband learned I had been raped he threw 
me out of the house, along with my children. I pleaded with him, not for 
my sake but for the sake of the children. After all they are his kids, too. 
He only said, ‘They no longer need me. They have five fathers now.’ He 
said this because I had been raped by five men, one after the other.”
 Survivors noted that apart from the moral satisfaction of the convic-
tion of the main accused in the Baraka trial, they had hoped for material 
compensation. The nonexecution of the judgments, which did indeed 
provide for compensation to the tune of $10,000 each, is considered a 
major drawback by virtually all observers of the Baraka trial. However, 
from the halting way the women spoke, it appeared to me that there 
was still something else that bothered them. Finally, one woman stated, 
“I went to testify in court. They asked me many questions. I was happy 
with the judgment but when I came back to my village, there was noth-
ing for me to eat and no place to sleep. Looking back I think the judges 
made it easy for themselves. If they really want to know how we suffer 
here in our community they should not ask questions but see for them-
selves. Why don’t they go and feel the pain?”
 Other women I interviewed, both in Fizi and elsewhere in the east-
ern DRC, echoed that sentiment. The very quality that judges pride 
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themselves on, namely, the ability to parse the facts and to determine 
what is pertinent and what is not, bewildered them. It made them feel 
that their stories had been cut short. This is a problem typical of crimi-
nal justice because the formalization of procedural rules, as important 
a safeguard as it may be for the rights of the accused and the defense, 
reduces the witness to a source of information, someone filling in the 
blanks, not drawing a picture of their own. The position of “victim” has 
advantages for survivors of sexual violence since it comes with the rec-
ognition that the infliction of harm results in rights and entitlements, 
such as the right “to speak up,” the right to reparation, including mon-
etary compensation, and the right to an apology and assurance of non-
recurrence of any of the violations experienced. However, such role-play 
is harmful to the extent that restricting survivors of sexual violence to 
the position of “victim,” which is the prerequisite for allowing them to 
become beneficiaries of any compensation resulting from the conviction 
of a perpetrator in a criminal trial, deprives them of the agency to tell 
their own story of what they endured and how they coped. The court, 
not the “victim,” determines what facts are relevant to decide a case on 
its merits, and international entrepreneurs of transitional justice, rather 
than limiting themselves to amplifying the voices of survivors, speak 
on behalf of “victims,” reproducing relationships of dependency and 
inferiority.39
 Kelly Askin, describing her feelings as a “proud mother,” may be an 
example of international observers or activists taking center stage when 
listening is all that is required. In a social climate where, as we have 
seen in the context of the cases taken up by the mobile court in Burhi-
nyi, witchcraft provides an excuse to settle scores or snatch land, where 
women are blamed for strokes of bad luck, chased away or abandoned at 
will, criminal justice is no panacea and to pretend otherwise distorts the 
often complex articulations of survivors. Pamela Scully warns that “con-
temporary campaigns against violence against women, now traveling 
under the sign of gender-based violence, like their colonial predeces-
sors, attempt to create the ‘modern woman’ by seeking to bring women 
under the aegis of the state.” In the process, she continues, campaigns 
place an emphasis on the individual as a victim of sexual violence, thus 
undermining traditional solidarity networks and, because women are 
more likely to be targeted when they are of childbearing age, “sever-
ing generational ties between older and younger women.”40 Restorative 
justice concepts at first seem better equipped to promote social healing 
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processes because they call for solutions based on holistic assessment 
rather than the application of formal law to a given case. However, 
restorative justice follows a communitarian approach to political judg-
ment, and so, just like its sibling, retributive justice, presumes a “basic 
consensus on who should be understood as ‘victims,’ who should be ad-
dressed as ‘offenders,’ and what constitutes a ‘crime.’”41 The use of justice 
scripts, whether written locally or internationally, silences the individual 
survivor’s often surprisingly nuanced account of what happened to her 
and how she could be restored to her rights. Human rights law and the 
corresponding enforcement mechanisms designed to protect women 
from violence, as Chiseche Mibenge observes, are sometimes blind to “the 
pain that law and justice can inflict, the omission they make, the control 
they keep [over women’s lives in patriarchal societies].”42
 The Baraka trial brings home the fact that the issue of transitional 
justice in the context of sexual violence is twofold. First, there is a prob-
lem of conception because criminal justice features so prominently in 
the discourse and yet knows no other approach than to decide a case 
on its merits and ascertain the guilt of the accused, thus narrowing the 
scope of possible redress. Second, agents of transitional justice are faced 
with a problem of representation as complex situations are all too often 
simplistically couched in the language of rights, which is then used as 
a tool for advocacy. However, from a survivor’s perspective, justice is 
more than the application of legal rights. Internationally assisted mobile 
courts and their inherent drive to make global justice solutions work at 
the local level bring the Congo back on the radar of the international 
human rights community but create obstacles, rather than opportuni-
ties, for survivors of violence to define, and perhaps achieve, their own 
version of justice.
Irrespective of how information on the DRC is packaged and which 
methodological tools are applied, most strands of analysis that factor 
in sexual and gender-based violence, perhaps because they factor in such 
violence, converge on the idea that international intervention is inevi-
table. At the same time, it is clear that international justice mechanisms 
neither have the capacity nor the mandate to try but the most severe 
cases of human rights abuse. Against this background, mobile courts, 
first introduced by the Belgian colonial regime, seem a fitting response 
to address a broader range of human rights violations. Perhaps it is 
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possible to argue that mobile courts open up space for debate in local 
communities on the issue of sexual violence and its root causes. However, 
as I have demonstrated in this chapter, internationally supported mobile 
court programs, based on the principles of complementarity, universal-
ity, and uniformity, do not give access to justice to all in equal measure. 
Rather, they give priority to those who claim to have suffered forms 
of abuse that conform to patterns of violations that are internation-
ally deemed to be of particular gravity. Thus they validate one particular 
justice narrative at the expense of other narratives and foreclose avenues 
available through other means of conflict resolution. On the flip side, 
survivors testifying in criminal proceedings take considerable risks. As 
the Baraka trial illustrates, they have reason to fear stigmatization and 
retribution, and the prospects of reparations are slim. Pushing the law of 
the land to the dotted lines of international borders may restore to state 
authorities a semblance of control in areas of limited statehood but does 
little, it seems, to rehabilitate survivors or address structural problems of 
postconflict situations in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Conflicting Conceptions of Justice and the 
Legal Treatment of Defilement Cases in Malawi
n g e y i  r u t H  K a n y o n g o L o  a n d  b e r n a d e t t e  m a L u n g a
T h E  M A L A w I  P E N A L  C O D E  U N D E R  S E C T I O N  1 3 8  C R I M I N A L I z E S  S E x U A L 
intercourse with a girl below the age of sixteen with or without her 
consent. This is the offence of defilement. Research shows a number of 
challenges in the legal treatment of defilement cases by both formal and 
informal traditional systems, which affect the protection of girls from 
sexual abuse. Such challenges include inefficiencies in the delivery of 
public services by such agencies as the police, courts, and traditional sys-
tems. The inefficiencies reflect, and result from, a distinction in concep-
tions of justice as held by communities and applied by the formal justice 
system. This paper explores the implications of these differences for the 
protection of girls. The paper thus examines discrepancies between the 
conceptions of justice articulated by ordinary citizens and those that 
inform formal legal proceedings. It shows that these differences have 
an adverse effect on efforts to deal with cases of child sexual abuse. The 
paper highlights the underreporting of sexual abuse of young girls as a 
significant impediment to the pursuit of justice and considers a variety 
of causes of underreporting, including situations in which sexual inter-
course with children is not condemned because it occurs in culturally 
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sanctioned settings, such as initiation ceremonies, as well as the on-
going economic dependence of victims on perpetrators. What is clear 
is that the achievement of justice for victims of defilement will require 
coordinated efforts across the divisions between formal and informal 
authorities.
 The paper is based on research conducted in eight districts of Ma-
lawi. The research set out to investigate the extent to which the justice 
delivery system protects the rights of children who have been sexu-
ally abused. The findings show that there are conflicting conceptions 
of justice between communities and the formal justice system, which 
ultimately adversely affects the protection of children from sexual abuse.
 The Malawi constitution provides for the protection of children from 
any treatment that is likely to be harmful to their health or their physi-
cal, mental, spiritual, and social development,1 and this includes defile-
ment. Defilement of children is harmful to their well-being.2
 Statistics indicate that one in five females experience sexual vio-
lence.3 In the Machinga District of Malawi, for example, the preva-
lence rate is particularly alarming, and police records indicate that a 
total of fifty-five cases of defilement were reported there between Jan-
uary and September 2015.4 In 1999 research conducted by the Centre 
for Social Research at the University of Malawi found that 55 percent 
of women in Malawi indicated that they had been raped or forced into 
sex.5 There is also research that shows that only a small proportion 
of incidents of defilement are reported to police.6 Further, those that 
are reported and brought to court often end in acquittal for want of 
evidence, in part owing to the incapacity of personnel in the system 
to handle such cases.7 The prevalence of defilement cases is due to a 
number of reasons, including the myth that sexual intercourse with a 
young girl cures HIV/AIDS.8
Conceptions of Justice in the  
Formal and Informal Justice Systems
There have long been debates around the concept of justice. Rawls de-
fines justice as fairness and argues that self-interested rational persons 
would choose two general principles of justice to structure society in 
the real world. The first principle is about equal liberty and states that 
each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible 
with similar liberties for all. The second is the difference principle, which 
states that social and economic inequalities should be arranged to the 
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greatest benefit of the least advantaged persons and attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity.9
 Rawls’s definition of justice as fairness resonates with conceptions 
of justice in defilement cases that would balance the interests of both 
the accused persons and the victims. In most criminal trials, emphasis 
is placed on the right to a fair trial for the accused person, whereas the 
victim is relegated to the background. For example, the constitution 
of the Republic of Malawi clearly stipulates various rights accruing to 
accused persons.10 The constitution is, however, silent on the rights of 
victims in criminal matters. In criminal law, the concept of justice as 
fairness takes a number of forms. Some criminal law scholars advocate 
for retributive justice, which is equated with punishment or just deserts 
for the offender.11 This kind of justice does not focus on the victim.
 By contrast, other scholars advocate for restorative justice. While it 
must be acknowledged that there are several different approaches to 
restorative justice, what all definitions of restorative justice share is a 
common moral vision: that justice requires more than the infliction 
of the “just desert” of pain on an offender.12 For instance, Marteni 
argues that something more than punishment is required if we want 
to implement a system that really pursues justice.13 He suggests that a 
path worth exploring in that regard is the one laid down by restorative 
justice. He states that the restorative justice approach is an approach to 
justice that has the victim at its center. Further, it also focuses on the 
unique needs of the individuals affected by specific incidents of crime 
and invites them to participate in a personalized and private experience 
where they have the opportunity to consider what is necessary to help 
them heal. Restorative justice therefore aims to empower the victim and 
give him or her influence over decisions relating to how the offender 
should make up for the crime committed.14 Restorative justice does 
not negate accountability for offenders. Apart from calling the offender 
to account, proponents of restorative justice argue that it goes beyond 
the benefits found in court-based, adversarial modes of administrating 
criminal justice.15 Through restorative justice, the victims can experience 
at least some form of reparation for the wrongs suffered, restitution for 
the losses incurred, and compensation for the suffering endured. This 
approach is thus said to go beyond giving offenders their just deserts.16
 The paper shows how evidence from ordinary people reflects a sense 
of justice as fairness. This goes beyond retribution and incorporates 
aspects of restorative justice in defilement cases. It shows how the 
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criminal justice system has to go beyond its focus on offenders receiving 
what they deserve and also ensure that victims of such offences receive 
justice. The focus on both victims and offenders can have an influence 
on the rate of reporting and prosecution of these offences and therefore 
can reinforce justice for both the accused and the victim.
The Formal Justice System
The formal justice system is defined in the paper as a system in which 
the delivery of justice is within the limits imposed by patterns of state 
law.17 Under section 41(2)(3) of the Malawi constitution, everyone has 
the right to access any court of law or any tribunal with jurisdiction for 
the final settlement of legal issues. In addition, every person has the 
right to an effective remedy by a court of law or tribunal for the viola-
tion of his or her rights and freedoms. While everyone has the right to 
access formal state justice as per the constitution, in practice this is often 
denied for a number of reasons. Our research shows that proceedings 
are often subject to considerable delays at all stages, mainly as a result 
of the sheer number of cases being processed through a limited number 
of courts. Further, the attitude of the criminal justice system toward 
victims of sexual assault is often negative and judgmental. The woman 
or girl may be blamed for the crime of which she is a victim.
 One particular form of injustice to defilement victims in the formal 
state system is shown by the continued requirement for corroboration of 
the victim’s evidence. It is the practice of the courts in Malawi to require 
corroboration of the evidence of a complainant in every sexual offence, 
including defilement. Corroboration is defined as independent evidence 
supporting the testimony of the complainant.18 The need for corrobora-
tion is applicable to each aspect of every sexual offence. As such, in 
defilement cases, the state has to bring corroborative evidence to sup-
port the core elements of the offence, namely, penetration, the age of the 
victim, and the identity of the accused person. However, corroboration 
is required as a matter of practice by the courts and not by authority of 
statute. Consequently, it is possible to convict on the uncorroborated 
evidence of the victim if the court is convinced about the trustworthi-
ness of the complainant. Before conviction in such cases, the court is 
required to recognize and put on record that it is aware that practice 
demands corroboration, that the court has looked for it in vain, that it is 
aware of the dangers of convicting in the absence of corroboration, and 
finally that, despite the absence of corroborative evidence, the court is 
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convinced that the evidence represents the truth. Without recognizing 
and stating the above, the decision may be overturned by the high court 
in its supervisory or appellate position.19 For example, in the case of 
Tinazari v. Republic, the high court stated that where the only evidence 
against an accused person in a sexual offence case is the uncorroborated 
evidence of the complainant, the court may, in rare cases, accept the evi-
dence as the truth and convict, provided that the court expressly record 
that there is no corroboration.20 As such the requirement of corrobora-
tion, though only a practice in Malawi courts, has almost become a 
rule of law that is applicable in every sexual offence case.21
 The requirement of corroboration in sexual offences is an injustice 
because it makes the prosecution of sexual offences unlike the prosecu-
tion of any other criminal offence. It brings an intense focus on the 
character and motivation of the complainant, which are unrelated to 
the proof of the essential elements of the offence. The prosecution may 
thus lose its case on the basis of what would appear to be irrelevant fac-
tors in other cases—for example, if the victim takes a long time before 
reporting the assault, or if the victim did not appear distraught at the 
time she reported the assault, although neither is an element of the 
crime.22 These rules, which shift the usual focus of a criminal trial from 
an inquiry into the conduct of the accused to that of the moral worth of 
the complainant, give legitimacy to the saying that sexual offences are 
the only offences wherein a victim is treated as an offender.23 The origins 
of the requirement for corroboration point to the fact that the rule was 
specifically developed to apply to women and girls as victims of sexual 
offences. Owing to the fact that women and girls constitute the major-
ity of complainants in sexual offences, prejudices appear to have entered 
considerations to the effect that women are not to be trusted in sexual 
matters and therefore their evidence must always be treated with cau-
tion.24 A police prosecutor at Nsanje police station stated that the need 
for corroboration has made many perpetrators escape prosecution and 
conviction in defilement cases. He stated that cases with no corroborat-
ing evidence are often not prosecuted and that, if prosecuted, they end 
up in acquittal for lack of corroboration, thereby denying the victims of 
such offences the opportunity to see formal justice being served. Our 
research further shows that it is not easy to secure corroborative evi-
dence in defilement cases. This is because the cases tend to be reported 
late when all corroborative evidence is gone. This late reporting is often 
due to the victim’s fear (perhaps following threats by the perpetrator) or 
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because of the relationship of trust that they have with the suspect. As 
such, without an intervening factor, such as pregnancy, cases may never 
be reported.
 In addition, the form of justice administered by the state seldom 
involves restorative or compensatory awards or sentences. In this it is 
often out of step with the expectations of people whose view of justice 
is based on traditional justice models. The emphasis under the formal 
system is on the punishment of the wrongdoer by the state. Any fines 
that are imposed are paid to the state. The victim, therefore, is relegated 
to the status of witness and ignored as far as her compensation needs 
are concerned. Under these circumstances, the state system is seen as 
repressive, patently unjust, and wholly inappropriate to the needs of the 
parties, and it is viewed as operating simply to further the interests of 
the government.25 The issue of compensation also plays a crucial role in 
the reporting of defilement cases. Though the penal code is clear that 
compensation can be ordered as punishment for any criminal offence, 
courts tend not to order such compensation in defilement cases. Thus, 
most families would rather not report the case and instead discuss the 
matter out of court with the perpetrator so that compensation might 
be paid.26 In Mzuzu and Mzimba, some of the respondents suggested 
that the formal justice system is unsatisfactory in the way it settles 
disputes, particularly in its emphasis on the arrest and imprisonment 
of the perpetrator as opposed to compensation for the victim and her 
family. As a male respondent in Ekwendeni, Mzimba, put it, “Arrest and 
imprisonment is not enough and does not profit the victim in any way. 
When defilement cases are resolved at community level, the victim and 
her family gets compensated and this is more fulfilling.” Community 
members thus expressed dissatisfaction with the court system, which 
they claim sidelines the victim and her family in relation to the remedies 
provided.
 In addition, there is a lot of mistrust by communities in the credibility 
of the justice system. Most communities stated that the formal system 
is full of corrupt officials and that therefore they do not trust it to settle 
defilement cases. Low confidence in the police’s ability to handle de-
filement matters effectively contributes to low reporting of defilement 
cases. The police were branded corrupt and reputed to favor people 
with money, who will give them bribes in exchange for the release of 
a perpetrator. Our research revealed that some reported cases were not 
investigated by the police or taken to court. In Mitundu, Lilongwe, a 
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female respondent summed up local attitudes toward and expectations 
of the police as follows: “The police do not attract respect and confi-
dence from the people in the way reported cases are handled. As such as 
part of showing discontent with the way cases of defilement and other 
offences such as theft and murder were being handled, the community 
vandalized their own police station in the year 2011.”
 Similarly in Nsanje, some respondents reported that defilement cases 
were better off being handled by the community rather than the police, 
who were considered to be corrupt. Participants suggested that, as a 
result of police corruption, cases of defilement are not properly inves-
tigated and prosecuted. The same was stated in Chimaliro, Mzuzu, by 
a local community leader and party chairman, who said, “We have no 
confidence with the way police handle defilement cases in this area. The 
police is not effective, does not attach importance to defilement cases 
and they are often bribed by the perpetrators. I have a number of cases 
in mind which were reported to police but have not been followed up.”
 Further, it was shown in some areas that accused persons with mental 
health issues were not prosecuted by the police but released from custody 
once it was reported that the accused was not of sound mind. This has 
also contributed to the low trust that people have in the police when it 
comes to dealing with defilement matters. For example, in Ekwendeni, 
Mzimba, the family of a victim was suspicious about the way the police 
handled their matter as regards the perpetrator. After the police arrested 
the perpetrator, the family alleged that they were called by the police, 
who told them that the perpetrator wanted to discuss the case out of 
court. They declined to do so because they wanted the case to be settled 
by the court. They were surprised to see that the perpetrator was released 
a few days later and that the case was discontinued because the police 
claimed that the suspect was mentally ill. Similarly in Mtandile/Mtsiliza 
in Lilongwe, the police did not take an accused to court once they learned 
that the accused was mentally ill. However, the law in section 11 of the 
penal code presumes every person to be of sound mind and to have been 
of sound mind at any time that comes in question until the contrary is 
proved. As such, the police practice of shielding accused persons with 
mental health issues can be challenged as against the law owing to the 
fact that it is the duty of the court to assess whether or not a person is 
mentally stable according to the evidence brought before the court.
 The need for compensation and the issue of mistrust in the formal 
system shows that the formal system does not relate to the way of doing 
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things in the communities. The formal system is more oriented to the 
accused person, and the needs of the victim are rarely taken into account. 
Community members expressed the need to be involved in the cases but 
said that most of the time they are not informed of what is happening 
once a case has been reported to the state authorities. This lack of infor-
mation creates suspicion about the way cases are handled by the state. 
This has contributed to low levels of reporting of defilement cases and 
the concomitant settlement of such cases at the community level.
 In addition, the law and procedure practiced in formal courts were 
found to be unfamiliar and complicated from the perspective of most 
citizens. Not least because proceedings are generally carried out in 
English, a language that most Malawians do not understand. Despite 
the fact that court clerks serving as interpreters are made available, the 
question remains as to whether substantive justice is done in all cases.27 
Furthermore, some respondents were dissatisfied with sentences meted 
out against convicts of defilement, arguing that they were on the low 
side. Others argued that the formal system is filled with men and that 
the lenient sentences are a sign of men protecting their fellow men.
The Informal Justice System
Informal justice is the social phenomenon consisting of settling dis-
putes between litigants outside state courts.28 It is defined broadly as 
encompassing the resolution of disputes and the regulation of conduct 
by adjudication or the assistance of a neutral third party who is not a 
part of the judiciary as established by law, or whose substantive, proce-
dural, or structural foundation is not primarily based on statutory law.29
 The rationale may be that court procedures are generally too slow 
and costly to be useful in resolving relatively minor disputes and that 
the adversarial process is not always the best mechanism for resolv-
ing such disputes.30 It has been argued that informal justice transforms 
current conceptions of justice away from an adversarial all-or-nothing, 
blame-and-guilt orientation and toward a conception that is aimed at 
conciliation of disputants or reintegration of deviants into society. It 
also expands the range of relevant issues to be taken into account when 
processing disputes so that all factors and not merely those that go to 
guilt or innocence can be given full consideration.31 Thus, the informal 
justice system may be more accessible than formal mechanisms and may 
have the potential to provide quick, relatively inexpensive, and culturally 
relevant remedies.32
167
Conflicting Conceptions of Justice and Defilement Cases in Malawi
 One such informal justice system is founded on values of umunthu. 
Umunthu, which is similar to the more widely known Zulu term ubuntu 
(see chapter by Scott, this volume), connotes both human dignity and 
humanity as basic human attributes of every individual, as well as the 
basis of an individual’s dignity and their relation to others.33 There is 
tacit understanding among some scholars of African indigenous epis-
temologies that umunthu implies, among other things, a comprehensive 
ancient African worldview that has normative implications associated 
with humaneness.34 However, it has not been taken seriously at the state 
level such that there is a disjunction in the conception of justice between 
the state with its adversarial all-or-nothing, blame-or-guilt orientation 
and umunthu principles that promote unity, dependency, reciprocity, and 
not vengeance.35 Thus, the formal justice system, which seeks to punish 
the offender in defilement cases, leaving the victim with no other rem-
edy, breaks the sense of dependency and unity embedded in umunthu. It 
can be argued that this helps explain the resort to informal justice where 
everyone “wins” in the sense that the liberty of the offender is not always 
compromised and the victim is compensated or considered through in-
formal justice procedures. The informal justice system therefore shares 
certain characteristics with the idea of restorative justice rather than 
retributive justice. However, the informal justice system is not free from 
the violation of human rights. It can also reinforce discrimination and 
neglect principles of procedural fairness.36 For instance, traditional and 
customary setups can take a skeptical attitude toward girls who report 
sexual abuse. Girls who are victims of defilement are often thought 
to have brought the act on themselves. In Nsanje, for example, most 
male respondents stated that women encourage defilement incidents 
through the way they dress, which was said to provoke men to commit 
these offences. Similar sentiments were echoed by an elderly woman 
at Zolozolo in Mzuzu, who said, “There was a case which happened in 
2002 where a young girl in her early teen years was defiled. Most people 
questioned the morals of the victim and she was labelled as promiscu-
ous. As such people did not feel sorry for what happened to her.” Analo-
gous sentiments were also recorded in Chilomoni, Blantyre, where some 
male respondents argued that men are sexually aroused if a young girl is 
not dressed “properly” and are therefore led to commit such offences. As 
such, many cases go unreported because the girls feel they would rather 
protect their reputation and keep a “clean” record by not exposing their 
experience to public scrutiny.
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 In other instances it is the parents, guardians, or family members of 
the victim who prefer it not to be widely known that their daughter has 
been defiled. Consequently, once the offence has occurred, the victim 
may be transferred from where she was living to another location so as 
not to feel the sting of shame and stigma. It ought to be noted that the 
impact sexual assaults can have on girls in a patriarchal society is signifi-
cant and long lasting. This is due to the fact that, in such contexts, a girl 
who has had numerous sexual partners may be devalued and demeaned. 
Rape and defilement may be seen as sordid, and victims of sexual as-
sault may be stigmatized.37 For example, in Ekwendeni, Mzuzu, it was 
discovered that among people who identified as Ngoni, a girl child is 
highly valued and regarded as a source of wealth by means of the pay-
ment of lobola (bride price) upon marriage. It was reported that, if a girl 
had been defiled or raped, men were often unwilling to pay a high bride 
price since she was regarded as “contaminated.” This adversely affects 
the reporting of defilement cases, as families do not want to receive a 
lower bride price.
 Further, in some settings, defilement cases are not reported so as to 
protect the perpetrator. Perpetrators are often people who are known to 
the victims rather than strangers. The perpetrators in this research were 
generally men who were close to the girls, such as fathers, step-fathers, 
grandfathers, employers, teachers, and house helpers. A traditional leader 
in Ekwendeni, Mzimba, reported as follows: “I have presided over such 
cases where the family does not want to report defilement to police to 
protect the perpetrator. One such incident comes to mind where the 
victim’s family did not want to report the matter as the perpetrator was 
a friend of the family and as such they wanted to resolve the matter at 
family level. They did not want the perpetrator to be prosecuted and 
possibly serve a long term jail sentence.”
 In some cases the perpetrator is a breadwinner for the victim and other 
family members. In such cases the families may remain silent about the 
offence rather than suffer because of the perpetrator’s arrest and possible 
imprisonment. Women may thus be caught in a bind when it is their 
husband or a male relative who has defiled their daughter.38 A woman 
who reports her husband or male relation lays herself open to divorce 
and social exclusion. Fear of the consequences, social and economic, of 
taking defilement cases to state authorities contributes to low rates of 
reporting, meaning that perpetrators are going unpunished by the formal 
system and victims are not seeing formal “justice” being done.
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 The discussion above about the formal and informal justice systems 
raises the question of how to balance the two systems and their different 
senses of justice. This paper argues that the formal state system should be 
allowed to evolve and incorporate positive aspects being implemented 
in traditional systems. The following discussion shows how the offence 
of defilement is constituted under formal and informal justice systems. 
It highlights a number of issues that result in injustice for the victims 
of the offence and how they might be redressed. The constitution of 
the offence of defilement under the law and in people’s understanding 
has a bearing on whether victims of such offences receive justice or not, 
and what kind. In some cases, the constitution of the offence prevents 
the victims from accessing formal justice. Further, there are differences 
between the ways in which defilement is conceived between community 
members and the formal justice system. What the formal justice regards 
as defilement is not the same as what many communities would regard 
as defilement. This affects community perceptions and practices in the 
handling of the offence of defilement as compared with the expectations 
of the formal justice system. These differences also affect the protection 
of the victims of defilement cases. Below is a discussion on the elements 
of the offence of defilement, how it affects justice, and how the two 
systems differ in its conception.
The Concept of “a Child”
The formal and informal systems of justice differ on the definition of 
the child. The offence of defilement under formal law is committed 
against female children under the age of sixteen. It is noted, however, 
that the provision does not protect all female children, as the definition 
of the child under international instruments is all persons below the 
age of eighteen.39 The standard of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) has to be adopted by all state parties to the convention.40 
The CRC aims at protecting children from all forms of exploitation 
because a child is, by reason of her physical and mental immaturity, in 
need of special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protec-
tion. Malawi is a party to the CRC and is therefore under obligation 
to protect people who are under the age of eighteen.41 The age of de-
filement emphasizes that a child is incapable of consenting to sexual 
intercourse as well as participating in sexual activities. The difference in 
the protection of children of various ages applies when imposing penal-
ties. Currently in Malawi, the penalty for defilement is the same for all 
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children. In Kenya, on the other hand, the Sexual Offences Act protects 
children up to the age of eighteen against the offence of defilement 
but specifies different levels of punishment depending on age. Section 
8 of the Sexual Offences Act provides that a person who commits an 
offence of defilement with a child aged eleven years or less ought to be 
sentenced to life imprisonment. Defilement of a child between the age 
of twelve and fifteen years attracts a prison term of not less than twenty 
years, and defilement of a child between the age of sixteen and eighteen 
is punished by a term of not less than fifteen years.42
 The informal or traditional system is no better than the formal system 
in protecting young girls from defilement cases. This system has no clear 
definition of who is a child, and in most cases a girl who has reached 
puberty is considered mature and ready for sexual activities.43 Custom-
ary law has no specific minimum age for capacity to marry. Capacity to 
marry is determined by the physical and intellectual capability of a par-
ticular individual to sustain a relationship. As a result, sexual intercourse 
with a girl who has reached puberty would not necessarily be reported 
as defilement.44 In this way, many girls are denied protection from sexual 
abuse. This is in view of the fact that girls often experience menarche 
before the age of fifteen, which has been said to be the median age for 
menarche in Malawi.45 In some of the research areas, such as Mitundu 
in Lilongwe, it was discovered that a number of people are of the view 
that once a girl reaches puberty, she is mature enough to indulge in 
sexual activities. As such they argue that it should not be an offence 
when a girl of such age is proven to have given consent to the sexual 
act. In the words of a male respondent, “There is nothing wrong with 
having sexual intercourse with a girl who has reached puberty. Some 
girls at the age of twelve are capable of consenting to sexual intercourse. 
I consider a girl who has reached puberty well matured to understand 
and appreciate and therefore consent to the act of sexual intercourse.”
 Different conceptions of the age at which a girl can consent to sex 
in the formal and informal justice systems have a direct effect on the 
protection of victims of such offences and their sense of justice.
Consent to Sexual Intercourse
It is not necessary to show lack of consent to sexual intercourse in order 
to prove defilement. This is unlike other sexual offences where lack of 
consent is always an element of the offence. As such, whether the girl 
consented to the sexual contact or not is irrelevant. If consent is proven, 
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the accused person would still be guilty. In the case of Republic v. Goliati, 
two accused persons slept with a ten-year-old girl on agreement with the 
girl that they would give her money, which they did.46 The court held as 
follows: “Consent of the complainant provides no defence to a charge 
of defilement. A girl who is under the age of thirteen47 is not capable of 
giving that consent.” Similarly, in the case of Republic v. William John, the 
court held that for offences of defilement, it does not matter whether the 
girl consented or was willing to have sex.48 The act is still criminal even 
in cases where a girl below thirteen years initiated the sex. This is because 
the law deems such girls too young to give proper consent to the act of 
sex (prior to 2014, defilement was defined as a crime against girls up to 
the age of thirteen). In the case of Republic v. Luwishi, consent to sexual 
intercourse with a girl under thirteen years was given by her sister;49 the 
court held that consent on behalf of a girl under thirteen to the com-
mission of an offence against her is irrelevant to the issue of the guilt of 
the offender. However, though the issue of consent under formal law is 
irrelevant to the question of guilt of the accused person, the courts have 
decided that consent can be relevant to the issue of sentencing. Further, 
the courts have held that where the girl consented, the court cannot make 
an order for compensation: “Be that as it may, consent may be taken into 
account when considering sentence. It is not proper to make a compen-
sation order following a conviction for defilement where it is established 
that the complainant consented to the sexual intercourse, since it may act 
as an inducement to her to encourage others to commit similar offences 
with the hope of obtaining other compensation orders.”50
 The factoring in of consent when sentencing has the effect of bring-
ing in the element of consent through the back door. If consent is in-
consequential in proving defilement cases, then it ought not to feature 
at all, even in sentencing. Girls within the protected age of defilement 
are unable to give consent, and that should be taken as such.
 Though consent is not an important element in formal courts, it plays 
a big role under customary law and practices. In most communities and 
under customary law, it is unlawful to have sexual intercourse with a 
child with or without their consent. However, in some cases customary 
law and practices allow sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 
sixteen. There is evidence to suggest that sexual violence against children 
can be perpetuated in the administration of various cultural practices, 
including rituals related to rites of passage, funerals, and marriages.51 
In certain circumstances, sexual intercourse with a girl under sixteen 
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may not be questioned or reported to formal authorities. Consent to 
sexual intercourse in these circumstances is given by people entrusted 
with the care of the girl, often fathers or uncles, and such instances 
are not labeled as defilement. As a local NGO officer in Nsanje told 
us, “In this community, there are so many cultural practices that allow 
sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of sixteen, such as initiation 
ceremonies. Such cases are not seen as bad by the villagers because they 
consider them as part of their culture.”
Child Marriages
In Malawi, some children marry or are forced to marry before they 
reach the age of maturity. Economic pressures and the association of 
puberty with adulthood are significant contributors to this problem.52 
In these instances, the consent of the child is hardly sought. This com-
monly happens when the parents seek lobola, which they receive from 
the husband’s family. This practice is common in the northern part of 
Malawi, where cultural practices may force girls from poor families, 
some as young as nine years old, into marriages, particularly when their 
parents need to settle loans.53 In Nsanje, in the far south of the country, 
where patrilineal kinship norms also prevail, some respondents indi-
cated that a practice known as kutomera is conducted in the district. 
Kutomera entails a customary marriage, which is arranged with an older 
man on behalf of a girl who has yet to reach puberty. Reasons given as 
to why families would conduct kutomera centered on the poverty of the 
parents, who receive money from the man who marries their daughter. 
This was explained to us by a female respondent in Nsanje, who said, 
“In kutomera the girl is given in marriage before she starts her monthly 
periods and she still lives with her parents until she reaches puberty and 
in most cases it’s between the age of twelve and fourteen. The man is 
required to support the girl while she is still living with her parents.”
 Another practice is known as nhlazi, which entails giving in marriage 
a young relative of the wife as a reward to her husband for being good 
to her family. The girl need not consent; the decision is made by the 
senior members of her family.54 Child marriages, which are sanctioned 
by the community, are not seen as entailing defilement. These instances 
are rarely reported to police for investigation as community members do 
not see them as a form of injustice against the girl child.
 At times, the reasons for engaging in such practices are religious 
or include a low appreciation of the importance of girls’ education.55 
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Data from the Education Management Information System (EMIS) 
shows that, in 2010, there were 3,371,289 children enrolled in primary 
school; of these, 1,713,982 (50.8 percent) were girls. It is noted that 
gender parity in lower classes (1.04) has been achieved, but disparities 
remain in upper primary school, particularly from grade 6 onwards, 
when students are adolescents (there are eight grades—referred to as 
“standards”—of primary school in Malawi). Less than 25 percent of 
girls transit to postprimary education.
Initiation Ceremonies
In some, although by no means all, Malawian communities, when a girl 
reaches puberty she undergoes an initiation ceremony welcoming her 
into adulthood. Girls are taught about pleasing their future husbands 
as well as being gentle and obedient wives. In some instances in the far 
south of the country, female initiation rites can involve bringing in a man, 
known as fisi (hyena), who is expected to have sexual intercourse with 
the girl to test the knowledge she has gained.56 This sexual intercourse is 
without the girl’s consent because it is sanctioned by the community.57 
As such, even if the girl is below the age of sixteen, such cases are not 
considered defilement offences by most local community members and 
they are very rarely reported to the police. In Nsanje, respondents also 
referred to the custom of kuchotsa fumbi (shaking off the dust), accord-
ing to which girls are supposed to have sexual intercourse with a man 
during their initiation ceremonies in order to prepare them for mar-
riage. In Balaka, some respondents referred to the custom of kugwira 
ndodo ya mfumu (holding the chief ’s rod), which is also not regarded as 
defilement by the community. As an officer from a community-based 
organization in Balaka explained: “In this community girls who have at-
tained puberty undergo initiation ceremony, where they are counselled 
about life. One such ceremony is that of kugwira ndodo ya mfumu, which 
allows a local chief to have sexual intercourse with female initiates dur-
ing initiation ceremonies. This is done to prepare the girls for marriage 
obligations.”
 Certain cultural practices, and the corresponding customary law, can 
thus be said to have the potential effect of denying girls access to jus-
tice when the customs allow girls to be defiled under the disguise of 
“culture.” This leads to nonprosecution of instances of defilement at the 
community level since cases are rarely reported to the police. It should 
be noted, however, that these practices are slowly being abandoned, 
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owing in part to the vocal condemnation in terms of the human rights 
of girls as well as to favorable laws recently introduced.
 For example, in the year 2013, the country enacted the Gender Equal-
ity Act, which makes it an offence to engage in harmful cultural practices. 
Recently, a magistrate court convicted a man, Eric Aniva, for engaging 
in harmful cultural practices contrary to section 5(1)(2) of the Gender 
Equality Act.58 Aniva was convicted of having sexual intercourse with 
over one hundred women and girls during so-called sexual cleansing 
rituals. He was arrested on the order of President Peter Mutharika soon 
after he confessed to BBC radio that he had sex with over one hundred 
girls and widows.59
 Further, in the past it was difficult to challenge these harmful cultural 
practices. This was so because—although these practices could be chal-
lenged under section 23(4) of the constitution, which protects children 
from economic exploitation or any treatment, work, or punishment 
that is or is likely to be hazardous, interfere with their education, or be 
harmful to their health or to their physical, mental, spiritual, or social 
development—there was a contradiction with sections 22(7) and 22(8) of 
the same constitution. Subsection 7 allowed marriages between persons 
between fifteen and eighteen years old where the parents or guardians 
had given consent, and subsection 8 obligated the state to discourage 
marriages of children under the age of fifteen years. Although the legal 
age of marriage under section 22(6)60 is eighteen years, the above pro-
visions entailed a possibility of marriage with a girl less than sixteen 
years of age without prosecution for defilement because the law had not 
forbidden such marriages, and the state had only been given authority 
to discourage them. This affected the reporting of defilement cases. The 
provision has since been amended. In February 2017, Malawi’s parlia-
ment took a historic step toward ending child marriage and removed 
from the constitution the provision allowing children between the ages 
of fifteen and eighteen to marry with parental consent. Parliament has 
now established the minimum age of marriage at eighteen years of 
age.61 As such there are improvements, albeit minimal, toward achieving 
justice for girls in defilement cases.
The effective prosecution of defilement cases in Malawi depends on a 
number of factors, including the study of how the formal and traditional 
systems handle and affect such prosecutions. Defilement is viewed and 
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conceived differently in the light of various cultural practices and tradi-
tions in Malawi that often run counter to what the formal justice system 
conceives as defilement. As such, many cases of defilement go unre-
ported and unprosecuted, thereby promoting injustice in such offences. 
This is so because the perpetrator is never punished for his offence 
and the victim’s sense of dignity and justice is never vindicated. It is 
therefore contended that aspects that promote injustice in the formal 
state system should be reviewed. Further, traditional forms of justice 
should also be considered and taken into account in the formal laws. 
Good practices shown in the traditional systems, such as the emphasis 
on compensation, should be adopted by the formal system, whereas bad 
practices should be condemned and outlawed in order to comprehen-
sively protect victims of defilement.
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E I G h T
“Home People” and “People of Human Rights”
Understanding Responses to Rape in Northern Uganda
H o L L y  P o r t e r
“No Good Acholi Pursues Justice Alone”
The woman in front of me seemed hollow. She sat hunched over, her 
shoulders drawn in. “I was raped four days ago,” she said. The man who 
raped her was her late husband’s nephew. He resented her presence on 
“his” family land. Her husband had died years before, and since she had 
been married traditionally, she still belonged to his family under the care 
of her brother-in-law and was entitled to use and benefit from family 
land. Her nephew is well-known to be HIV positive. She narrated how 
four days earlier he knocked down her door in the middle of the night 
and said, “Since my uncle your husband is dead you should go and join 
him. I’m going to infect you now,” and then he raped her. She reported 
him to her in-laws and called her brothers, who gathered under a mango 
tree for a joint family meeting to decide how to handle the incident. Their 
decision was to take her for an HIV test. Postexposure prophylactics 
would have been more appropriate, given his status. If anyone had known 
that an international nongovernmental organization (INGO) had a cen-
ter nearby and a hotline that could have made the drugs available to her, 
she would have had more peace of mind. Instead she was told to come 
back after three months when the virus might be detectable in her blood. 
In regard to the perpetrator, they decided to admonish him, strongly. He 
disappeared after the meeting. She told me how she was struggling to 
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sleep in a hut alone, not knowing his whereabouts and feeling deeply 
unsafe. She wished her relatives had involved the police. If it were up to 
her, she said, he should be imprisoned. “But,” she explained, “I didn’t tell 
the police. I told the home people and they decided to settle it that way. I 
have to accept it because I can’t decide anything like that alone.”1
 Her situation highlights common dynamics that exist after rape in 
northern Uganda. NGO services were available yet unutilized. Her rela-
tives made a decision in the interest of social harmony contrary to her 
private wishes. She was resigned to the situation, because in the aftermath 
of crimes such as rape, no good Acholi would pursue justice alone. Indeed, 
the end goal of responses to wrongdoing may not be primarily about a 
victim’s needs or a perpetrator’s deserts. Although justice is commonly 
invoked as a fundamental moral standard in social life, a moral imperative 
as universal as “human hunger or thirst,”2 what this looks like and how 
it is established have been contested in different cultures and societies 
throughout history. In Acholi, there is no word for justice. “Ngol matir” is 
the most common translation. Literally, it means to “cut straight,” to “de-
cide a question,”3 or to “determine a way forward.” This raises the question 
of what the prevailing priorities are in such determinations.
 The study this chapter draws from examined responses to the wrong-
doing of rape as a window into understanding end goals of determining 
a way forward after crime. By looking at the experiences of women who 
were raped, it found that the pursuit of social harmony was central.4 
This chapter focuses on understanding why so many women never ac-
cess justice or take advantage of available services after rape in northern 
Uganda. Interpretations of their experiences are rooted in over ten years 
of living in northern Uganda, 187 interviews with a random sample in 
two Acholi villages conducted between 2009 and 2011, as well as ethno-
graphic data collected over the same period. In this study, it was found 
that out of a total of 187 women interviewed in the two villages, 76 (just 
over 40 percent) had been raped, some of them in more than one situ-
ation, making a total of 94 different rape situations.5 These rapes were 
perpetrated by civilians as well as combatants in the war between the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda.
 In the individual interviews, all women were asked to whom they 
would go if they experienced the kind of violence we had been dis-
cussing (forced sex). Figure 8.1 shows their responses. Some mentioned 
several categories of actors, so the figure indicates the number of times 
a category was mentioned.
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 Figure 8.1 represents the answers to a hypothetical question asked 
of everyone whether they had or had not experienced sexual violence. 
Figure 8.2 depicts what actually took place after the experiences of 
forced sex that women narrated (in ninety-four situations of rape).
 Although the numbers of responses are different, visually the dif-
ference between what women said they would do and what they actu-
ally did is striking, especially the first row, depicting how few said they 
would (hypothetically) tell no one and how many actually remained 
silent. Much of the rest of this chapter explores why.
 The following sections elaborate the roles of relatives and NGOs. The 
chapter looks first at practical ways they were—or were not—involved 
after the situations of rape that form this study. Second, it examines 
figure 8.1.  Actors women said they would involve
figure 8.2. Actors actually involved after rape
182
Holly Porter
how they have influenced notions of rape, appropriate sexual behavior, 
and responses to crime. This examination of their roles in shaping moral 
imaginaries and as practical actors after crime perpetrated by civilians 
and combatants alike grounds understanding for scholars and prac-
titioners in the fields of gender-based violence, access to justice, and 
transitional justice.
Relatives
Relatives continue to play both the most practical and the most com-
mon role in the aftermath of rape, and they also exert considerable 
influence on notions of rape and redress. Several dynamics of relatives’ 
role are apparent. First, women have situated freedom within a social 
system that highly values social harmony. The tendency within such a 
system is to deal with the situation expeditiously. This can take different 
forms, depending on the perceived threat of the crime or wrongdoing to 
social harmony. There are situations where punishment protects social 
harmony.6 When it does, communities find satisfaction in meting it out 
to perpetrators. Second, the context for acceptable and unacceptable 
violence against women is strongly affected by communal exchange 
of customary payments and bridewealth. And last, the strength of the 
kinship system, which is understood in the Acholi “ideal” as both patri-
lineal and patrilocal, has been weakened by the confluence of changes 
ignited by war and modernization.7 What this has meant for women 
has been mixed. It has created more space for individual freedom and 
understanding of rights. It also means the authority of the most for-
midable actors has been eroded. The social protection that relatives are 
meant to provide, in the “ideal” Acholi situation, has been and is being 
undermined, and there is no clear replacement.
Relatives’ Practical Role after Rape
A common Acholi saying is Rwodi pa mon pe, meaning “women have 
no chiefs.” What women do have are relatives, with male relatives often 
taking prominence: husbands, brothers, fathers, paternal and maternal 
uncles, brothers-in-law, and fathers-in-law. The particularities of the situ-
ation and personalities involved determine which relatives might be part 
of determining “the way forward” after rape. In most situations when rela-
tives were involved, it was “finished gang gang” or “finished down home,” 
through punishment, shaming, cleansing, payment, marriage, or some 
combination of these. As this middle-aged woman described, “In Acholi 
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when there is a problem within your house a woman will always go to 
her eldest brother-in-law and then he will call her and her husband and 
talk to them. After he fails to resolve the problem then he will involve 
their fathers to come and talk about it. How good it [the decision] is, I 
mean whether it is good for the women or not, depends on the character 
of the brothers-in-law. If they are respectful and trustworthy, it might be 
good.” This gets at the heart of the issue when she indicates that the result 
for women varies widely depending on the character of her relatives. In 
instances of marital rape, or forced sex in a relationship where custom-
ary exchanges have occurred, most women (thirty-two, or 80 percent of 
them) had not discussed it with anyone apart from their husbands.
 However, eight women (20 percent) raped by their husbands sought 
social support. In half of these cases, it was to seek advice from their 
aunts, cowives, mothers, or sisters. They distinguished this from “report-
ing,” as they did not expect action to follow from consultation with “their 
fellow women.” The other half reported their husbands and hoped for 
action. All (four) of these instances were when sexual violence was one 
of many abuses they suffered at his hands. These exceptions highlighted 
the potential of the kinship system to protect women. One woman had 
been violently forced by her husband to have sex after a serious dis-
agreement. She told her brother and the man’s elders, who then “warned 
him seriously,” and he reportedly never did it again. Likewise, another 
was said to have reformed or at least temporarily improved after his 
brothers and father admonished him.
 In the other instances, elderly relatives and in-laws supported women 
in separating from their sexually violent husbands. This was the case 
when sexual violence was combined with other serious behaviors, such 
as severe alcoholism, obvious neglect, extreme violence, or sexual con-
duct that drastically raised the risk of sexual diseases at home. In one 
instance, when in-laws’ stern warnings failed, the woman was even al-
lotted nearby clan land, and her brother-in-law acted as male provider 
and protection for her family, much as if her husband had died.
 Not all women had relatives who acted in their interests. Many more 
anticipated that they would not and so were convinced there would be 
no benefit in telling anyone. Out of ninety-four different situations of 
rape my informants shared with me, forty of them had never told any-
one else. Many of them gave explanations similar to the following given 
by one woman: “I do not tell anyone about this thing. Even if I went to 
elders they would ask me, ‘What brought you to this home? When you 
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get married that’s what you’re there for—to sleep with him.’ So I have 
that shame. They’ll just tell me it’s my duty.” Talking about her relatives, 
another woman explained, “it will just cause more problems if you tell 
someone who can’t understand.”
 In some cases, telling a relative did bring more problems, such as 
when a young girl’s father entered her hut after a man had raped her. 
Rather than consoling her, he beat her for promiscuous behavior. At 
times, relatives encouraged or coerced (or employed some variety of so-
cial and economic pressure in-between) the girl/woman into marrying. 
The following story is illustrative. The girl was raped when she was still 
a teenager after a young man who was a fellow student and three of his 
brothers grabbed her on her way home and locked her in his home.
When it happened I told my mother what had happened and she 
went to school and reported the case. They gave him a big anthill to 
dig up. That was his punishment. His father was a policeman so he 
hid his son’s case. So they took it to the rwot kweri’s [a community 
leader] home.8 When they reached there they set a date in which 
the boy and his father were to report and the amount of money 
they should pay but they did not show up. When we tried to follow 
up with what happened, the father of the boy and his son went to 
Kampala.
 It happened again when he came back from Kampala. I had 
gone to my auntie’s place in town since she had delivered her new-
born baby and I went to help her. On my way back I saw him on 
the road and he grabbed me and dragged me all the way up through 
the grass and to his home and that’s how I started my marriage. I 
just stayed in that home. After I’d stayed at his home for two nights 
I escaped to my sister’s home. But my sister’s husband took me 
back to him and said that I should stay there. When my parents 
heard about it they came and took the things I was bringing them 
from my auntie’s place. They said since it was the second time we 
had slept together they couldn’t remove me and bring me home 
again so I should just stay.
 The war disrupted social protection in dramatic ways. The level of 
insecurity and circumstances into which it thrust people exacerbated 
weaknesses of the system. Thus, relatives act with diminished power and 
often within limited and weakened wider social networks. As in this 
situation, relatives were involved but unable to act effectively on her 
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behalf. Further, the social authority of the rwot kweri that would have 
compelled the man to appear in his “court” had been undermined, al-
lowing him to escape judgment in the city. When he returned and raped 
her again, marriage was determined to be the right way forward.
 Relatives’ responses evidenced a number of considerations. Com-
mon themes included social factors, fertility and children, and, im-
portantly, the expected cosmological consequences—which if left 
unaddressed might entail a myriad of grave misfortunes not only to 
the individuals in questions but to relatives, neighbors, and even future 
generations. The location of where sex occurs, consensual or otherwise, 
is important in Acholi understandings of illicit and acceptable sexual 
behavior. Sex “in the bush” or near water is considered particularly 
dangerous. A girl who had been raped by a neighbor explained, “It 
happened by the well here [she pointed in the direction of the well] 
and I told my parents, and they said I should be cleansed and leave 
alone the rape case or taking it to a court. It is because it happened in 
the wrong place.”
 It was more important to deal with possible consequences of commit-
ting an abomination/taboo (kiir) of sex near a well than to hold the boy 
accountable for his crime. Women who had been raped “in the bush,” in 
a garden, or near a well had fears of cosmological consequences. All sex 
that happened in the context of the LRA, even if it occurred within huts 
in the more permanent LRA camps, is considered to have taken place 
in the moral space of “the bush.” During the war, fighting in the bush, 
displacement, and the practice of night commuting all provided many 
more opportunities than usual for sex to happen in the wrong places.
 After rape in the context of “forced marriage” in the LRA, the fact 
that the women had been abducted was usually well-known. Relatives, 
neighbors, and extended social networks assumed they experienced 
sexual violence. Often they returned with children and sometimes 
resultant health problems.
 Most such forced husbands whom women discussed in this study 
were either still in the bush or dead. A few had returned and received 
amnesty. The strong reaction of many civil society actors after the inter-
vention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 20059 could be 
interpreted as a version of the extended family role of settling the issue 
gang gang by themselves by responding to LRA violence in the inter-
est of social harmony, trumping concurrent beliefs that wrongdoing 
deserves to be punished.
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Relatives’ Role in Shaping Ideas
Notions of appropriate sexual behavior—and therefore what consti-
tutes sexual crime—are deeply influenced by one’s relatives. Many 
women who were raped by their husbands or who began their mar-
riage after someone forced them to have sex had sentiments similar 
to that expressed by one woman who said, “You just tell yourself that 
maybe this is a normal way of settling in a home. It was like that 
[forced] my first time and I was annoyed and depressed at first but I 
realized that it was also my fault because I am the one who accepted 
going to his house.”
 My informants told me that long ago, close female relatives, usually 
aunts, were meant to teach girls about what to expect when they “went 
to a man’s home.” Such education focused more on caring for children 
and proper respect for husbands than providing any specific sexual edu-
cation. Sexual education often happens in unintentional ways, more by 
osmosis than by deliberate imparting of norms.10
 An important aspect of relatives’ contribution to notions of appro-
priate and unacceptable sexual behavior is how they shape the under-
standing of consent. Though not explicitly taught, most women come to 
understand that a good Acholi girl should refuse and even fight the first 
time they have sex, regardless of desire. As such, ascertaining consent 
is complicated, and how a man distinguishes whether his partner has 
given it or not is problematic.
 Many people equate consent with going to a “solitary place” with a 
man. The vulnerable position this erroneous assumption puts women in 
is illustrated well by the experience of a young woman raped twice by 
different men when they were alone. Because of this, she did not con-
sider these instances “rape,” yet she said she had not wanted to have sex 
with them, that they forced her, and that she was deeply aggrieved. The 
first was a man she had begun dating but had not yet decided to sleep 
with. The other was a family friend. Trusting him, she assumed when 
he invited her to his house that he had something important to discuss 
with her. Instead he drugged and raped her. In both cases, she told no 
one about what happened because of her notion of consent.
 But perhaps the most crucial way in which relatives impact ideas 
around sex, sexual violence, and about the right way forward in its 
aftermath is through social agreements that are formed through the 
exchange of luk, customary payments related to sex, and of bridewealth. 
During the war, many girls and women were abducted by the LRA, 
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raped “in the bush,” and forced to act as “wives” to designated men. 
They have been referred to as “sex slaves” but were also expected to cook, 
clean, garden, and bear and raise children.11 It would seem that life as 
a forced wife might not have been drastically different from the lives 
of girls and women abducted and forced into marriage by noncomba-
tants. Scholars working in other areas have noted that the plight of war 
victims and women harmed by forced sex in their own homes and com-
munities was at least qualitatively similar.12 There are, however, distinct 
and significant differences in the harm they experience.13 One is worth 
mentioning here. It is related to the connection between customary pay-
ments and the social permissibility of violence against women and girls.
 Acholi language and represented attitudes around bridewealth and 
women’s place in a family are often tied to notions of property rights. 
Adultery or rape of another man’s wife can be understood as a trespass 
on his property. This idea is not new or unique to Acholi. Other com-
mentators have noted a number of analogies between theft, trespass-
ing, and other property laws and laws pertaining to sexual violence.14 
Similarly, many women in this study who recalled confrontations with 
their husbands about his sexual violence toward them were given the 
excuse that his father’s cows purchased them and as long as they are 
wives husbands should “have access.” Their husbands insist that after 
the payment of bridewealth the women’s bodies ceased to be their own, 
and they have no right to refuse access to “the owner.”
 I point out this metaphor between property and sexuality with some 
pause, and I wish to add an important caveat, because if understood in 
isolation it risks painting a distorted picture of what I have come to see 
as the deeper meaning behind bridewealth 
for many Acholis. Although for some, it 
may be related to notions of individual 
property rights (as values of individualism 
are being imported and assimilated, the 
idea of women as personal property seems 
to go hand in hand), in general, it is better 
understood as akin to establishing social 
belonging. It has to do with social order, 
identity, entitlements, protection, and re-
sponsibility. The common saying in Acholi 
in figure 8.3 points to a conscious belief in 
the difference between wives and property. figure 8.3
Iwila ki lab lyec?
Did you buy me with 
elephant tusks? 
A rhetorical question 
used by wives who are 
mistreated by their 
husband to draw a 
distinction between slaves, 
who were bought with 
elephant tusks, and wives 




The idea of ownership is still in play, but as with other understandings of 
property rights in this context, it is often communal. Sexual transgres-
sion, then, is a trespass not only on an individual man’s property but 
against the social foundations of Acholi society.
 Because this belonging, established through payment of bridewealth, 
is so critical to social harmony, unless sexual violence that occurs in 
conjunction with this system of exchanges is extreme or coupled with 
other types of socially unacceptable behavior, much violence, including 
marital rape, is ignored or effectively condoned.
 A crucial social distinction concerning a woman who was abducted 
by LRA and forced to become a “wife” in the bush is that the man in 
question did not enter into a social contract with the woman’s family, 
nor involve her relatives in her selection or in negotiating bridewealth 
or other payments. Thus, an LRA “husband” was related to her in ways 
that were outside of Acholi social norms. The sexual violence and forced 
marriage she endured broke conventions of interaction between men and 
women and are therefore experienced as a crime or wrongdoing perpe-
trated against both her family and his; indeed, it is against Acholi identity.
 Women often talk about being married “to a home” rather than being 
married to a man. If a woman married traditionally (nyome), and all cus-
tomary payments such as luk and bridewealth (lim akumu) were paid, 
she and all of her children belong to the man’s family and wider clan. 
Before war and displacement, both individual families and wider kin-
ship groups typically had more resources—including cattle, which were 
depleted during the war—both to pay and to refund bridewealth. Many 
women today are in “their homes”—that is, the man’s family home—but 
are not nyome, meaning that no bridewealth has been paid. What this 
means in practical terms is that she has more freedom to leave but she is 
less protected by her own relatives and her in-laws, another example of 
the mixed effects on women of a weakened kinship system.15
 On the other hand, women who have been married with payment of 
bridewealth might (depending on the character of both his family and 
clan and hers) have greater social protection. The ownership or social 
belonging established through customary payments can work in her 
favor. It gives her husband’s extended family more authority to inter-
vene on her behalf if her husband mistreats her. After all, he is mistreat-
ing “their” wife. They contributed financially to bring her into the family 
and they have a stake in her well-being. It can, and in some instances 
does, work against her interest to keep her in a position where she is at 
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risk of violence and unable to leave without refunding the payments, 
which her family may be unable or unwilling to do. Given current eco-
nomic constraints, many families are unlikely to be capable of refunding 
bridewealth, making many women less able to leave sexually violent 
marriages. In sum, a woman is largely at the mercy of the particular 
ethical attributes of her in-laws and the good hearts and economic abil-
ity of her parents’ kin.
“People of Human Rights” or Nongovernmental Organizations
We used to follow the culture that we had in the olden days, but 
now we women are realizing that we have rights and anything 
that oppresses us we don’t accept. You see, that’s why I have sepa-
rated [from my husband]. The way I found out that I had rights is 
through the radio and also because of being in the IDP [Internally 
Displaced Persons’] camp. NGOs used to call gatherings and talk 
to us about women’s rights.
 Based on information provided by women in this study, NGOs’ 
roles have several dynamics. First, NGOs teach that rape is something 
that should be considered a violation of human rights and reported, 
with some action to follow. Second, among women interviewed, 
many expressed their belief that NGOs could be trusted to uphold 
their interests. This was in contrast both to governmental authority, 
which they often deemed corrupt and inefficient, and to relatives or 
traditional authority, which were commonly perceived as not sharing 
a progressive understanding of rights and the women’s own evolving 
concepts of gender. Despite this, few benefit from existing services 
both because of a lack of awareness regarding the availability or 
relevance of services and because of the strong social constraints and 
the diminished yet still paramount role and priorities of relatives in 
decision making.
 When asked where they would go for help if someone committed a 
violent crime against them, one woman’s response typified that of others 
when she said, “I heard that there is some group of people that are help-
ing women but because I’m not educated I don’t know the name of that 
group. I hear they stay in town. I heard they’re from other countries, but 
I don’t know.”
 A few had slightly more specific knowledge, saying they would visit 
the “people of human rights” and that “all NGOs are human rights 
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people.” A few described the location of a particular Ugandan NGO in 
Gulu commonly referred to as “the people of human rights.” Knowledge 
of what NGO services are available and how to access them is low. Even 
where knowledge exists, very few women take advantage of opportunities. 
My comments here are not expressions of doubt about the intellectual 
capacity of the “grassroots” to grasp human rights as an idea (as indeed 
they often expressed their claims in terms of rights and felt NGOs might 
in theory uphold them). They do however direct critical attention to the 
relevance and competence of NGO services for which women were the 
intended beneficiaries. Many women had an awareness of their own 
human rights and felt they were entitled to have them recognized, but 
NGOs had largely not made their services accessible or communicated 
their services in ways that were obviously relevant to women’s challenges. 
The following section looks in greater detail at how NGOs were involved 
in the aftermath of the rape of women in this study.
NGOs’ Practical Role after Rape
In northern Uganda the influx of NGOs during the war resulted in 
a high level of activity aimed at the prevention of and response to 
gender-based violence (GBV). Child protection committees and GBV 
committees were formed and, at the time of my research, existed in all 
subcounties and in most parishes in the Acholi subregion. Training was 
conducted for police, the judiciary, “traditional” leaders, teachers, and 
other parties identified as “stakeholders” in the protection of women. 
Lay counsellors have been trained, sometimes in case management. 
There was an operational hotline to report instances of sexual violence 
and centers where services can be accessed. Services have been mapped 
and referral pathways have been written for most subcounties. A lead 
NGO was designated in each subcounty to partner with local govern-
ment authorities to prevent and respond to GBV.
 Despite this flurry of NGO efforts in the region, and specifically in 
the two villages where this study was conducted, only four of the inter-
viewed women had any interaction with NGOs after they were raped.16 
Of these, two women had been raped within the LRA and talked posi-
tively about the assistance they received from a reception center after 
their return. One of them said,
What has helped me is that when I was in [the reception cen-
ter] those people helped me with counseling. Not only that, 
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they took me to the hospital and I had the bits of bombs and a 
bullet that were in my body removed. I was also given tests and 
treatment and I left there healthy. Then they inquired my inter-
est since I didn’t have access to education and I chose tailoring 
and they trained me in that. They didn’t have a sewing machine 
to give me then, so I went home and I would begin thinking 
that I should do something even if I can’t be educated, and I 
managed to struggle to buy my own machine, and even today I 
have some good customers and I get at least a little money and 
it’s sustaining me.
 The other two had been raped by their husbands and tried to access 
services from NGOs. One went to a Ugandan NGO, but according to 
her they did not help. The other reported to a “group that helps women,” 
which I found was the child protection/GBV committee for her area. 
They wrote a report documenting her problems with her husband, 
which included sexual violence as well as serious neglect. She expected 
their report to be followed by action. When it was not she sought 
help from her relatives, mediated by the local councilor I (village-level 
elected leader often involved in dispute resolution) to separate from her 
husband, which she eventually succeeded in doing.
 Some women in the more remote villages where this research was 
done mentioned an INGO, and their trained lay counselors, as being 
helpful after rape. But none actually went to the center or counselors 
after rape. Some said they visited the center for other reasons, such as 
their husbands beating them seriously. A woman whose husband rapes 
her commented on why: “We have people like [the INGO] and also 
the people of human rights. They might help in a difficult situation or 
your conflict. But with problems like mine [a sexually violent husband] 
of course they can’t help. If there are issues in the home you settle it 
between the two of you or you can call in the brothers of the husband, 
but if it passes them then we call family elders.”
 Even when the sexual violence was perpetrated by people other than 
husbands, relatives and elders were the primary sources of decision 
making on responding to rape. Women in this study who were raped by 
combatants and passed through a reception center (with the exception 
of the two cases discussed above) were unaware of how NGOs or other 




 Reparations efforts have limited scope thus far in providing individual 
redress even in the most straightforward and obvious ways—even more 
so with the more complicated and delicate nature of reparations for sexual 
crimes. One woman who had been deformed by a bullet wound and also 
raped commented that although she had not received reparations for 
either injury, the harm of her sexual violence could not be photographed 
and thus her invisible wounds would be impossible to compensate. The 
reparations measures to be put in place, among other transitional jus-
tice mechanisms, remain in their initial stages in northern Uganda. The 
ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) at the time of research (2009–12) 
had been one of the only actors on this front and was supporting an 
NGO-run program of responding to gender-based violence. However, 
the violence the program responded to was current and perpetrated by 
civilians. It was not war-related crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
outlined in the Rome Statute.17 This begs the question of why the TFV 
was not operating within its mandate. Perhaps it is in part because of 
the way the TFV works, namely, through NGO partners. As the re-
sult of wider learning, NGOs have largely recognized that singling out 
particular categories of people for assistance, rather than using a more 
needs- or rights-based approach, can create new problems. However, the 
TFV is not an NGO. It is meant to be about justice after crimes against 
humanity, not “a donor of last resort,” which is how a senior TFV staff 
in Uganda described their funding approach to me in an informal con-
versation. Perhaps in recognition of this, and in response to an external 
evaluation of the impact of its programs completed in 2013, leadership 
in the TFV indicated in 2014 they would take a new tack in their next 
phase targeting interventions that alleviate psychological and medical 
harms resulting from LRA sexual violence.18 In 2014, TFV leaders at 
The Hague indicated that the medical support is aimed at assisting 
women who suffer from fistula. From what I understand from women 
in forced marriages within the LRA, this condition is very rare indeed. 
Although the TFV note that some “spillover” outside of their mandate 
is unavoidable, it is likely that the majority of the medical assistance 
from the TFV could be considered “spillover.”19 According to a former 
employee of TFV, there has been much soul-searching about such issues 
within the TFV, but more is needed if it is to play a normative or repara-
tive role for victims of sexual crime within the jurisdiction of the court.
 Another often-cited issue with respect to sexual violence and repara-
tion efforts (particularly the TFV) is the difficulty of knowing exactly 
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how to identify victims and how to design targeted assistance to women 
whose rape would be counted among crimes of concern to the court. 
Evidence from this study is suggestive of material ways reparations 
could respond to the harm of rape. Others working on representing 
victims’ views regarding reparations have highlighted some of these, 
which resonate with many of the sentiments expressed by my infor-
mants, particularly health, education, housing, land inheritance, rebuild-
ing livelihoods, and proper treatment of the dead.20 The current study 
also reveals that women who have been raped can be identified and are 
often willing to self-identify for assistance. Many women I spoke with 
expressed sentiments similar to the woman with the bullet wound, who 
said, “Everyone knows what happened to me. Why should I be afraid to 
come forward if it can help me?”
NGOs’ Role in Shaping Ideas
One way of engaging with interlocutors’ dilemmas in the context of 
violence and profound gendered patterns of life is to move beyond static 
structural models to examine how people actively reassess and reshape 
forms of power through dramatic shifts.21 Evidently, one of the power-
ful opportunities for reassessment amongst Acholi came in the form 
of NGOs. Particularly, radio and other mediums of exposure to ideas 
about violence against women and women’s rights have influenced the 
way women think about their own experiences of sexual violence and 
perceptions of appropriate responses.
 The idea that “rape never used to be there” is not an uncommon re-
sponse when I tell Acholis about my research. I have found that what 
is meant by this statement is usually one of two things. First, that the 
notion of rape as a crime as it is talked about by NGOs did not exist 
prior to the war. An example is the reaction of one of the elderly women 
I interviewed. She laughed at my questions and said they were “very 
useless” because, as she said, “it is hard to even say whether a man forced 
you to have sex when you never even thought that refusing was an op-
tion and you were never asked if you agreed.” Another elderly woman 
said that she and her age mates did not know what “rape” was in those 
days, although she added that of course men used to force them.
 Another meaning of the idea that “rape never used to be there” is 
driven by values associated with Acholi identity “above history,” a vi-
sion of an ideal continuous past and of how Acholi society is at its best 
when all social protections are functioning as they should. It is less a 
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statement of understood reality and more an expression of values and 
ideals, a “benign” patriarchy (if that were possible): that women should 
be protected from sexual violence and that it should not happen if all is 
healthy in the community.
 These notions have been dramatically impacted since war and an 
influx of NGOs. In Acholiland, there are few places that remain un-
touched by NGO interventions, and certainly by radio airwaves. Al-
though many Acholi women talk about rape as something “normal” or 
gin matime (literally, “something that happens”), they equally talk about 
it as morally wrong with negative impact on their relationships, mental 
health, and bodies. When asked how they came to this understanding, 
radio and NGOs were the most common responses.
 One woman commented on how she viewed changes in the way 
people think. Her own experience with sexual violence had been severe. 
She was abducted and spent five years as a forced “wife” in the LRA, 
only to survive a second sexually violent marriage before she settled 
with a man who treats her well.
In case the girl changes her mind after she has gone somewhere 
alone with the man, but she’s embarrassed to scream, she will show 
that she’s very annoyed and also fight him. Sometimes she’ll end 
up giving in because he overpowers her, but afterwards she’ll sack 
the boy. And in today’s situation she can even take that person to 
court. In the past people were ignorant of their rights. But today 
with sensitization of NGOs people know their rights. Not only 
that, in the past the issue of age brackets wasn’t considered. It was 
just whether the girl has breasts or not. Now it’s if someone is 
under 18 they are considered children, and so if someone sleeps 
with them the person can be taken to court. But in the past, the girl 
could report to her parents and from there the parents would go 
and talk to the parents of the boy and sometimes they would have 
to make a payment called luk. Luk doesn’t mean they have to stay 
together necessarily, but in some cases they do get married. Either 
way, that payment, luk, would need to be paid.
 The idea that a girl who was unhappy about a sexual encounter could 
sincerely fight or “sack the boy” would not have occurred to many of my 
elderly informants in their youth. Even though virtually none of the 
women in this study accessed legal avenues of redress, the knowledge 
that laws are part of what defines appropriate sexual behavior and how 
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they do so is a more recent phenomenon that is attributed to NGOs. 
The idea of sexual violence has evolved from only a social crime—as the 
discussion of luk indicated—to a crime that also abuses the rights of an 
individual that should be protected by the state.
 Evidence from women in this study suggests that NGOs have had 
an impact on notions of rape and appropriate responses to it. They have 
contributed to a growing sense of individual rights that women feel 
are violated by being forced to have sex, even by their husbands. It also 
shows the limits of NGO impact. Despite the fact that the majority of 
women said that they trusted NGOs to help them, and many said they 
would turn to an NGO for help after sexual violence, only four actually 
did, and just two felt they were helped in a meaningful way. Women’s 
experiences point to two main contributors to this state of affairs. Many 
women, especially in rural areas, are unaware of how or if NGO services 
are relevant to their needs and situations—and indeed, there is a ques-
tion of relevance and approach. Another study showed that the services 
that NGOs supported—for example, health services—tended to focus 
on sexual violence from a stranger and not the overwhelmingly more 
common forms of sexual violence such as intimate partner violence.22 
NGO programs tend to target women as individuals in their gender-
based-violence response programs. They emphasize “confidentiality” 
and offer services that are medical, psychological, and legal to individual 
women—some of these services are most relevant for the least common 
experiences of sexual violence. Focusing on individual needs, NGOs 
tend to respond within frameworks of global best practices and have the 
supremacy of human rights as a driving factor. Yet decisions surround-
ing how to respond to wrongdoing seem to be made within the context 
of extended family structures and tend to have the supremacy of social 
harmony as a driving factor.
While both relatives and NGOs influence the evolution of social norms, 
reactions to crime and wrongdoing more generally are still primarily 
determined by decisions made in the context of extended family and 
kinship structures. Whether the perpetrator of a crime such as rape is 
a rebel, a soldier, a husband, a relative, a neighbor, or a stranger, notions 
of how to maintain or restore social harmony largely determine what to 
do in the aftermath, trumping individual sentiments regarding what the 
man deserves and what the woman needs.
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 Despite a growing understanding of individual rights as pro-
moted by NGO and human rights discourse, the most important 
thing that women need (and often value) after suffering crime is 
still for the people who are closest to them to agree that the course 
of action taken after rape is appropriate. “In our tribe in Acholi 
here, I think settling it down at home [gang gang] is best because 
if you take it to another level like the LC and police it will bring 
hatred between the clans, so doing things traditionally by getting 
elders to just warn them is good. The community seals the issue 
within themselves.”
 In the final analysis, “home people” and not “the people of human 
rights” determine what “justice” after rape looks like. The “home people” 
are certainly not homogenous, and as explored above, reactions to rape 
vary greatly. Yet, while there are multiple and sometimes competing voices, 
home people typically grant cosmological consequences and the effects 
on social harmony precedence in their deliberations. An often evidently 
valid concern in the pursuit of justice raised in regard to “traditional” au-
thority is the existence of gendered hierarchies and inequalities that exist 
within them.23 The postconflict moment of transition offers a window of 
opportunity to forge more just gender relationships. Social norms and 
power dynamics have been affected by war and subsequent postconflict 
developments in Acholi, but the role of relatives is still strongest and can-
not be bypassed or overcome simply by strengthening other actors or by 
access to justice programs designed to target women as individuals (nor 
is it at all clear that it would be desirable to do so). In order to maximize 
the opportunities for greater equality presented by the transitional mo-
ment that still characterizes Acholi a decade after the guns fell silent in 
Uganda, those working on these issues will need to recognize women as 
part of and not apart from the social orders they inhabit, engaging the 
role of extended family structures in women’s lives and appreciating the 
deference to relatives that women are likely to continue to show while 
aiming to transform detrimental gender dynamics within them.
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Out of the Mouths of Babes
Tracing Child Soldiers’ Notions of “Justice,” ca. 1940–2012
S ta C e y  H y n d
The TRC may be able to make every Liberian child to feel 
justice. This is my expectation.
—Statement from a child1
w I T h  T h E  C O N v I C T I O N  O F  C O N G O L E S E  w A R L O R D  T h O M A S  L U b A N G A 
Dyilo in 2012 at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the crime 
of recruiting and using child soldiers, and the ICC’s recent arrest and 
indictment on war crimes charges of Dominic Ongwen, a former child 
soldier turned senior commander in Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance 
Army, the question of child soldiers’ place in international justice regimes 
has become a topic of growing debate. Current legal discussions of Af-
rican child soldiers have focused on the criminalization in international 
law of child soldiering as a practice, and on whether child combatants 
should be considered as “victims” or “perpetrators.”2 The primary aim is 
to provide justice for former child combatants. Children’s, and former 
child combatants’, own notions and understandings of “justice,” how-
ever, have been largely ignored, to the detriment of legal and humanitar-
ian interventions. Contemporary discussions focus overwhelmingly on 
child soldiers as “victims” or “perpetrators because they are victims.” The 
snippets of children’s voices that emerge in both legal and humanitar-
ian arenas, however, suggest that the relationship between children and 
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justice is more engaged and complex. The opening epigraph highlights 
children’s postconflict desire “to feel justice,” and yet the Liberian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report made no substantive at-
tempt to interrogate what children meant by the phrase “to feel justice.” 
As Graça Machel argues, “Adults can act on behalf of children and in 
the best interests of children, but unless children themselves are con-
sulted and engaged, we will fall short and undermine the potential to 
pursue the most relevant and durable solutions.”3 This chapter argues 
that to facilitate effective rehabilitation, reintegration, and transitional 
justice, child soldiers’ own voices need to be inserted more firmly into 
processes of justice, and existing representations and mediations of 
those voices must be critiqued and historically contextualized. This is 
because the contemporary “child soldier crisis” emerges not simply from 
new patterns of warfare, but from a new global “politics of age” that has 
shaped the evolution of international law while, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, occluding children’s own agency.4
 Under international humanitarian norms, a child soldier is today 
defined as “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of 
regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity.”5 How-
ever, this chronological definition runs counter to local understandings 
of childhood in African communities, which are based more on social, 
cultural, and physical markers, forming an indeterminate life stage be-
tween infancy and adulthood, often overlapping with ideas of youth.6 In 
many African cultures, childhood is not socially constructed as a time 
of innocence or special rights and protection but is rather a crucial stage 
of socialization on the path toward adulthood, a transition often delin-
eated by marriage, reproduction, and the establishment of a household. 
Children are expected to provide labor to household economies and to 
contribute to the support and defense of local communities in times of 
need. Military service can itself be a key marker of the transition from 
child to adult. In Sierra Leone, violent youth have been a historically 
significant social category. Local communities view children as liminal 
and unformed and therefore as potentially more capable than adults of 
dangerous, inhuman behavior.7 The line between childhood and youth 
is blurry, with youth a “shifter category” that is as much political as bio-
logical, but usually youth denotes someone between the ages of fourteen 
and thirty-five and of subaltern or marginalized social status.8
 It should be noted that while there has been an explosion in re-
search on youth in Africa, childhood in and of itself remains largely 
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underresearched; in fact, child soldiering has been one of the few areas 
of significant academic concern, alongside other major contemporary 
social ills like child labor and child migration.9 There has been a recent 
trend in humanitarian circles against using the term “child soldier,” 
which is held to be stigmatizing and misrepresentative since many chil-
dren do not have primary roles as fighters. Instead, the term “children 
associated with armed forces and armed groups” (CAAFAG) is increas-
ingly preferred. Even this term, however, conceals a continuum of ex-
perience, as well as legal and moral accountability: how should children 
who alternate between military training and life in refugee camps, like 
some of the “Lost Boys” of South Sudan, be classified? Or teenagers 
who participated in the struggle against apartheid and were regarded 
as legitimate military targets by the South African state, despite not 
formally being part of armed opposition group like Umkhonto we 
Sizwe? As such, and to directly engage with dominant humanitarian 
and legal discourses, this chapter adopts a broadly “Straight 18” position, 
whereby all persons under the age of eighteen are classified as children, 
while remaining sensitive to the varied and contestable categorizations 
of “child” that emerge. The majority of “child soldiers” discussed herein 
were teenagers during their war service.
 The existing literature on how to provide justice for children re-
cruited into armed forces draws on a range of different conceptions of 
justice: transitional justice, with its debates on restorative and retributive 
justice, which are constructed in opposition to the “jungle justice” that 
communities fear children will bring back with them from the bush; 
juvenile justice, viewed as too underdeveloped in African criminal jus-
tice systems to be widely available; criminal justice, seen as unsuitable 
owing to its punitive nature; but also therapeutic justice, highlighting 
how law can aid mental health and healing. Overall, the focus has been 
on providing social justice and reconciliation through transitional jus-
tice mechanisms and demobilization, disarmament, rehabilitation, and 
reintegration (DDRR) programs.
 This chapter emerges from research on the history of child soldiering 
in Africa, which argues that the presence of children in armed groups 
is not simply a “new war” phenomenon but is linked to historical struc-
tural patterns of childhood, child labor, and “total” warfare, as well 
as postcolonial state crises and youth revolutions.10 Contemporary 
developments in child soldiering and international legal responses are 
themselves the products of specific historical and cultural contexts, and 
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it is these developments that this chapter will critique. The first section 
analyzes memoirs and archival sources in an attempt to ascertain chil-
dren’s understandings of “justice” and the shifting political discourses 
that frame these accounts. The second section interrogates the prob-
lematics of child soldiers’ positioning within international humanitar-
ian law, highlighting the clashes between local and global categories 
of “childhood,” the tensions between child soldiers’ status in “law” and 
“justice,” and the difficulties of providing both protection and account-
ability for child soldiers. The final section analyzes pilot fieldwork in-
terviews conducted with twelve former Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
child abductees about their understandings of social and legal “justice.” 
This chapter represents initial steps toward developing a new histori-
cized methodology of analyzing child soldiering and justice for children 
in Africa.
Tracing a Historical Genealogy of Child Soldiers’ Ideas of Justice
Historical archives and memoirs reveal that children have been involved 
in most of Africa’s twentieth-century conflicts. Notably, child soldier 
testimonies from the colonial to contemporary eras do not routinely 
mention justice in any detailed, direct sense, instead revealing both the 
horrors and empowerment that children experienced in conflict: many 
of these children were not simple “victims” but active agents fighting for 
causes they believed in, or for their own advancement. Teenage African 
boys who fought for British forces in the Second World War recount 
how they were taught it was a necessary, “just” war.11 In the 1950s to the 
1970s, accounts from liberation struggles and civil wars speak mainly of 
young fighters’ pride in contributing to the defense of their peoples and 
nations; teenage schoolboys who fled Rhodesia into exile to fight against 
white minority rule argued, “We want our country. . . . We want to rule 
ourselves and we will choose our own leader,” while teenage spies and 
soldiers in Biafra speak of their desire to avenge the “abominable crime” 
of Nigerian aggression and of the empowerment they felt in fighting 
for their people.12 In the 1980s, child combatants in Marxist-influenced 
forces in Angola and Eritrea speak in terms of freedom, liberation, and 
equality—of social justice—but also of how their experiences of war 
and their treatment within their armed groups belied these ideals, often 
exposing them to exploitation and abuse.13
 These accounts are undoubtedly fallible, shaped by adult memory 
and authorial subjectivities, presenting personal narratives rather than 
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historical “truths” or legal “facts.” They do, however, reveal how child 
soldier testimonies are shaped by dominant political discourses of the 
conflicts and times that they emerge from. Ideas of “justice” are absent 
because it was only in the late 1980s that a critical nexus of globalized 
discourses of human rights and international law gained both political 
and cultural prominence. Formal recognition of child soldiering in the 
sphere of international humanitarian law was established only in the 
1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, which, for the 
first time, legislated internationally against the recruitment and use of 
children under fifteen years in war.14
 While diplomatic negotiations for the Additional Protocols were 
underway, a link between justice and children became manifest follow-
ing the 1976 Soweto uprising in South Africa. That link was sharpened 
during the 1984–86 state of emergency with the killing of around three 
hundred children and with the detention without trial or arrest of over 
twenty-thousand other children under eighteen during the struggle 
against the apartheid regime. With teenage “comrades” in the vanguard 
of the struggle, global antiapartheid campaigns drew on legal expertise 
and emerging human rights discourses to highlight the brutality and 
illegality of the apartheid state’s violence against these children and 
youths.15 Following media coverage of child soldiers in Africa, Latin 
America, the Middle East, and Asia, children’s involvement in war be-
came a topic of growing international concern, a concern intensified 
by developments in child rights.16 The 1989 United Nation’s Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) created the first universal 
definition of “the child,” expanding this category to include “any per-
son below the age of eighteen years.”17 In the late 1980s to early 1990s, 
global child rights combined with new liberal humanitarianism to fuel 
a wide-based campaign by international NGOs against the recruitment 
and use of child soldiers, culminating in the 1996 Machel Report on 
Children in Armed Conflict and the establishment of the UN’s Office 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in 
Armed Conflict.18 It is in this period that the modern image of the child 
soldier—the ragged African boy carrying an AK-47, both brutalized 
and brutalizing—emerged.19 The child soldier moved from being a he-
roic minor-citizen fighting to defend family and community to a violent 
icon of the “new barbarism” of late-twentieth-century warfare, a symbol 
of Africa’s broken modernity that was in need of external salvation. As 
Jézéquel argues, child soldiers have subsequently become “object[s] of 
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a new humanitarian crusade” and a central issue in efforts to legitimize 
Western intervention in Africa.20
 Human rights and truth and reconciliation commission reports have 
been key to the discursive construction of this contemporary “child sol-
dier crisis,” but while these reports provide valuable data on patterns 
of child recruitment and utilization in conflict, they problematically 
often rely on “composite portraits of victimization” and universalizing 
norms of childhood to engender active and empathetic responses in 
the reader. They are more useful for analyzing the imposition of global 
justice norms than for unpacking children’s understandings of justice.21 
Child soldier memoirs have emerged as another key genre of evidence. 
These do not reflect child combatant’s experiences through a prism 
of law and crime but rather focus on the injustices that drove them 
into armed groups and the abuses they suffered within them, primarily 
following a humanitarian “victimhood” framing.22 With children who 
volunteered rather than being forcibly recruited, there is an additional 
sense of injustice when their service is not rewarded: “Of all the prom-
ises that I was made, not one has been kept. I have never been paid for 
what I went through. A war without salary. And peace without rewards. 
Nothing.”23 One might posit that the focus on immediate injustices 
is because children are not intellectually, socially, or morally developed 
enough to understand ideas of “law” and “justice,” but many accounts 
from former child combatants highlight that they do recognize that 
the crimes they committed during war were morally wrong, although 
most claim diminished responsibility as they were coerced, drugged, or 
indoctrinated into those actions.24 It can be argued that the silence sur-
rounding justice in child soldiers’ accounts stems from the questions 
that are (not) being asked and the narratives that are being prioritized 
rather than a simple lack of understanding or concern about justice 
from young participants in Africa’s conflicts. It also demonstrates that 
children’s perceptions (and adult former child combatants’ memories) of 
conflict are not narrativized within a sociocultural framework where the 
provision of formal legal justice is viewed as an available option.
Globalized Childhoods, International Humanitarian Law,  
and Child Soldiers in Contemporary Africa
International legal responses to child soldiering have focused on the 
criminalization of child recruitment into armed forces in international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Following the 1977 Additional Protocols, in 
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1998 the ICC’s foundational Rome Statute banned “conscripting or en-
listing children under the age of fifteen years into national armed forces 
or using them to participate directly in hostilities” in both national and 
international conflicts.25 However, because it adopts the UNCRC’s 
definition of a child, the ICC has no jurisdiction over anyone under the 
age of eighteen and therefore avoids the issue of criminal responsibility 
for war crimes for teenagers between fifteen and eighteen years of age. 
Child soldiers are thereby constructed as deviant products of adult abuse 
who cannot be held responsible for their alleged war crimes because 
they hold no legally relevant agency.26 Humanitarian dissatisfaction 
with the lower age limit of fifteen years of age for military recruitment 
led in 2000 to the UNCRC Optional Protocol on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflicts, which established the “Straight 18” posi-
tion that today dominates humanitarian policy and developing soft 
law.27 This tension in determining the legal status of “child soldiers” 
between fifteen and eighteen years of age is further complicated by 
discrepancies between international and domestic norms on criminal 
responsibility and juvenile justice, norms that can range from seven to 
eighteen years of age.
 The liminality of childhood, whereby young girls and boys can easily 
move between posing as “innocent civilians” to acting as “armed fighters,” 
facilitates child soldiers’ military impact. This very liminality, however, 
also makes it difficult to categorize child combatants and to attribute 
legal and moral responsibility to them. A culturally sensitive reading of 
IHL would argue that not everyone under the age of eighteen should 
simply be treated as “children”—especially teenagers who regard them-
selves as adults and are seen as such within their communities—but this 
runs counter to the desire to protect young persons whom the interna-
tional community regards as bearing diminished or circumscribed re-
sponsibility for their actions in war, either through forcible recruitment, 
indoctrination, or coercion. It can be argued that children’s relationship 
with justice should be conceived of in terms of their “needs” rather than 
their “wants.” While their needs do require accurate and appropriate 
assessment, this position problematically conceives of justice as an ex-
clusively adult realm, with only adults having the knowledge, judgment, 
and rationality to determine the scope and content of “justice.” This does 
not fit with recent evidence on African childhoods and excombatant 
reintegration. The idea of child soldiers as a “lost generation,” whose 
moral compass and sociability are permanently damaged by war service, 
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is now being overturned by research showing that many do reintegrate 
effectively into society.28 While developmental psychology stresses that 
juvenile brains are not fully developed and that teenagers are more likely 
to make risky decisions, child sociology and anthropological research 
has increasingly acknowledged children’s resilience and their social and 
political agency, both during war and in their navigation of postconflict 
reintegration.29 With the acknowledgment of agency, however, comes 
the question of accountability. The overarching question here is whether 
child soldiers—of whatever biological age—should be subject to formal 
criminal justice and held accountable for their actions. And can current 
international law deliver “justice” for both child soldiers and the victims 
of their crimes?
 Debates over child combatants’ legal status passed from treaty to trial 
arenas when the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was formed 
in 2001 to try offences committed during that country’s civil wars.30 
The criminal culpability of child combatants was a subject of intense 
debate between the UN, which granted the court jurisdiction to try 
children between fifteen and eighteen at the time of their offences, hu-
manitarian groups that took a “Straight 18” position, and Sierra Leonean 
authorities and communities, many of whom believed that justice would 
not be served unless child combatants were held accountable for their 
participation in many of the worst atrocities of the war.31 Ultimately, 
international demands for child protection were placed before local 
conceptions of justice, and the SCSL chose not to prosecute anyone 
under the age of eighteen.32
 The issue of child soldiers’ role in IHL arose again in 2006 with the 
arrest and prosecution of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo by the ICC. Sym-
bolically and significantly, the only charge brought against him for his 
actions in the Ituri conflict was regarding the conscription and use of 
children under the age of fifteen in armed hostilities. Kamari Clarke 
argues that during Lubanga’s trial, the ICC discursively mobilized child 
soldiers as “spectres of international justice,” creating legal fictions of 
their victimhood and negating their responsibility in order to reassign ac-
countability to Lubanga as an individual under the doctrine of command 
responsibility.33 The ICC achieved this by constructing child soldiers 
as “doubly-victimised,” as children and as Africans, with Africa being 
essentially pathologized as a space of violence.34 The idea of children 
as objects of justice, as innocent victims, certainly makes for a much 
clearer prosecutory narrative in terms of criminalizing the recruitment 
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of children by armed forces, as Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s open-
ing statement demonstrates: “The children still suffer the consequences 
of Lubanga’s crimes. They cannot forget what they suffered, what they 
saw, what they did. . . . Some of them are now using drugs to survive. 
Some of them became prostitutes and some of them are orphaned 
and jobless.”35 This victimhood focus stems from a global politics of 
“childhood”—a modern, Western, middle-class idea of children being a 
special protected category of consumer rather than productive members 
of society, as is the case for most African children.36 Perversely, however, 
as Pupavac suggests, these globalized norms that suffuse humanitarian 
structures and discourse negate child agency and can lead to a silencing 
and appropriation of children’s voices, as occurred in the Lubanga trial 
where only evidence of appropriate victimhood was heard.37
 There are significant parallels here with international interventions 
on behalf of African women from colonial times to the present day, with 
African women frequently being constructed as victims of patriarchal 
socioeconomic and political norms, lacking in agency but deserving of 
external salvation (so long as they conform to appropriate gender roles 
as wives and mothers): these constructions have routinely sidelined 
African women’s agency and engagement in conflict and postconflict 
reconstruction.38 As MacKenzie argues in relation to the treatment of 
female former soldiers in Sierra Leone, “post-conflict policies are largely 
shaped by patriarchal norms associated with liberal social order rather 
than by ‘local’ needs,” and highly gendered notions of “conjugal order” at 
the heart of postconflict securitization and development impose a rever-
sion to (idealized) preconflict gender and familial norms to reestablish 
social order.39 This chapter would suggest that there is also a significant 
generational component to any gendered reordering of postwar societies, 
and that concepts of “patriarchal” social order need to pay close atten-
tion to the intersection between the generational and gendered power 
structures therein. Patriarchal norms are often taken as synonymous with 
gender oppression, but male control of generational hierarchies in fami-
lies (whether real or presumed) should not be ignored in such analyses.
 In locating accountability solely within command responsibility, 
the ICC also reinforces the failure of international law to address the 
foundational injustices and structural inequalities that drive conflict and 
children’s recruitment. As the conviction of Thomas Lubanga suggests, 
the moral economy of IHL is driven by the need to justify international 
intervention and global norms cascades, spreading law rather than 
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justice.40 This is not to suggest that child soldiers are not “victims” or 
should not be treated as such in legal arenas, but rather to argue that 
their relationship with justice needs to be understood as more nuanced 
than simple victimhood, particularly for older teens who would face 
criminal conviction under domestic jurisdictions for crimes of violence 
in peacetime. A lack of formal criminal accountability for child soldiers’ 
actions during wars can leave a legacy of unaddressed guilt for individu-
als and communities. Recent research has increasingly acknowledged 
children’s legal roles not just as victims but as witnesses or as “complex 
political perpetrators” like Dominic Ongwen of the LRA; a “victim” in 
his abduction as a child, he rose to become commander of the Sinia bri-
gade and was indicted by the ICC in 2005 alongside Joseph Kony and 
other LRA commanders.41 With Ongwen currently being tried in The 
Hague on seventy counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
including the conscription and use of children under the age of fifteen, 
the issue of child soldiers’ culpability and accountability has become 
starkly multivalent, both legally and morally. Should his abduction and 
forcible recruitment as a child create diminished responsibility for his 
actions, or potentially mitigate his sentencing, as Prosecutor Fatou Ben-
souda indicated might be possible?42 Or should the focus remain on 
convicting Ongwen as a deterrent and to secure justice for his victims? 
The relationship between individual and communal justice lies at the 
heart of child soldiers’ position within international law.
Justice in War and Peace: Returning LRA Abductees  
and Transitional Justice in Northern Uganda
Perhaps the most notorious example of children’s recruitment into Af-
rican conflicts is that by Joseph Kony’s LRA. The LRA have waged a 
guerrilla conflict against the Ugandan government since 1987. With a 
lack of popular support for Kony’s rebels among Acholi and Northern 
Ugandan communities, children like Dominic Ongwen quickly became 
a prime target for abduction and recruitment, providing the LRA with 
military manpower and auxiliary support, “bush wives” to raise the next 
generation of fighters, and a terrifying tactic to punish communities 
who failed to support them.43 It is estimated that more than thirty thou-
sand youths under eighteen were abducted for varying lengths of time 
by the LRA between 1988 and 2004.44
 There is a wealth of information on returning LRA rebels and their 
reintegration into local communities, but there has been less focus on 
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children’s roles in justice and reconciliation.45 Within Uganda, transi-
tional justice frameworks have emphasized reconciliation over retribution, 
as seen in the 2000 Amnesty Act granting amnesty to all demobilizing 
LRA rebels.46 In Northern Uganda, the Acholi community leaders Ker 
Kwaro Acholi have consistently espoused the cause of amnesty, pro-
claiming reconciliation and forgiveness as central to Acholi custom.47 
The question, however, is where child abductees fit in local discourses 
and practices of reconciliation and retribution. A 2011 survey of over 
seven hundred respondents in Acholi and Lango communities reported 
that only 31 percent of respondents believed that children should be 
held responsible for their actions during their time with the LRA, and 
only 13 percent believed that children should be punished, compared to 
50 and 35 percent, respectively, for adults.48 The majority of respondents 
stated that individuals should be held accountable or punished only for 
acts committed from the ages of nineteen to twenty-one years and over: 
given that twelve is the age of criminal responsibility in Uganda, this 
could indicate a “vernacularization” of international child rights norms 
into local contexts, or “sensitization” among local communities as to 
which answers will generate international support.49
 Allen argues that the amnesty process in fact underemphasizes adult 
accountability, with returnees constructed as “innocent children” who 
deserve forgiveness, even when they have become biological adults.50 
However, while biologically “adult,” many of these returnees could still 
be “youths” or “children” in the eyes of the community, as they had not 
undergone appropriate socialization or marked normative transitions 
into adulthood with marriage and establishing their own homestead: 
the lack of accountability for youths thereby indicates their liminal sta-
tus. The influence of local cosmologies and moral economies on Acholi 
ideas of justice must be recognized, as should Christian traditions of 
forgiveness and childhood innocence.51 Public transcripts of forgive-
ness for returnees are often underwritten by private admissions that 
forgiveness without accountability is difficult, and, suggestively, over 80 
percent of interviewees indicated that returning children should both 
apologize for their actions and do mato oput (“drink the bitter root”).52 
Mato oput is a reconciliation ceremony and process that historically 
functioned to reconcile two families in the aftermath of a homicide 
as part of restitutive Acholi customary law frameworks. Since 2000 it 
has been repurposed, first by local leaders and then by international 
NGOs, as a transitional justice mechanism to aid the reintegration of 
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former LRA members into their communities, promoting both com-
munity forgiveness and individual healing.53 The ceremony, presided 
over by the rwot (chief ), involves an acknowledgment of wrongdoing 
and the offering of compensation by the offender, and it culminates in 
the sharing of the symbolic bitter-root drink. There is, however, dis-
agreement over whether mato oput and other reconciliation rituals are 
applicable to minors, who traditionally would not have borne the same 
level of culpability for their actions as adults.54 Evidence also suggests 
that some youth are less supportive of such traditional reconciliation 
methods, viewing them as a mechanism for reinforcing unequal gen-
erational structures and engaging with them only to appease their par-
ents, thereby calling into question the efficacy of any individual moral 
suasion and healing.55
 There is a pressing need for research into the relationship between 
children and justice, and in particular to explore what children formerly 
associated with armed groups believe justice is and should be. Signifi-
cantly, in Northern Uganda, which returned to a state of relative peace 
following the LRA’s relocation to the DRC after 2006, there is also a 
need for greater investigation of the relationship between the specific 
context of transitional justice and wider ideas of social and criminal 
justice—can there be transitional justice without a wider belief in justice 
itself ? This section is based on pilot project interviews with former LRA 
abductees, mostly in their early twenties, in Lamwo District on the 
border with South Sudan. Youth interviewees were selected because of 
ethical concerns over interviewing children. Semistructured interviews 
were conducted by research assistants in Acholi with individual respon-
dents, with male and female respondents asked what they thought that 
“justice” and “social justice” meant, what the current state of justice in the 
community was, and what they thought would be justice for the LRA’s 
crimes.56 The Acholi term used for “justice” was ngolo kop, which trans-
lates as “reaching a decision” or “passing a verdict” and is more associated 
with formal court processes, although it is now used informally among 
groups trying to reconcile around a specific decision. As one respondent 
noted, “Justice is helping solve a disagreement amongst different groups 
of individuals.”57 “Social justice” was translated by the interviewers as 
ngolo kop me te gang—justice in the community, te gang meaning “under 
the home.” Ngolo kop me te gang was generally understood in terms of 
punishment more than reconciliation, unlike Western conceptions of 
social justice as equality.
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 Asked what they thought that “justice” would be for LRA rebels, most 
interviewees expressed a desire for lenient treatment for child abductees 
and others whom they held less responsible, but this was coupled with 
a strong belief in the need for retributive justice for senior command-
ers, indicating a level of agreement with the ICC’s focus on command 
responsibility. As one interviewee responded, “I would punish the gen-
erals heavily if not by hanging because the kind of trauma and lives lost 
can never be replaced. But the little ones should be forgiven.” Another 
noted, “I would forgive some actions because some were abducted as 
children and robbed of their innocence but those who raped women 
and killed with[out] a conscience should be sentenced to life imprison-
ment.”58 Another stated that while “deep down I believe forgiveness 
should be done on these people . . . others say because the lives of their 
relatives were lost, they should hang for their crimes. And sometimes 
I agree with them.”59 The possibility of hanging or imprisoning senior 
rebel commanders for their “guilt” was repeatedly raised.
 Key to the attribution of guilt and demand for punishment was a 
perception of mens rea: “Most are not guilty because it’s done out of 
our will and I accepted Jesus as my savior so I would just let go and 
forgive each and every one of them apart from the generals in the rebel 
camp who performed every action in their right mind and soul.”60 Those 
who had been forced to commit atrocities, however, were held deserving 
of “forgiveness” or “lenient” treatment, as were women and children.61 
Many noted the need for forgiveness and reconciliation of former reb-
els “to release the flow of grudge in our blood stream,” but they felt 
some actions were beyond the pale, violated social taboos, and deserved 
punishment. Others identified a particular hierarchy of criminality and 
abuse, listing the unforgivable crimes as “rape, sexual slavery, human 
butchering and cannibalism,” while both male and female respondents 
highlighted that sexual slavery should be severely punished.62 Personal 
knowledge and experience unsurprisingly inform the value judgments 
made about particular forms of offence, with ideas of honor and shame 
supplying a fundamental interpretative framework for understanding 
moral agency and accountability, as well as Christian notions of forgive-
ness and innocence.63 Only one person suggested that everyone should 
be found “not guilty” because “I want those still left in the bush to return 
without fear and to spread a forgiveness mentality.”64 Overall these in-
terviews are indicative of a limited reconciliation between former LRA 
abductees, their communities, and their former captors: the desire for 
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reconciliation and the recognition of the importance of forgiveness in 
that process is still weighed against the need to see those designated as 
responsible for individual and community suffering held accountable 
for the worst of their actions.
 These oral testimonies are inevitably cast through the life experi-
ences and the current sociopolitical contexts of Lamwo and Uganda 
more broadly. What emerged from these discussions was the need to 
strengthen and reform existing civil and criminal justice frameworks 
within Northern Uganda. Returnees unanimously stated that justice 
was neither functioning nor available for all in Acholi, with money and 
status viewed as prerequisites for accessing any form of justice, which 
supports Anna Macdonald’s research on Acholi legal structures.65 Re-
spondents noted that “our justice here is terrible because it’s based on 
money only,” that community members tend to avoid attending case 
proceedings because they think these are “already fixed to suit a par-
ticular party with status and money or property,” and that “only the rich 
get justice, we the poor get no justice whatsoever.”66 The concern about 
money and the commodification of justice seems linked to tensions sur-
rounding the increasing costs of both civil cases and bridewealth, but it 
also reflects debates on the rising costs of mato oput and who should bear 
the costs of compensation in those ceremonies, which are exacerbated 
by wider agitation about poverty and social inequality. It is also linked 
to social and generational tensions surrounding the nature of power and 
authority in Acholi, as well as concerns about the self-interested ac-
tions of chiefs. One young woman simply noted that “I believe I am the 
wrong person to answer this because I have very little knowledge about 
this so I prefer you ask me another question, those in power can help 
you very well,” which was indicative of a wider disengagement and sense 
of legal disenfranchisement among interviewees.67 Another interviewee 
suggested that “our justice system needs to be revised and the right un-
corrupted people need to be in these positions, otherwise I have no trust 
in our justice system.”68 As this evidence from Lamwo indicates, the 
injustices and inequalities that can push children into conflict, or drive 
the conflicts into which they are recruited, need to be addressed for any 
truly successful transitional justice to be delivered.
The treatment of child soldiers highlights the tensions in transitional 
justice between local and global norms, justice for individuals and 
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communities, and the difficulties of categorizing individuals and their 
actions. An historical survey highlights that child combatants are often 
acutely aware of the injustices that drive conflict but have not expected 
the law to provide justice for themselves or their communities. It also 
highlights that the modern “child soldier crisis” is a product of interna-
tional humanitarian action and child rights norms, which have in turn 
shaped the development of children’s positions within IHL. The univer-
salized definition of childhood embedded in global humanitarian law 
and politics is, however, “too blunt an instrument” to address the com-
plexities of children’s involvement in war; a more nuanced, historicized, 
and ethnographically contextualized understanding of “childhood” is 
needed.69 Future research will hopefully delineate the multiple social 
meanings of childhoods within different African environments from 
the twentieth to twenty-first centuries, researching childhoods not just 
as a life stage leading to adulthood but reclaiming children’s subjectivity 
and their ability to be reflexive about their lives and identities. That is, 
it will investigate children as “beings” rather than just “becomings.”70 
The identities of child soldiers in particular need to be understood as 
processes of strategic self-representation, shifting according to context 
and audience and formed at the intersection of local and global models 
of childhood and rehabilitation.71
 There is a parallel need for ethical and sensitively conducted interdis-
ciplinary research into children’s understandings of law and justice, in 
both war and peace. If transitional and traditional justice are ultimately 
about restoring social equilibrium between communities, and if youth 
under eighteen are regarded as active members of those communities, 
some form of accountability seems necessary for the actions of child sol-
diers. Restorative justice lessons drawn from juvenile justice have more 
recently been promoted as effective for children in transitional justice 
frameworks. Those lessons focusing on informal and flexible procedures 
that emphasize future welfare and community relations rather than 
individual punishment for past offences should be supported because 
those procedures promote a child’s ability to contribute to the com-
munity rather than isolating them from it.72 There will always be ten-
sions between the right of an individual child soldier to protection and 
rehabilitation, on the one hand, and a community’s right to justice, on 
the other. But we need to understand the child’s ideas of justice—what 
it is, and what it should be—to facilitate their contribution to commu-
nity reconciliation. A balance needs to be struck between a former child 
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soldier’s right to protection and their right to agency and consequent 
accountability, between their limitations and their capabilities for func-
tioning within the realms of justice.
 Academic and policy research has recently stressed the need for gen-
dered justices; the argument of this chapter is that generation and age also 
need to be taken more seriously as a vector of and for justice. More research 
is needed into African children’s ideas of law and justice, both in peace 
and in war. As Dorothy Hodgson has noted, there is a particular moral 
authority of motherhood owned by and accorded to African women.73 
Perhaps we should also be talking about the moral potentiality of child-
hood. Children’s roles in the political and moral economies of justice need 
to be acknowledged and engaged with: we need to listen to, rather than 
simply speak for, children in arenas of international and domestic law.
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T E N
Good and Bad Muslims
Conflict, Justice, and Religion among Somalis  
at Dagahaley Refugee Camp in Kenya
f r e d  n y o n g e S a  i K a n d a
I  w A S  A L E R T E D  T O  T h E  U b I q U I T O U S  I N F L U E N C E  O F  M A S L A h A  ( A N 
Islamic concept that connotes public weal) on the lives of Somalis soon 
after commencing fieldwork in a village lying adjacent to Dagahaley 
refugee camp in northeastern Kenya when villagers ousted the food 
committee chairman for alleged misappropriation of foodstuffs. In 
quick succession, a female pupil from the deposed chairman’s lineage 
fought and injured a male pupil from the village chairman’s lineage. 
Because blood had been spilt, village elders asked the girl’s parents to 
pay the village chairman’s lineage 1,500 Kenyan shillings (KSh)1 as a 
maslaha settlement. The following day, the same girl fought with a girl 
from the chief ’s lineage. Subsequently, ten men escorted her to the po-
lice station where they lodged an assault case against the chief ’s lineage. 
This occasioned another round of maslaha talks, and the parents of the 
girl from the deposed chairman’s lineage were paid KSh 1,000 before 
they withdrew the police case.
 When the same girl got into another gratuitous school fight three 
days later, it became apparent that her lineage was seeking revenge 
against the two village leaders for having ratified changes to the food 
committee. A teacher asked her to go and fetch one of her parents. 
Instead, a group of fifteen parents dramatically stormed the school 
223
Conflict, Justice, and Religion among Somalis at Dagahaley Refugee Camp in Kenya
and withdrew their children from class, claiming that the teacher was 
siding with their rivals to unfairly punish “one family.” Following a 
maslaha meeting, the girl’s lineage agreed to return their children to 
school after being promised a position on a newly formed committee. 
This vignette illuminates a wider reality of how maslaha and kinship 
were foregrounded in the justice-seeking process among Somalis in the 
course of my fieldwork. As shown above, the Somali notion of maslaha 
was basically a kin-based form of justice that was typically undertaken 
by lineage elders who usually assembled under an acacia tree for rec-
onciliation discussions whenever a conflict erupted. Although maslaha 
connotes peace, it often epitomized revenge because it was the possibil-
ity of retribution and the concomitant fear of avoiding it that drove the 
reconciliation process.
 In this chapter, I analyze the disputation process among Somali locals 
and refugees based on ethnographic research I conducted using a mix-
ture of Swahili and Somali languages2 between August 2011 and August 
2012. Dagahaley, together with four other camps (Ifo, Ifo 2, Hagadera, 
and Kambioos), are commonly referred to as the Dadaab Complex be-
cause they are closely clustered around the town of Dadaab, which has 
hosted Somali refugees since the 1991 outbreak of civil war in Somalia.
 The Dadaab camps’ long-term existence has largely been sustained 
by relationships that go beyond it, especially because the majority of 
refugees and locals belong to the same ethnic group, speak the same 
language, and share cultural and historical ties.3 The two groups’ prac-
tice of nomadic pastoralism, kinship relationships, and centuries-old 
interactions, indeed, suggest that the establishment of the camps about 
seventy-five kilometers from the porous Kenya-Somalia border merely 
intensified their previous relations. The attempt by bureaucratic ac-
tors to draw an indelible line across the lives of Somali “locals” and 
“refugees,” therefore, tended to map imperfectly onto the way people 
managed their daily lives. Bureaucratic distinctions were particularly ren-
dered partial in disputes, which, like elsewhere, acted as a major terrain 
for negotiating social life.4 Fights and arbitrations often transcended 
local-refugee categories inasmuch as relatives often aligned themselves 
against nonrelatives across the camps, local villages, surrounding bushes 
where Somali nomads5 operated, and in neighboring countries where 
ethnic Somalis reside.6
 Somalis are a patrilineal, Islamic people who are divided into clans, 
subclans, and lineages. The majority of local inhabitants at the Dadaab 
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camps belong to the Darod clan family, who are the largest and the most 
widely distributed among the Somali clans.7 Dafa8—a village named 
after its founding chief where I conducted my fieldwork—is inhab-
ited by the Aulian sub-subclan of the Ogaden subclan that is part of 
the larger Darod clan confederacy. The Aulian have a big presence in 
Somalia and Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. They are subdivided into nine 
lineages or “doors” as they themselves commonly proclaim—following 
Aulian’s two sons who are the founding ancestors of the nine Aulian 
lineages. The village contains five of these lineages. They correspond to 
distinct homelands in Kenya that are within a one-hundred-kilometer 
radius: the Songat, who traditionally inhabit Dadaab; the Haus from 
Kulan and the border town of Liboi; the Afwar from Shantabaq and 
Korofani; the Rer Ali from Modogashe; and the Rer-adhankher from 
Kumahumato. They were drawn to camp areas by the flourishing aid 
economy and have typically organized themselves into lineage-based 
clusters. The remaining four lineages coalesced under a different chief 
in a neighboring village.
 Because of the fact that refugee flight patterns were generally in-
fluenced by kinship considerations in the context of the Somalia war 
that was often waged along clan lines, the majority of Dadaab’s earliest 
arrivals also belonged to the Darod clan. During my fieldwork, however, 
the area was experiencing one of the worst droughts in the Horn of 
Africa, which resulted in a huge influx of mostly non-Darod refugees 
from Somalia. Many were fleeing territories held by al-Shabaab9 mili-
tants who had banned relief assistance and instituted a terror campaign 
against those whose Islamic credentials did not measure up to the ideal 
of what the group ostensibly described as “good Muslims.”
 An enduring aftermath of these dynamics was the emergence of 
“new” and “old” refugee distinctions that were largely inspired by earlier 
arrivals’ (who defined themselves as “old” refugees or locals) attempts to 
link the then prevailing insecurity to later arrivals, whom they labeled 
as “new” refugees. This insecurity was characterized by guerrilla-like 
attacks by suspected al-Shabaab militia, who mainly targeted police 
convoys using a range of explosive devises (bombings) in retaliation for 
the 2011 Kenyan military incursion into Somalia. A common complaint 
among “old” refugees and locals was that “new” arrivals had been so-
cialized in “al-Shabaab culture,” which supposedly “believed in guns” as 
opposed to religion. Accordingly, the bombings were increasingly seen 
as an extension of al-Shabaab’s distinctive violence that was particularly 
225
Conflict, Justice, and Religion among Somalis at Dagahaley Refugee Camp in Kenya
hallmarked by its harsh brand of punishment (beheadings, amputations, 
stoning, and flogging), which allegedly was routinely meted out to their 
relatives in Somalia.
 Somalis have been described in conventional ethnography as orga-
nized according to a segmentary lineage model whose “pastoral democ-
racy” is ostensibly governed by the philosophy of consent and lengthy 
discussions where every male has a say in council.10 The segmentary 
model is, in fact, generally construed as a channel for creating or re-
solving conflicts.11 The idiom of nomadism as a concern with feud and 
anarchy,12 moreover, suggests that Somalis are unwilling or unable to 
operate within relief agency and government bureaucracy. Contrary to 
these suggestions, the chapter highlights how state and international 
justice (in the form of police and other agencies), as well as al-Shabaab-
induced practices, have increasingly altered traditional channels for 
seeking justice among Somali people.13 Opposition to characterizing 
Somali society as egalitarian has recently gathered pace, most notably 
in works that interrogate functionalist reifications of the Somali war.14 
Certainly, the idea of an ever-present potential for conflict that is at 
the core of segmentary lineage analysis is essentialist, especially because 
camp and noncamp contexts are too different to be easily discussed in 
the same terms. I am not, however, concerned with furthering the cri-
tique of functionalist analysis of Somali society per se. Instead, I seek to 
demonstrate that, although ideas about justice were intricately linked to 
maslaha, external influences have widened disputation options and that 
Somalis flexibly utilize these channels in their quest for justice.
 I first frame the chapter within the concept of legal pluralism before 
showing the importance of maslaha in resolving conflicts among So-
malis. I then focus on contested ideas of Islam based on al-Shabaab’s 
attempts to purify Islam.
New Forms of Legal Pluralism
While disagreements exist on what constitutes law,15 legal anthropolo-
gists generally concur that all societies have recourse to a repertoire of 
norms that constitute a form of “legal pluralism.”16 In many African 
societies, the establishment of structured hierarchies of formal courts 
accompanied the process of colonization. Colonial law was often su-
perimposed on customary law—as long as the latter was deemed as 
not being repugnant.17 These plural systems continued to serve as of-
ficial channels of justice after independence.18 In Kenya, kadhi courts 
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adjudicated most disputes between Muslims during the colonial period. 
Susan Hirsch has documented the prominent role that these courts 
have continued to perform in hearing claims of marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance among Muslims following their official recognition at 
Kenya’s independence.19 Although their influence has waned somewhat 
owing to state supervision that is perceived as having a diluting impact 
on the application of Islamic law, these courts are often preferred over 
secular courts because they are renowned for preserving Islamic ideals.20 
Many Muslims have, therefore, tended to use formal secular courts only 
when litigants want state-enforceable judgments.21
 Discussions of legal pluralism often place state laws on top of the 
hierarchy of norms.22 State law ostensibly displaces prevailing local 
regimes because of its coercive power.23 Commentators even suggest 
that state law has achieved unprecedented importance in the present 
era of declining religious influence.24 Historical circumstances in the 
larger northeastern part of Kenya have, however, undermined the ef-
fectiveness of state law in the region. Before the advent of the camps, for 
example, the area was remote and inaccessible because of the systematic 
marginalization it endured at the hands of colonial and postcolonial 
governments. Some scholars have even concluded that Kenyan Somalis 
are second-rate citizens who are inside the state’s orbit only when it 
comes to security concerns but are otherwise outside its purview in de-
velopmental matters.25
 The absence of government influence in the lives of Kenyan Soma-
lis was particularly amplified by their nomadic culture, which elevated 
the role of religion and kinship in organizing social life and resolving 
conflicts. As the opening vignette underlines, the closeness and trust 
with which Somalis perceive their relatives is reflected in the fact that 
the word “reer” (family) is applied (equally it seems) to both members 
of a household and those of the entire lineage.26 It was hard to discern 
finely drawn distinctions in the way people treated lineage and house-
hold members during my fieldwork insofar as individual problems were 
perceived to affect the entire lineage. Thus, the disputation process—as 
described elsewhere27—was largely dictated by collective allocation of 
liability where payments and distribution of compensation was done by 
the entire lineage. Throughout my fieldwork, adult male lineage mem-
bers assembled almost daily—often in homesteads of respected lineage 
elders—where they would chew miraa28 together for the better part of 
the night. It was in such gatherings that decisions about retaliation or 
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compensation were mostly made whenever one of the lineage members 
was involved in a dispute. And although payment or receiving of com-
pensation was often deemed to be a lineage responsibility, offenders or 
aggrieved individuals generally paid or received the largest share of the 
compensation. In the village and camp where I worked, this communal 
approach to resolving conflicts also obligated people to resolve conflicts 
“religiously” through the process of maslaha.
 At the Dadaab camps, state power was most visibly demonstrated 
by the heavy police presence. Because of the al-Shabaab-induced in-
security, the camp was literally sandwiched between two police posts. 
In addition, a magistrate came to hear criminal cases involving both 
refugees and locals for the last week of every month. The office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its 
humanitarian partners had the responsibility of establishing policing 
mechanisms in the camps. But as mentioned above, state and inter-
national justice29 procedures were largely ineffective at Dadaab and 
were often subordinated to kin-based maslaha, which enjoyed greater 
legitimacy in the eyes of locals and refugees. For example, although the 
Lutheran World Federation was charged with overseeing camp security 
and administration, it did not have a physical presence inside the camp. 
Instead, it carried out its core mandate through elected refugees who 
performed the role of community policing.
 Still, state and international actors wielded considerable power within 
the camps. They could occasionally deploy the threat of refoulement (force-
ful return to the country of origin) or suspension of essential services as 
levers for ensuring compliance with local and international norms. When 
two agency workers were abducted at Ifo 2 camp in October 2011 by sus-
pected al-Shabaab militants, for example, basic refugee provisions were 
suspended almost immediately. Soon afterward, government and agency 
officials organized a series of “peace meetings” that turned into avenues 
for brazen threats that refugees would be expelled if they did not reveal 
the culprits. It was not until refugees organized a peaceful demonstra-
tion four weeks later—displaying posters lauding government and agency 
“peace efforts”—that essential services were restored.30
 State and international justice, moreover, expanded the range of dis-
putation options for Somalis. Throughout my fieldwork, for example, 
the police station proved a popular alternative to maslaha. Similarly, 
UNHCR commonly accommodated people who were expelled from the 
village or camp for engaging in acts that were deemed haram (illegal). 
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These different forms of legal pluralism also gave people a chance to 
reflect on the appropriateness of the various methods in relation to re-
ligious moralities and cultural ideals. For example, external disputation 
mechanisms tended to ignite moral deliberations over what consititutes 
good or bad Muslims inasmuch as they challenged conventional ideol-
ogy. In a nutshell, external influences had increasingly resulted in the 
erosion of trust. This forced those disillusioned with the traditional 
channel of resolving conflicts to pursue their grievances in a serial fash-
ion. I use the case of Kassim to illustrate this point.
 Kassim—a close informant—operated a retail shop in the town of 
Dagahaley. Most of his customers took goods on credit and paid for 
them at the end of the month after earning their wages or selling their 
food rations. He kept a record of his credit transactions in an exercise 
book and would always remind his customers of their accumulated debt 
whenever they came for more supplies. Surprisingly, none of his cus-
tomers ever verified Kassim’s figures, an act he attributed to kinship 
ties: “Most of them are my relatives who know that I can’t steal from 
them,” he explained. Following the long drought, Kassim claimed to 
have lent foodstuffs worth KSh 150,000 to a family of distant relatives 
on the strength of the fact that the head of the household’s sister had 
succeeded in getting third-country resettlement in the United States. 
The debt accumulated gradually because he was repeatedly told that the 
woman in the United States was still settling down and needed time to 
look for work before starting to remit money to her brother. This did not 
worry Kassim. He had operated on this basis before and was happy to 
let the debt grow since, at the time, this also seemed like a way of saving 
for the future.
 Eventually, however, he grew impatient because it was taking a 
long time and the family’s promises were not being fulfilled. When 
he sought the intervention of lineage elders, the family in question 
acknowledged having been supplied with foodstuffs but differed on 
what they owed Kassim. “They claimed I had given them goods only 
worth KSh 80,000 instead of the KSh 150,000 and at this point, I 
knew they were looking for ways to steal my money,” he explained 
when I met him at the police station where he had come to report 
the case. The elders had simply asked the debtor to swear by the name 
of God that he had borrowed goods worth KSh 80,000 and instead 
of losing everything, Kassim agreed to the sum of KSh 80, 000 and 
a promise that the family would pay in four monthly instalments of 
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KSh 20,000. He was then paid KSh 20,000 as first instalment and 
only KSh 8,000 the following month. That is why he had decided to 
seek police intervention. Kassim had to pay a KSh 2,000 bribe before 
police arrested the male family head, who was released shortly after-
ward when the man’s close relatives paid Kassim a further KSh 10,000. 
By the time I was exiting the field, Kassim was still owed KSh 42,000 
and kept insisting that he would find a way to recover his money: “I 
have to recover all my KSh 150,000 even if I have to rob them to get 
it,” he would swear furiously.
 The move by elders to invoke religion as part of their conflict reso-
lution procedure is not unique to Somalis. In another Islamic context 
in Kenya, for example, the morality of choosing the police over a reli-
gious disputing option was deemed inappropriate.31 But as opposed to 
the fear of exposing family matters to public scrutiny in the Kenyan 
coastal context, Somalis generally asserted that good Muslims should 
follow the dictates of their religion by resolving all conflicts through 
the channel of maslaha. Kassim’s case shows that the “traditional” 
method of disputation was preferred over other forms, notwithstanding 
the competing interests of disputants. This was largely due to strong 
kinship ties and the pressure that was often exerted on individuals to 
show conformity with Somali customs. Many people underlined their 
commitment and capacity to defend Islamic ideals through acting com-
munally against haram conduct. In cases where women conceived out of 
wedlock, for example, community members would routinely hurl stones 
at their homes at night until the women’s families relocated away from 
the camp. The government’s capacity to prosecute those perpetuating 
violence against others appeared all but nonexistent. However, the 
state and the UNHCR did routinely intervene in protecting victims 
who were expelled from the community by relocating them to a “safe 
haven” inside the UNHCR compound at Dagahaley. Thus, police and 
safe haven options significantly altered the social and religious contours 
of the camps. Contrary to Islamic prescriptions of gendered space,32 
for instance, women and men residing at the safe haven mixed freely 
and often took alcohol, to the apparent chagrin of other community 
members.
 As the case of Kassim has shown, Somalis, like other nomads else-
where,33 did not regard the police as having the authority to resolve 
internal feuds. In the opening vignette, for example, people approached 
police officers merely to remind opponents about the need to initiate 
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or comply with maslaha. Thus, new options for legal redress have re-
configured long-standing ties of kinship and mutual assistance. Still, 
maslaha was the most ubiquitous concept in disputation. It is to the 
predominance of the concept’s role that I now turn.
The Working of Maslaha
According to conventional ethnography, diya—a group of related lin-
eages who collaborate in fighting together and in paying and receiving 
bloodwealth through social contract—is a critical Somali institution 
that helps reduce incidents of open conflict.34 However, people rarely 
made reference to diya at my field site, perhaps because its interpreta-
tion had evolved following the setting up of camps and villages. This 
illustrates the fact that “traditions” are not the timeless abstractions that 
colonial ethnographers often portrayed them to be. Rather than diya, 
the most ubiquitous concept at the village and camp settings was the 
notion of maslaha.
 The idea of maslaha gained currency as a universal general principle 
that permeated all commands especially after the eleventh century and 
is today the most flexible and rational method of Islamic legal reason-
ing.35 This is because it is more context friendly, links the good in the 
world to the hereafter without limiting the common good to material 
utility, and its application supposedly inoculates the law against abuse.36 
For these reasons, one earlier Islamic scholar “unambiguously declared 
maslaha to be the overriding principle of shari’a, and as such superior 
even to scripture and consensus.”37
 As an Islamic concept, maslaha resonated with both locals and refu-
gees at Dadaab. The concept’s popularity stemmed from its primacy in 
mediating conflicts and in ordering relations, and it was particularly 
entrenched by clan and subclan affiliations and antagonisms that have 
historically ordered the political field among Somalis.38 However, the 
Somali maslaha notion was loaded with various cultural aspects. For 
example, reference to maslaha in the camp areas seemed only to be made 
in relation to fights. As many of my interlocutors explained, maslaha 
was primarily concerned with reconciliation, as spelled out in the Holy 
Qur’an’s hadith, where every crime has a prescribed remedy, mostly in 
the form of fines. However, they were also keen to point out that the 
person to be compensated could decide to waive or accept a lesser fine if 
he did not wish to unnecessarily ignite an endless sense of ill-feeling or 
believed that what had happened was accidental.
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 However, the alternative to maslaha was often aargutsi (revenge). 
Revenge was, in fact, so normal in the camp and village settings that 
it almost seemed to be synonymous with maslaha. Still, reconciliation 
was the antithesis of revenge. The striking resonance of these concepts 
merely depicted them as two sides of the same coin, both contained 
in the Somali disputation process. Still, maslaha denoted peace. There 
might be a vicious revenge cycle following fights or perceived incidents 
of wrongdoing, but as I was repeatedly told, in the end maslaha would 
bring peace. Many people also pointed out that there should ideally be 
a twenty-four-hour window before revenge is taken. Those who have 
caused serious injury or death have an obligation to alert one of their 
close relatives within this time frame. If this time limit expires without 
initiation of maslaha, it would be assumed that offenders had chosen to 
“disrespect” the wronged party.
 An understanding of clan, subclan, and lineage alignments is neces-
sary for comprehending how the concept of maslaha is perceived and 
applied among Somalis at Dadaab. Because strong kinship ties pervade 
Somali sociality, individuals’ actions were often tied to their larger 
lineage in the village, camp, and other places where kinsmen resided. If 
someone committed a crime in any of these places, his or her relatives 
in the larger social network would be obligated to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement. Otherwise, revenge—which is largely perceived as a moral 
imperative—could be taken against anyone associated with the larger 
group. Similarly, the decision of lineage elders is binding for all mem-
bers of the social group in different places. Once a settlement is reached 
through maslaha, all members of the lineage are informed and should 
abide by the elders’ decision. If they do not, they risk touching off an 
endless cycle of feuds, and elders—who act on behalf of their respec-
tive lineages or clans—would be blamed for the actions of their lineage 
members. That, I was told, is why elders are respected in Somali society.
The Application of Maslaha
What happened in practice was often at variance with the ideal maslaha 
prescription outlined above. It was this ideal, however, that provided 
the general framework that guided the reconciliation process. In other 
words, the first step to reconciling warring parties was to attempt to 
impress on them the importance of adhering to religious and cultural 
requirements by reminding each party about what should have been 
done to avoid the current situation and what needed to be done now 
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that injury or death had occurred. This became evident only a few weeks 
after the beginning of my fieldwork. One Saturday morning, I saw my 
host father, who was also the village chairman, loading his donkey cart 
with building material. He explained that he was going to the recently 
established Ifo 2 camp where “new” refugees were hosted. The local 
councillor had allocated him a plot at the proposed market center next 
to the camp, and he wanted to construct a restaurant in readiness for the 
widely anticipated business boom that would accompany the creation of 
a food distribution center.39 At that time, refugees at the new camp were 
still getting their food and nonfood items from Dagahaley because food 
stores had not been set up at their camp.
 I also noticed that our neighbors—mindful of the stakes—were simi-
larly loading their donkeys, and it soon became apparent that almost 
every household had been allocated a plot at the new camp. While chat-
ting with friends at the police canteen where I usually had drinks later 
that afternoon, two men who were bleeding profusely from head injuries 
came to report that they had been attacked by “people we know” over a 
plot dispute at the new camp. The police officer on duty advised them to 
get treatment at the nearby hospital and have a doctor fill in a P3 form40 
before they could arrest the suspects. As soon as the men had left, the 
police officer commented that he did not expect them to return because 
“Somalis always prefer maslaha.” Indeed, the men never did return to 
the police station again, and when I mentioned the incident to my host 
father that evening, he explained that the Afwar and Songat “families” 
had been fighting over some plots at Ifo 2 because the councillor, who 
was from the Afwar lineage, and the chief, who was a Songat, had sepa-
rately allocated the same plots to their friends and relatives. Fighting 
had erupted when one of the chief ’s relatives accused his competitor of 
seeking to benefit from the locals’ land, even though he was a refugee. 
He added that the injured men were from the Afwar lineage and that 
elders had already attempted to initiate maslaha even though the Afwar 
members had indicated they wanted to treat the injured before talks 
could begin.
 At four o’clock the following morning, I was awoken by frantic 
screams of distress from around the chief ’s home. Three hours later, my 
host father came to tell me what had happened. Two of the chief ’s broth-
ers (fifty and fifty-five years old), his twenty-two-year-old nephew, and 
the nephew’s wife, who had tried to shield her husband from a machete 
attack, had sustained life-threatening injuries following a dawn raid by 
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a group of around twenty men who were suspected to be members of 
the Afwar lineage. The chief had not been affected since he was at his 
second wife’s home at Dadaab when the attack occurred. My host father 
then assured me I need not worry, as the vitina (witch hunt) did not in-
volve us. Meanwhile, the chief ’s home, which was a short distance away, 
was steadily filling with people. When I went there, I found two parallel 
meetings in progress. Around fifteen Songat lineage elders—mainly from 
Dadaab—were engaged in an animated discussion with the chief on one 
side of the compound. A group of about twenty male youth, roughly 
between fifteen and twenty years old, were holding another meeting on 
the opposite side of the compound. Unlike the elders who were seated, 
the youth were standing facing the elders’ direction and seemed to be 
anxiously awaiting instructions as to what to do next.
 It was this second group that I joined to inquire what had happened. 
A young man in the group told me that the injured had been taken 
to the Garissa provincial hospital. Like everybody else, he was con-
vinced that the Afwar were behind the attack. “No wonder that their 
family name translates to big mouth. That is why they cause endless 
trouble here in the village,” he angrily remarked. Everybody knew the 
land between Liboi and Dadaab belonged to Songat, he added, and he 
expressed surprise at how the Afwar had decided to wage war on them 
considering that the people who had ignited the conflict were village 
outsiders—one came from Liboi and the other was a Somali refugee 
from Kismayo. At the police station where I had gone to seek assurances 
about my own safety, I was told nobody had been arrested. A police 
friend assured me that I would be safe and pointed out that Somalis 
would not dare to attack a non-Somali Kenyan who would not consent 
to maslaha negotiations. He added that he would not be surprised if the 
incident was never formally reported, even if one of those attacked suc-
cumbed to their injuries. “Here, it is all about maslaha. We can’t arrest 
anyone without a complainant. All we did upon arriving in the village 
was to take the injured to hospital,” he remarked. He then narrated 
how the chief and a group of elders had earlier approached the police 
station as if they intended to lodge a formal complaint but instead held 
a lengthy discussion at the police station’s gate before turning back.
 This incident reverberated across the region as evidenced by the 
composition of elders involved in maslaha negotiations who were drawn 
from the various homelands occupied by the five village lineages, as 
well as the camps and even Somalia. Although maslaha talks had duly 
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been initiated, people worried that Songat might secretly be organizing 
a revenge attack and that Afwar must surely be mobilizing members 
across the village, camps, and beyond in anticipation of this possibility. 
To compound the problem, there was uncertainty as to whether the 
injuries would result in death, which complicated compensation nego-
tiations. It was not until one and a half months later that a compromise 
was reached when the injured were finally discharged from hospital 
with several permanent injuries. My host father, who had been heavily 
involved in the marathon negotiation meetings that had been ongoing 
at Dadaab, arrived one evening and announced the good news about 
a maslaha settlement that we had been eagerly awaiting: Songat had 
paid Afwar KSh 21,000 for the earlier day fight, while Afwar had paid 
KSh 39,000 to Songat for the injuries sustained during the dawn attack. 
During various informal discussions with lineage elders, it emerged that 
the twenty-four-hour waiting period before revenge is taken was a mere 
guiding principle that was not binding. This argument is well illustrated 
by Schlee, who writes, “Like in all bargaining situations, the parties may 
have different bargaining power. . . . The logic of compensation is based 
on that of retaliation. The only purpose of compensation is to avoid 
retaliation. If the aggrieved party prefers to retaliate, negotiations about 
compensation will not even be initiated. The group of the perpetrator 
may ask for them in vain.”41
 The chief ’s reputation was sullied considerably as many villagers 
blamed the incident on his perceived corruption. He was also publicly 
humiliated during Jamhuri42 celebrations one month later at Dadaab 
when the Liboi councillor asked the district commissioner (DC) to ad-
dress the Dagahaley issue before “people finish each other.” In response, 
the DC threatened to sack the visibly distraught chief and announced 
that he had nullified the plot allocation. When I was exiting the field 
nearly a year later, villagers had not yet erected structures on the plots 
at Ifo 2 because refugees were still getting their food rations from the 
Dagahaley distribution center. In what follows, I consider how al-
Shabaab-inspired practices led to the questioning of maslaha and other 
conventional procedures.
Purifying Islam:  
Al-Shabaab and the Reconfiguration of Social Life
The Dadaab camps are diversely linked to spaces that go beyond inter-
national borders.43 During my fieldwork, the difficulty of delineating 
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“refugees” from “locals” was always complicated by kinship ties and 
nomadic pastoralism that problematized the idea of “home” since 
many families had members scattered across camps, local villages, and 
among herders in Kenya and Somalia. The back-and-forth refugee 
movements across the porous border, moreover, corresponded with 
the ever-fluid political situation in lawless Somalia. Camp patterns 
often changed as refugees moved in and out of the camps depending 
on how they perceived the shifting political landscape and balance of 
power back home.
 Consequently, the transformative impact of al-Shabaab’s dominance 
in Somalia was closely felt in the camps and surrounding areas. Al-
Shabaab rejected the moderate Sunni form of Islam practiced by Soma-
lis insofar as some of its top leadership was comprised of non-Somalis 
aligned to Al-Qaeda—the global militant Islamist group—who ad-
vocated a radical Sunni Islamic movement. These varying strands are 
informed by the fact that many Islamic societies interpret shari’a dif-
ferently.44 They then apply adat (customary law) whenever they deem 
it to be compatible with shari’a. Thus, different adat versions (based on 
different local customs) abound in the Islamic world.45 The Somali adat 
version (xeer) is so firmly ingrained in Somali sociality that the bound-
ary between customs and Islamic practices is often blurred.46 Indeed, 
many Somalis make no distinction between xeer and shari’a, believing 
their xeer to be divine law.47
 Predictably, the al-Shabaab group dismissed xeer as soon as it en-
trenched itself in Somalia. It accused those practicing xeer of being 
“bad Muslims” and embarked on a campaign of purifying Islam by 
imposing a strict version of shari’a. The al-Shabaab group was eas-
ily accepted when it first emerged because it convinced many people 
fatigued by fighting and clannism that it was capable of creating unity 
and lasting stability in Somalia. Its promise to rule through shari’a 
was particularly well received, given that there was little else on the 
ground in the form of organized secular discourse. Gradually, how-
ever, it started to deviate from its original nationalist aims—notably 
when foreign fighters started to swell its ranks in response to a call to 
arms by diaspora al-Shabaab militants, as well as a sustained Ameri-
can campaign of drone attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan against 
Al-Qaeda targets that drove some jihadists to lawless Somalia.48 By 
deploying their superior financial resources, these foreigners assumed 
leading roles and used their positions to impose a harsh brand of Islam 
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that was unfamiliar to most people in Somalia. The initial zeal, there-
fore, slowly gave way to a sense of disenchantment when the group 
enforced a ban on many Somali customs that it deemed as having 
eroded the Islamic character of social life.
 One of the areas most affected by this drastic reconfiguration was 
al-Shabaab’s attempt to deemphasize the role of kinship and elders in 
disputation. The process of maslaha, as discussed above, pivoted on the 
respect accorded to elders who acted on behalf of lineages in recon-
ciliation deliberations. According to Gure, a refugee clan elder who 
came to Kenya in 2008, people were ordered to stop relying on elders 
and to abandon long-standing practices in favor of a new and more 
violent form of Islam. “They introduced new rules and condemned our 
religion, saying what we were practicing was not genuine Islam. They 
then accused elders of lies and declared that they were the ones who 
were practicing true Islam. Their strategy was to divide people based on 
their age and they cheated young people whom they recruited that they 
would become martyrs upon death for being true Muslims. Those of us 
who refused to join them fled to avoid slaughter.”
 Following Gure, it is plausible that many Somalis perceived al- 
Shabaab’s mission as a concern with purifying Islam from Somali cul-
ture. The distinction that Gure makes between those who refused to join 
al-Shabaab (who opted to go to exile) and those who remained behind 
(construed as having accepted the group’s ideology) was often deployed 
in informal discussions as a temporal benchmark for differentiating 
good and bad refugees. Good refugees had ostensibly been driven into 
exile by war, whereas bad ones had come only recently because of the 
drought. This view gained wider currency in the middle of my fieldwork 
when police arrested a suspected al-Shabaab operative following a tip-
off from a man who claimed that the suspect had chopped off his left 
foot as part of al-Shabaab’s disputation process in Somalia. This was 
followed by another incident where unknown assailants killed three 
refugee leaders. Locals blamed “new” refugees in both cases, saying they 
had been socialized into the “al-Shabaab culture” of resolving differ-
ences through guns as opposed to maslaha. For many people, maslaha 
was anathema to “new” refugees precisely because the timing of their 
arrival endorsed a convergence with al-Shabaab’s practices.49 Maslaha 
was compatible with violence and revenge, but it was not considered 
arbitrary. On the contrary, al-Shabaab’s quest to purify Islam was seen 
as unreasoned, formalistic, and arbitrary.
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 Central to al-Shabaab’s agenda of identifying bad Muslims (whom 
they branded as infidels or unbelievers) was the notion of accusing those 
who were deemed to be acting contrary to Islam. For the first time 
in Somali history, the importance of kinship was contested. As many 
people put it, your own brother or son could accuse you of theft or any 
other arbitrary crime and have your limb chopped off as long as he had 
two witnesses to back his claims. For people like Gure, it created an 
unstable sense of justice and was, therefore, the antithesis of Somali 
disputation where religious and clan elders played a central role in rela-
tion to maslaha.
 The significance of kinship in Somali sociality largely draws on 
the segmentary principle of aligning oneself to close kinsmen as a 
means of governance and resource access.50 This is well illustrated by 
their practice of continuously scattering people and livestock among 
close relatives across international borders, towns, villages, and camps 
to maximize on resources in multiple places.51 For some authors, the 
Somali kinship supremacy has created a setting where it is “impos-
sible, or at least extremely difficult, for one who is not a kinsman to be 
trusted.”52 It is the sustainability of this kinship support model that 
was at issue when al-Shabaab’s challenge of its legitimacy in Somalia 
started to be felt at the camp areas during my fieldwork because of the 
closeness that existed between “old” arrivals and their relatives back in 
Somalia. Indeed, the group’s influence transcended the international 
border as demonstrated by the fact that almost every refugee or local 
family I knew had been affected in some way by its actions. Moulid, 
a nephew of my host father, told me, for example, that he had been a 
miraa trader “in all forty-two years of my life.” He would coordinate 
miraa supply from Kenya and oversee its distribution in Kismayo, 
Somalia. In March 2011, al-Shabaab arrested him without warning 
and detained him for seven days for trafficking haram substances. 
Some “brave” elders rescued him when they testified that he was a 
good person whom they had known for twenty-seven years. He was 
then released and warned never to sell miraa. Soon afterward, he fled 
to Kenya and was briefly hosted by his uncles in the village before 
founding his own home. “They were initially good but started being 
animals in 2008 when they intensified their slaughter campaigns,” he 
explained.
 The case of Fawzia, a forty-two-year-old woman whom I had come 
to know well through the course of my fieldwork, was particularly 
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remarkable for the way her daily life highlighted the nexus between the 
camps and regions in Somalia controlled by al-Shabaab. She had been 
driven out of Somalia by al-Shabaab-induced violence, but the group’s 
ideologies had continued to haunt her long after her exile. On one of 
my visits to her home, I found two of her brother’s sickly children who 
had recently been brought by some relatives who were fleeing the vio-
lence. She explained that her brother was unwilling to come into exile, 
but he feared for the children’s safety and had, therefore, requested that 
she look after them. On another occasion, she was raising money from 
relatives to facilitate the release of her seventy-four-year-old father, 
who had been arrested by al-Shabaab officials. When I went to bid 
her farewell at the end of my fieldwork, she told me that her husband 
had been forced to travel back to Kismayo to take care of the family 
business following the arrest of his brother, who had apparently been 
accused of shaving his beard. When I visited her eighteen months after 
exiting the field, she tearfully informed me that her husband had never 
returned. He had been killed following al-Shabaab’s accusation that he 
was a bad Muslim.
 For many locals and “old” refugees, therefore, al-Shabaab—and by 
extension new refugees—were shetani (devils) who did not appreciate 
that Islam was a peaceful religion that does not condone killings. In-
deed, the sense of injustice associated with al-Shabaab’s rule was often 
directed at “new” refugees who lacked kinship connections to integrate 
in the area’s community. Accusations against this group, in particular, 
dominated proceedings during barazas (public meetings for dissemi-
nating government policy). In one such baraza, my host father framed 
the group’s threat in the following terms when he was invited to speak 
as the village chairman: “al-Shabaab started throwing bombs around 
when this camp hosting new refugees was opened. That camp is full of 
shetani.”
 Despite the harsh anti-al-Shabaab rhetoric in public encounters, 
however, younger people occasionally supported the group’s activities 
in private conversations. This was particularly highlighted by the ex-
periences of a twenty-year-old village friend, whose previous work as 
a minibus driver plying the Liboi–Kismayo route had entailed “coop-
eration” with the group. When I told him I was looking for a cheap 
electric generator, he offered to get me a tax-free one from Kismayo, 
where he was “known and respected.” He then explained how he had 
helped some Kenyans to get rich after connecting them to the group, 
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saying they were good people who were misunderstood by many people. 
These varying perceptions aptly illustrate how external influences have 
increasingly reconfigured the traditional mechanisms of disputation 
that largely revolved around the notion of maslaha.
External influences have expanded channels for pursuing justice at 
the Dadaab Complex, contrary to earlier suggestions that Somalis are 
too anarchic to accommodate external institutions. Bureaucratic actors 
altered public space permanently, not only by deploying the threat of 
refoulement and suspension of essential services as levers for ensuring 
compliance with local and international norms, but also by providing 
protection mechanisms for minorities and those unwilling to live ac-
cording to the established moral order. Police authority was, moreover, 
increasingly invoked by locals and refugees to remind opponents about 
the need to initiate maslaha. Still, kin-based maslaha exercised consid-
erable power over locals and refugees because state and international 
structures often depended on local institutions. This created specific 
room for kinship and revenge to do their work. However, the seepage 
of al-Shabaab-inspired practices into Dadaab’s landscape resulted in 
the questioning of the legitimacy of kinship in the disputation process. 
The discourse on good and bad Muslims, as well as new-old distinc-
tions, indeed, illustrated contested ideas about Islam that reflected many 
people’s anxieties about the growing influence of al-Shabaab on justice 
and other social issues.
 The interaction of multiple disputation mechanisms in the chang-
ing political landscape prompted people to reflect on proper ways of 
pursuing justice. What elevated maslaha’s prominence was the belief 
held by many Somalis that good Muslims ought to pursue justice in 
ways that conformed to religious moralities and cultural ideals. How-
ever, this intersected with social realities in a setting characterized by 
an increasing erosion of trust. This forced people to pursue grievances 
in a serial fashion, often in opposition to idealized ways of pursuing 
justice.
 The ubiquity of maslaha at the Dadaab camps is an indictment of 
the view that states are universally the most dominant dispensers of 
justice.53 Indeed, the popularity of such local mechanisms illustrates 
the usefulness of legal pluralism as a heuristic disputation concept in 
nomadic societies.
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Notes
1. During my fieldwork, one US dollar was exchanging for about eighty-
five Kenya shillings. Agencies paid their refugee employees an “incentive” that 
mostly ranged between fifty and one hundred dollars per month.
2. Because I was not completely fluent in Somali, I commonly switched 
between Swahili and Somali languages while communicating with villagers.
3. Somali minority groups that don’t speak Somali, such as Somali Bantus, 
have a considerable presence inside the Dadaab camps.
4. See Susan F. Hirsch, Pronouncing and Persevering: Gender and the Dis-
courses of Disputing in an African Islamic Court (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998).
5. Villagers commonly referred to herders as people “who follow camels” and 
sometimes as “those staying in the bush.”
6. Colonial borders scattered Somalis in five distinct regions, including 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, and northeastern 
Kenya.
7. Lee V. Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History 
of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1982). See also Ioan M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and 
Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1999).
8. I use pseudonyms for villages and people’s names to protect the identity 
of my informants
9. Al-Shabaab means “the youth.” The group emerged in Somalia as a radi-
cal youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union militia to battle Ethiopian forces 
who were backing the interim government.
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Land Restitution (Old and New), 
Neotraditionalism, and the Contested Values  
of Land Justice in South Africa
o L a f  z e n K e r
A S  A PA RT h E I D  D R E w  T O  A  C L O S E  I N  T h E  E A R LY  1 9 9 0 S ,  T h E  P R O P E RT Y 
clause—as ultimately enshrined in section 25 of the constitution of 
1996—emerged as a matter of strategic compromise. While in principle 
protecting property rights to be expropriated only for “a public purpose 
or in the public interest” and subject to “just and equitable” compen-
sation, public interest was explicitly defined to include “the nation’s 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable 
access to all South Africa’s natural resources” (section 25[4][a]). In its 
subsections 25(4–9), the property clause further provided for the sepa-
rate demands of land redistribution, tenure reform, and land restitution, 
which have constituted the three legs of South African land reform up 
to today.
 In this chapter, I explore the shifting values that have been associated 
with the “land justice” to be achieved through this ambitious land reform 
program in South Africa.1 I hereby consciously refrain from studying 
this process in terms of a normative theory of justice. Instead, and in 
line with the overall approach of this volume, my focus is exclusively 
on justice as it is emically understood and constructed by the actors 
themselves.2 “Land justice” is thus interpreted descriptively as a con-
tinuous coproduction involving various actors engaged in negotiating 
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and putting into practice the morally rightful distribution of land and 
landed rights (i.e., rights derived from belonging to particular lands).
 Restricting my discussion to the ongoing land restitution process, I 
deal in the first section with the legal and institutional particularities 
and problems that have characterized land restitution since its incep-
tion in 1994 and that form the backdrop to the recent reopening of 
restitution in 2014, which had been brought to a halt by a constitutional 
court order in July 2016. Apart from presenting reasons for being skepti-
cal regarding this reopened process, I critique the restitution process’s 
conceptualization of land primarily as a means of production. This pro-
ductionist bias within the echelons of the state, which envisions rural 
residents primarily as would-be smallholder or commercial farmers, 
has played itself out in a wider political context that has experienced 
a marked shift toward neotraditionalist policies and legislation since 
the late 1990s. This process, in which potential farmers in the making 
have increasingly been transformed, in law, from rights-bearing citizens 
into lease-holding subjects in perpetuity, constitutes the topic of the 
following section. The shift in conceptions of restitution beneficiaries 
can be profitably analyzed with regard to land justice, as I subsequently 
argue, in terms of competing notions of autochthony. Autochthony 
here refers to actors’ own conceptions of a rightful link between an 
individual, territory, and group, often self-styling itself as profoundly 
“authentic,” “natural,” or “evidently legitimate.” Framing the restitution 
process in terms of autochthony has the advantage of making visible 
the way that restitution is embedded within much broader competitive 
moral economies of identity, each variant with its own postulated set of 
land(ed) rights that transcend narrow concerns with production. This 
reveals how subtle changes in restitution law, as well as broader shifts 
toward neotraditionalist legislation, produce complex and transforma-
tive conditions for rightful belonging, relatedness, and coresidence, with 
important consequences for the type of justice that can be achieved with 
regard to, and through, the land.
 Taking inspiration from James Ferguson’s observation that “the land 
question” in South Africa (and elsewhere) is far too often reduced to 
“the agrarian question,” the next section fuses the discussion of autoch-
thony’s proclaimed land(ed) rights with Ferguson’s notion of “a rightful 
share”: the emic idea that group membership based, for instance, on 
kinship, locality, indigeneity, ethnicity, or citizenship entails, or should 
entail, a rightful claim to ownership of, or a share in, the respective 
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group’s wealth.3 Seen in this light, belonging at various scales to multiple 
groups and their respective territories may be used by actors to press 
demands on the distribution of these groups’ belongings. In this way, 
restitution beneficiaries may share in the “productive values” of restored 
land, the “consumptive values” of reclaimed land in the form of financial 
compensation or the profit made from renting or selling it, and the “dis-
tributive values” of land as a means for tapping into multiple networks 
of resource distribution (e.g., wages, remittances, social grants, care, 
knowledge, contacts, etc.). In other words, land justice is shown to be 
about both a rightful share of the land itself and a rightful share through 
the land, where the former operates as the precondition for the latter. 
The chapter concludes with a reflection on the possible futures of land 
justice in South Africa under conditions of an ever-growing scarcity of 
wage labor and a rise in neotraditionalist politics.
South African Land Restitution and Its Recent Reopening: 
Transforming Anew the Rural Economy  
through Productionism?
Mandated through the constitution of 1996, the legal and institutional 
particularities of the restitution process were laid down in the Resti-
tution of Land Rights Act of 1994. This act provides several criteria 
according to which claimants are entitled to restitution in the form of 
either restoration of a right in land or equitable redress (usually financial 
compensation). The claimant can be an individual (or a direct descen-
dant) or a community. The claimant has to have been dispossessed after 
June 19, 1913, on the basis of racially discriminatory laws and practices. 
Finally, claimants must not have received just and equitable compensa-
tion and initially had to lodge their claim before December 31, 1998. 
Significantly, restitution is not limited to former freehold ownership but 
includes a whole array of registered and unregistered land rights derived 
from labor tenancy, sharecropping, customary law, and beneficial occu-
pation, among other things. The Restitution Act further established the 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights as well as the Land Claims 
Court (LCC) as its key players. Subsequently, about eighty thousand 
claims (the official figures have shifted) were validated as legitimate and 
in need of resolution.4
 In a media statement by the chief land claims commissioner, dated 
September 8, 2016, the commission presents the relatively small num-
ber of 7,419 claims lodged before the 1998 cutoff date as still requiring 
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settlement.5 Yet this statement does not provide an overall figure for 
the substantial backlog of those claims that were previously “settled” 
through a formal agreement but still require finalization through trans-
fer of either land or financial compensation. According to the Commis-
sion’s Annual Performance Plan 2016/17, as of November 31, 2015, only 
59,758 claims out of the then settled 78,483 claims had also been final-
ized.6 The backlog thus still consisted of a total of 18,725 claims. In other 
words, about 22 percent of all claims lodged before the 1998 deadline 
were not yet finalized by the end of November 2015.
 For a long time, the ANC government strictly opposed accepting any 
new claims, although both the 1998 deadline for lodging claims and the 
1913 cutoff date have been strongly contested. Yet during his 2013 state 
of the nation address, President Jacob Zuma announced that the gov-
ernment would reopen the process of registering land claims. On June 
29, 2014, he signed the Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act of 
2014, which reopened the lodgment period and extended it until June 
30, 2019. However, on July 28, 2016, the constitutional court declared the 
Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act as entirely invalid from 
the date of the judgment because of its improper procedural enactment. 
While prohibiting the acceptance of any new claims after that date, the 
constitutional court also maintained the validity of those new claims 
already lodged since 2014. However, these were put on hold and the 
commission interdicted from processing them until all claims lodged 
before 1998 have been processed or new legislation has been enacted 
by Parliament. According to the above-mentioned media statement by 
the chief land claims commissioner, the reopening of the claims process 
remains a concern of the government, which is already preparing for a 
new bill reopening restitution.7
 In the light of the experience of twenty years of first-wave resti-
tution, many observers (myself included) have been highly skeptical 
about the reopening of land restitution: given the vast number of new 
claims under budgetary conditions very unlikely to increase propor-
tionately, restitution would take many decades. Although old claims, 
according to the constitutional-court ruling, have to be settled before 
new claims regarding the same land can be processed, the question of 
how this will be done and how the land rights of older claimants will be 
protected remains unclear. Furthermore, the commission has been ac-
cused of using new counterclaims to justify its refusal to honor transfer 
agreements and restitution awards that they would otherwise be legally 
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bound to respect. This mainly relates to recent attempts by the com-
mission to sideline elected communal property associations (CPAs) in 
the context of reempowering traditional authorities.8 Even if these new 
claims cannot, for now, be used for this purpose, there are still doubts 
about whether all land will now be transferred to legally entitled CPAs 
in those cases in which traditional authorities also make claims to the 
same land.
 In fact, critics claim that the reopening of land restitution has been 
motivated by a different calculation, namely, to please the traditional 
leaders lobby, enabling them to make restitution claims on vast areas 
of land.9 President Zuma, speaking before the National House of Tra-
ditional Leaders in February 2014, explicitly advised traditional leaders 
to get “good lawyers” to file restitution claims on behalf of their people. 
Yet, any individual or community is entitled to lodge a claim; traditional 
authorities are not accorded any special role in the restitution process. 
This has not prevented many traditional leaders from expressing their 
intention to lodge massive land claims—like King Goodwill Zwelithini, 
who has expressed the intention to lodge a claim for the entire province 
of KwaZulu-Natal as well as sections of the Eastern Cape, Mpuma-
langa, and the Free State. The aim is to claim land taken from the Zulu 
Kingdom during the colonial period—from 1838 onward—first by the 
Voortrekkers and then the British. However, the restitution act provides 
for dispossession only after 1913.10
 Apart from these problems, what is striking is that the reopening 
of restitution has been justified on the basis of the contribution it is 
projected to make to the elimination of poverty and the reduction of 
inequality through a transformation of the rural economy.11 This trans-
formation seemingly remains firmly based on the vision of restitution 
beneficiaries making use of their restored lands as new smallholder or 
commercial farmers. That the restitution process should envision land 
primarily as a means of production is hardly surprising, given that 
restitution forms part of the overarching land reform program of the 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) and 
is meant to contribute to the “agrarian transformation” informing the 
department’s 2009 Comprehensive Rural Development Programme and 
the 2012 National Development Plan.12 Yet, as many studies from South 
Africa and beyond show, smallholder agriculture generally seems to be 
on the decline, both in terms of crop farming and livestock rearing, 
even among those who do have land.13 In other words, land seems to be 
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cherished far less for its “productive value” than is commonly assumed 
within state echelons.
 Such a productionist bias seems even more inappropriate in the pe-
culiar case of the restitution process, which—unlike land redistribution 
and tenure reform—is about redressing historical dispossession through 
various means rather than about an exclusive focus on land. In fact, in 
2013, out of the total of 77,334 claims reported as “settled,” 92 percent 
(71,292 claims) had been resolved through financial compensation rather 
than by the transfer of land.14 Even when claimants opted for land, they 
have not exclusively or even primarily put it to agrarian use or utilized 
it for production. In fact, land is sometimes being valued as a means of 
production, yet often also as a means of consumption (“eating the land” 
through financial compensation, renting or selling it) or a means of dis-
tribution. Before focusing on these various usages, I will first address the 
wider and increasingly neotraditionalist context in which these various 
values of land have been reconfigured over the past twenty years.
Neotraditionalizing the State of Restitution: From Rights-
Bearing Citizens to Lease-Holding Subjects in Perpetuity
Despite the structural incorporation of chiefs into the mechanisms of 
colonial oppression and the growing popular opposition to the chiefs 
during the 1980s, section 211 of the 1996 constitution explicitly recognizes 
“traditional leadership” and “customary law,” subject, however, to the 
constitution and any applicable legislation. Whereas “tribal” authori-
ties have continued to exercise the right, obtained under colonialism, 
to allocate land in the former “homelands,” the impact of “customary 
law” within state law pertaining to land restitution proved rather limited 
throughout the 1990s. Statutory provisions affecting land restitution at 
the time strongly emphasized individual rights, structurally bypassing 
chiefs in the control and allocation of land.15
 Thus, the Communal Property Associations Act of 1996, in its pre-
amble, enables “communities to form juristic persons, to be known as 
communal property associations in order to acquire, hold and manage 
property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in terms of a 
written constitution.” Apart from similar entities like trusts, such com-
munal property associations (CPAs) have constituted the main form in 
which land restored through restitution has been communally held. Ac-
cording to section 9(1) of the act, CPA constitutions must accommodate 
fair and inclusive decision-making processes, equality of membership, 
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democratic processes, and fair access to the property of the association. 
While traditional authorities are not legally prevented from holding key 
positions within CPAs and trusts, and often do so, by law they must 
be democratically elected onto the committee like any other member.16 
Common templates for such CPA constitutions even explicitly restrict 
the permitted proportional representation of traditional leaders on the 
committee.17
 However, under President Thabo Mbeki, the political tide began to 
turn toward a “African Renaissance” from 1999. In line with a general 
trend toward neotraditionalism, the Parliament passed the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003, recognizing tra-
ditional leaders and traditional councils and giving these councils broad 
but largely unspecified functions in the field of development and the 
administration of their communities in accordance with “custom” and 
tradition. The act thereby effectively endorsed the tribal authorities set 
up under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 as a legitimate foundation 
for a post-1994 “traditional” order.18
 The subsequent Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 envisioned tra-
ditional councils as having the authority to administer and allocate land 
in so-called communal lands, including land in former homelands, but 
also land already restituted or redistributed to CPAs. In 2010, the con-
stitutional court declared the act invalid because of its improper proce-
dural enactment.19 Despite this fiasco, another neotraditional bill—the 
Traditional Courts Bill—was reintroduced into the legislative process 
in 2011 after its intermittent withdrawal. In the context of renewed sub-
stantial opposition from civil society and legal activists fearing this new 
legislation would give chiefs even more judicial powers than they had 
under apartheid, “the bill was allowed to ‘lapse’ in the National Coun-
cil of Provinces (the second House of Parliament) just before the 2014 
elections, when it became clear that the required majority of five out of 
the nine provinces would not support it.”20 However, in January 2017, a 
revised version of the Traditional Courts Bill was published once again.
 Additional neotraditional legislation was also tabled. The Traditional 
and Khoi-San Leadership Bill, which is meant to replace the Tradi-
tional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 2003, further 
entrenches the power of traditional authorities—for instance, regarding 
their capacity to strike mining deals without consultation with the af-
fected community. While a bottom-up model for Khoi-San leadership 
is newly introduced, requiring proof of choice by each individual to be 
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associated with that specific leader, the traditional leadership model 
reinforces top-down jurisdiction within superimposed apartheid tribal 
boundaries without any need for prior consent by the affected.21
 Given the longstanding opposition from traditional leaders toward 
CPAs within “their” territories, the DRDLR has also increasingly side-
lined CPAs by discouraging their establishment wherever there is a tra-
ditional council, by refusing to transfer land to them, and by proposing 
corresponding amendments to existing legislation.22 What is more, the 
DRDLR has reversed its earlier emphasis in the 1997 White Paper on 
South African Land Policy on established occupants as “rightful own-
ers” of communal land.23 In its 2013 Rural Development Framework, the 
DRDLR projects the transfer of title deeds for the “outer boundaries” of 
communal land to traditional councils, wherever they exist, with merely 
derived “institutionalised use rights” for ordinary people subject to the 
overarching ownership of traditional councils.24
 This effectively means that potential land reform beneficiaries have 
increasingly shifted from rights-bearing citizens to lease-holding sub-
jects in perpetuity, more and more dependent on traditional authorities. 
This dependence applies both when they reside in the former home-
lands and when they are demanding rights in land outside communal 
areas, to which chiefs also lay claim (see below). This has substantially 
transformed the conditions under which restitution beneficiaries can 
imagine their own places in the world, their rightful senses of belonging 
and relatedness, and the specific forms of land justice they might pursue 
based on such ways of being and belonging.
Proliferating Autochthonies and the Land Justice of Restitution
While starting from a conception of “rights in land” that is much 
broader than mere freehold ownership of land, once in motion the 
restitution process usually narrows its focus to questions of property 
rights. Yet such a narrow approach arguably prevents an appreciation 
of the full extent to which the land justice of restitution is enmeshed 
in a more complex web of proliferating “autochthonies” concerned 
with questions of where, how, and why (and with what consequences) 
people rightfully belong.
 As I develop in more detail elsewhere,25 and as mentioned above, 
autochthony (literally meaning “sprung from the earth” in Greek) re-
fers to an asserted rightful link between an individual, a territory, and 
a group, often depicting itself as profoundly “authentic,” “natural,” or 
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“evidently legitimate.” Compared to other analytical notions such as 
ethnicity, autochthony has the advantage of highlighting the fact that, 
in many contexts, actors struggle not only with the question of how 
to imagine collective identities—that is, interconnections between in-
dividuals and groups—but also with conceptualizing the interrelations 
between such identities and specific pieces of land (their territories).
 I propose to distinguish two ideal types of autochthony based on the 
causal direction of connecting individual, territory, and group: in the 
mode of “individualized autochthony,” the place of birth or residence 
or both first links an individual to his or her territory, which, through 
land(ed) rights embedded in membership titles, is connected to a group, 
which, in turn, is likely to link up again with the individual through 
the possible, though not necessary, connection of a shared culture or 
descent. This autochthony is “individualized” in that the pronounced 
rightful link between an individual, territory, and group is essentially 
produced through the copresence of individuals, that is, through their 
individual place of birth or residence in their respective presents.
 By contrast, “collectivized autochthony” refers to an autochthonous 
mode in which an individual, through allegedly shared culture or de-
scent or both, first connects to a group that at some point in its pro-
claimed past rooted itself through the establishment of land(ed) rights 
for its members in a territory, which is likely to link up again with the 
individual through the possible, though not necessary, connection of 
placing the birth or residence of this individual within its own bor-
ders. This autochthony is “collectivized” since the asserted rightful link 
between an individual, territory, and group is essentially established 
through the past of groups, distinguishing between “earlier-comers” and 
“later-comers” to that territory based on alleged collective pasts.
 These two ideal types of autochthony allow for multiple empirical 
instantiations, varying in terms of causal direction and scale as well as 
in the specific meanings and concrete delineations attached to “place 
of birth,” “residence,” “territory,” “land(ed) rights,” “group,” “descent,” 
and “culture.” In fact, modern citizenship makes use of exactly the same 
elements and hence can be described as enforcing different versions of 
“state autochthony.” Yet even within a thus-constituted citizenry, ad-
ditional layers of autochthonous contestation live on regarding more 
specific questions of land justice—namely, who rightfully belongs (or 
should belong) where, how and why, and with what consequences for 
his or her landed entitlements?
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 Seen within this framework, restitution law has provided unstable 
templates for imagining forms of autochthonous belonging, with sub-
stantial consequences for the land justice that potential beneficiaries 
have been able to seek, and achieve, through restitution. Take for in-
stance the land claim on the farm “Kafferskraal” situated on the edge 
of the highveld escarpment to the northeast of Pretoria outside the 
former homelands, which I investigated as one of several cases dur-
ing the course of intermittent multisited fieldwork between 2010 and 
2016.26 Known to local Africans as “KwaMaquze,” the pejorative farm 
name “Kafferskraal” has appeared on successive title deeds since it was 
first granted in private white ownership by the then Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Republiek (ZAR) in 1872. However, the community of claimants, whose 
ancestors were forcibly removed in the 1930s, recently used this fact to 
positive effect, arguing in the Land Claims Court that, as the name 
indicates, black people had long settled the land and that this fact, and 
related land rights, survived the superimposition of white registered 
title. This argument was put forward when the former white landown-
ers unsuccessfully opposed the validity of the land claims that various 
former African residents had lodged after the end of apartheid.
 Thus, the state restored KwaMaquze to the overall group of benefi-
ciaries, consisting of descendants of the original Ndzundza Ndebele that 
had been deported in the 1930s from the farm, and, in accordance with 
the Communal Property Association Act, handed over the management 
of the land to an elected committee, the KwaMaquze Trust. However, 
local conflicts subsequently erupted, as the traditional council (them-
selves royal descendants of those deported) started insisting that it is the 
chief who owns the land in Ndebele culture and hence only he is entitled 
to manage it. This illustrates that even in a seemingly straightforward 
restitution case such as KwaMaquze, in which an African community 
was dispossessed and displaced and now wants to return, the underly-
ing autochthonous logic underpinning local senses of land justice is far 
from self-evident. Officials settling this claim argued at the time, as did 
representatives of the elected KwaMaquze committee, that it had been 
Ndebele individuals and nuclear families residing on KwaMaquze who 
thereby acquired beneficial occupation rights, of which they were sub-
sequently dispossessed.27 In other words, they evoked the land justice of 
small-scale individualized autochthony (as well as a derivative form of 
small-scale collectivized autochthony based on individual family inheri-
tance), aggregating today into a larger circle of beneficiaries. By contrast, 
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the chief and his traditional council claimed to have been dispossessed of 
land rights based on Ndebele “customary law” and culture and belonging 
to all Ndzundza Ndebele, to which individuals were connected through 
shared culture and descent. In other words, their sense of land justice was 
rooted in a form of large-scale collectivized autochthony extending be-
yond the confines of KwaMaquze (correspondingly, the chief had claimed 
the larger Mahlungulu area comprising a total of seventeen farms).
 A rather different case is presented by two communities residing on 
Kalkfontein farm situated just inside the former KwaNdebele homeland, 
near the town of settlers to the north of Pretoria.28 These communities 
consist of descendants of individuals that came together during the 
1920s in order to buy farmland. However, the Natives Land Act of 1913 
only allowed for the acquisition of land by blacks within the 7 percent of 
land specifically scheduled for that purpose. The farm Kalkfontein fell 
outside these scheduled areas but was part of those areas to be further 
released for black occupation. Therefore, the governor-general approved 
exemption, registering the land in the name of the Minister of Native 
Affairs, who held it in trust on behalf of the copurchasers.
 While both communities originally consisted of ethnically mixed 
groupings with Ndzundza Ndebele, Pedi, and Tswana origins, the situa-
tion on portion A of Kalkfontein was rather different from that on por-
tions B and C. For Kalkfontein B and C, thirty copurchasers seemingly 
came together from different backgrounds to acquire the land unam-
biguously as private communal landowners. By contrast, a considerable 
majority of the original buyers of portion A were Ndzundza Ndebele 
(104 out of 126), who wanted to buy “tribal land” under their chief Janu-
arie Mahlangu.29 But the former white landowner wanted to make sure 
that his farm workers, who were not Ndzundza Ndebele, could stay on 
the farm. He thus sold the land only as communal land under a com-
mittee rather than as tribal land under a chief. The Ndzundza Ndebele 
officially agreed. However, supporters of the royal family have claimed 
to this day that it had been clear from the start that the ethnically mixed 
group would accept the leadership of Chief Januarie Mahlangu. Thus, 
considerable tensions existed from the start between two competing vi-
sions of land justice—one advancing the management of the land by 
an elected committee (as officially written into the title deed), and the 
other promoting a local chief ’s rule over Ndebele lands.
 The following decades saw a recurrence of conflicts rooted in this 
basic difference. These became further entrenched when, toward the late 
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1970s, the South African government created an Ndebele homeland in 
that very area. Without the proper involvement or democratic consent 
of the copurchasers, both Kalkfontein communities were constituted as 
a single “tribe” under the chiefly descendant Daniel Mahlangu in terms 
of the Native Administration Act of 1927 and subsequently incorpo-
rated into the wider homeland, KwaNdebele. This made possible chiefly 
excesses that antagonized many of his former followers.
 For years, members from both communities used various political 
and legal means to resist this chiefly despotism. Finally, in 2008, the 
community of Kalkfontein B and C succeeded in using the restitu-
tion process to get a court order ensuring the transfer of the land to 
the elected “Kalkfontein Community Trust.” The descendants of the 
copurchasers of portion A, using the African name of the place, had 
formed the “Katjebane CPA”; yet at the time of my fieldwork, the of-
ficial title deed had still not been transferred to the CPA.
 Thus, to this day, two conflicting logics of collectivized autochthony 
have continued to orient local senses of land justice about who belongs 
to whom, where, and with what kind of rights. In one version of col-
lectivized autochthony, today’s right holders are linked through descent 
to a group of people who were united in the past by the intention to buy 
Kalkfontein as private communal property, albeit managed collectively 
through male democracy, in order to have a place for both residence 
and agricultural production. In the other version of collectivized au-
tochthony, a logic similar to the ethnicized imagination in KwaMaquze 
can be identified: shared culture and shared descent are seen as linking 
individuals to the local Ndzundza Ndebele “tribe,” which established a 
rightful claim to the land of Kalkfontein by buying the land as future 
tribal land.
 These and other competing forms of autochthonous belonging (such 
as smaller-scale individualized autochthony of community members 
based on household property established through residence) have co-
existed for a long time, informing constructions of land justice within 
restitution as much as conflicting with them. Broader political shifts 
toward increasingly neotraditionalist policies and laws have recently 
strengthened the position of traditional authorities in making their own 
ethnicized versions of autochthony prevail at the expense of more indi-
vidualized, or alternatively collectivized, imaginations. Yet, however such 
individual-territory-group triads are being construed, the idea of group 
membership typically entails rightful claims to land(ed) rights—or in 
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James Ferguson’s recent terminology, a “rightful share” in the group’s 
property that far exceeds the mere right to use land for production.
Rightful Shares or Distributing Belongings  
through Distributed Belonging
In a number of publications, culminating in the recent book Give a Man 
a Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution, Ferguson provokes 
us to rethink the productionist bias common to both development dis-
course and Marxist orthodoxy, which have seen production as far more 
profound and “structural” than mere distribution of material goods. In 
this vein, Ferguson argues, the land question in Southern Africa—“who 
has what rights to land, what do they do with it and with what implica-
tions”—is often unduly reduced to the agrarian question concerning 
“how farming is, or ought to be, organized, and with what role for peas-
ants or other small agricultural producers.”30
 Yet, under global conditions of jobless growth and increasing con-
centrations of production at quasi-monopolistic sites (e.g., Canada’s 
dominance in wheat production), Ferguson suggests that land in 
southern Africa might increasingly become more relevant as a means 
of distribution rather than as a means of production. In other words, 
sustaining livelihoods in southern Africa and beyond might increas-
ingly be maintained not only, or even primarily, through productive, but 
rather distributive, uses of land. Ferguson coins the terms “distributive 
labour” in order to emphasize the hard work invested every day in tap-
ping into different circuits of resource flows and successfully pressing 
demands, at different places and with different sets of people, on the 
resources of others in order to secure one’s share.31
 Ferguson proposes exploring the notion of a “rightful share,” descrip-
tively, in order to make better sense of people’s claims to be included 
in distributive flows, “where the rightfulness of the share is reckoned 
to derive from . . . a kind of membership or ownership-claim based on 
citizenship, indigeneity or ethnicity.”32 Put differently, rightful shares 
are rooted in conceptions of land justice based on autochthonous be-
longing. Ferguson further suggests exploring the normative potential of 
“the rightful share” in rehabilitating the value of distributive labor and 
in propagating a new politics of distribution that might be the future for 
many under global conditions of expansive structural unemployment.33
 At least with regard to South Africa, Ferguson’s suggestions seem to 
capture an important dynamic. As many academic and public observers 
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have noted, and often decried, much of the land is used below its poten-
tial for production. Yet as Derick Fay and Leslie Bank show in comple-
mentary ways with regard to rural land tenure in the Eastern Cape, land 
may be materially “unproductive” but still have considerable “attractive 
value” in persuading migrants to maintain their rural ties under condi-
tions in which out- and back-migration have become more unstable 
and insecure.34
 This highlights the multifarious ways in which South Africans 
distribute their multiple senses of belonging to different peoples and 
pieces of land in order to keep open potential avenues for revenue. Land 
restitution adds another layer to these dynamics of distributed belong-
ing through which people may press demands for distributing, and 
sharing, their groups’ various belongings. And the recent trend toward 
neotraditionalist reempowerment has reconfigured the balance between 
divergent autochthonous claims to belonging(s) (in the dual sense of 
the term), putting more and more weight on the traditional land justice 
of chiefs.
 This can be illustrated with regard to the two case studies. A superficial 
look at the case of KwaMaquze might create the impression that the dif-
ference between the two autochthonous logics—small-scale individualized 
autochthony based on family property versus large-scale collectivized 
autochthony based on Ndebele ethnicity—might not ultimately be that 
relevant, in that a more or less similar set of people (descendants of 
Ndzundza Ndebele deported from the farm in the 1930s) ends up having 
the same rights to the farm anyway. Yet, depending on the evoked mode, 
very different understandings of land justice follow: equal individual 
rights for men and women to be exercised democratically and inherited 
by all family members in the first case, versus ethnicized hierarchical 
rights based on patrilineality, seniority, and royalty to be exercised by a 
traditional council in the latter case.
 This has direct consequences for the specific usages to which the land 
can be put. During my fieldwork, only a few committee members of the 
KwaMaquze Trust lived permanently on the farm. Many people had 
built small huts on the farm, for the occasional visit and as a fallback 
option if things became difficult elsewhere. The land was primarily used 
for cattle grazing, and alongside a collectively owned herd provided by 
postsettlement support, several beneficiaries grazed their own cattle 
there. However, this is already where troubles arose since members of 
the traditional council expected the committee members to herd their 
257
Land Restitution, Neotraditionalism, and Contested Values of Land Justice in South Africa
cattle for free, as this was the prerogative of the chief as the “owner” of 
the land. Furthermore, the traditional council expected to be asked if 
someone wanted to graze cattle there or make any other use of the land. 
By contrast, within the logic of individualized autochthony (officially 
recognized by the state), every beneficiary would be responsible for his 
or her own cattle and have an equal say in the usage of the land. In 
fact, the chairperson had silently engaged in mineral prospecting on the 
farm, hoping for a future extractive business, and also tried to secure 
funding from foreign development agencies, so far without much suc-
cess. Yet had there been prospects for additional revenues, it was evident 
that debates about “rightful shares” based on the legitimate form of 
autochthonous belonging would have surfaced with renewed vigor.
 The specific contestations around land justice were somewhat dif-
ferent in the case of Kalkfontein, yet the underlying dynamics of dis-
tributing belongings through distributed belonging—that is, of diversifying 
senses of autochthonous belonging to different peoples and pieces of 
land in order to potentially benefit from resource flows within these 
collectives—were comparable. In this case, the actual set of people le-
gitimately belonging to Kalkfontein differed considerably, depending 
on which autochthonous logic was evoked. In the collectivized logic of 
referring back to a multiethnic group of private property holders, only 
their descendants could claim a rightful share of the collective property. 
Yet under the second collectivized logic of ethnicized autochthony, the 
Ndebele chief had made use of his proclaimed prerogative during the 
1980s and “sold” residential slots to over one thousand outsider families 
after they literally paid allegiance to him, allocating residential sites on 
the ploughing lands of the original owners in Kalkfontein and even 
neighboring farms. Within ethnicized autochthony, these people, by far 
outnumbering the descendants of the original buyers, now legitimately 
belonged to Kalkfontein.
 Whereas most of these new residents lived on portion A, the situation 
was somewhat different on portions B and C. There, as mentioned be-
fore, the descendants of the original buyers finally succeeded in acquiring 
title deeds through the restitution process, and hence they have some 
state backing regarding their insistence that they themselves can decide 
how to make use of their land. Nevertheless, the traditional authority 
ruling over Katjebane and Kalkfontein in its entirety is still in place. Any 
new piece of neotraditionalist legislation is thus scrutinized with much 
concern and anxiety by the members of Kalkfontein B and C. In fact, 
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members of this community have been prominently involved in several 
legal proceedings against such new statutory laws (e.g., in the successful 
constitutional challenge in 2010 of the Communal Land Rights Act).
 With regard to the actual usage of the land in Kalkfontein B and 
C, a set of strategies much more diverse than in KwaMaquze can be 
observed. All (male) descendants of the original buyers have been able 
to use their family land for cultivation, and they also use the commonly 
held grazing land for their livestock. There is still sufficient land left 
to provide additional residential slots, each with their own garden for 
cultivation. In the past, daughters were expected to move to live with 
their husbands, typically outside Kalkfontein, which ensured that land 
was primarily inherited patrilineally. However, recently an explicit com-
munity resolution was taken to give women equal rights in land, partly 
because of the reality of locally increased female-headed households, 
but also, as I was told, because of the changing political climate of con-
stitutional gender equality in the new South Africa.
 While local residents in B and C thus have easy access to both culti-
vating and grazing land, as well as to their own sufficient water supply 
(namely, the local limy fountain, giving “Kalkfontein” its name), culti-
vation land is visibly “underutilized” in terms of its potential for full-
time intensive agriculture. Some locals told me that they lack seeds and 
equipment and therefore cannot farm. Yet the state does offer help in 
providing tractors and, to some extent, seeds, and some locals make use 
of these provisions. The following statement by another local resident 
may be more to the point: “people, nowadays, don’t want to work on the 
land in the hot sun,” but rather prefer an urban lifestyle. In fact a con-
siderable number of people who rightfully belong to B and C commute 
on a daily or weekly basis to nearby Pretoria, where they engage in wage 
labor and the informal economy. Echoing South African migrant work-
ers elsewhere, many aspire to build a homestead on Kalkfontein in order 
to retire there, and many in fact do so. They also periodically return to 
Kalkfontein when unemployed or to look after relatives, both young and 
old. Multiple cash flows connect Kalkfontein with workplaces near and 
far, resulting from wages and the sale of agricultural products, as well as 
from social payments such as old age pensions, child care grants, and 
disability payments.
 In this way, descendants of the original buyers of Kalkfontein B and 
C, whether residing on the farm or elsewhere, have evoked their col-
lectivized logic of autochthonous belonging to Kalkfontein in order to 
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maintain and make use of flows of resources and thereby engage in the 
sharing and distribution of Kalkfontein’s wealth. Belonging to Kalkfon-
tein constitutes one among several autochthonous modes for joining 
networks of production, distribution, and consumption, with compara-
ble logics existing, for instance, within migrant communities in Pretoria 
and elsewhere. The restitution process has played only a partial role in 
giving relative weight, and only for some residents on the Kalkfontein 
farm, to their specific version of autochthonous belonging. Focusing 
only on the specific property rights in land that follow from restitution 
with regard to production risks missing a much broader dynamic in 
which people distribute their sense of belonging in order to partake in 
different distributive circuits of belongings, and thereby diversify the 
risk of making ends meet.
Contested Values of Land Justice in South Africa
As Cherryl Walker has recently pointed out, South Africa is no longer 
the agrarian country it was at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
“but how to factor this commonplace into thinking about contemporary 
livelihoods and aspirations for a more promising future continues to 
baffle restitution policy-makers.”35 Although the land reform policies 
of the South African government are still dominated by a productionist 
bias, the “productive value” of land might actually be on the decline 
for people on the ground. Especially with regard to land restitution, 
most claimants have clearly preferred the “consumptive value” of land 
(i.e., financial compensation) to its future potential for production. And 
even where people have chosen land, the multiple usages to which they 
have put it have gone considerably beyond production. The future of 
land in South Africa and beyond might indeed lie more in its “distribu-
tive value,” allowing people to root their claims of belonging to specific 
other people in particular pieces of land from which claims to a rightful 
share can be made.
 Seen in this light, the land justice of South African land reform might 
be more concerned with allowing renewed imaginations of autochtho-
nous belonging, and possibilities for pressing demands for distribution 
through them, than simply handing over land to would-be farmers. 
Under global conditions of diminishing wage labor, more and more 
work is likely to be invested in distributing and diverting, slicing up and 
subdividing, the meagre resources that people in their interrelatedness 
manage to secure. Against this backdrop, it seems irresponsible to spend 
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public resources to the extent envisioned under reopened restitution on 
the protracted and very long-term perspective of restoring rights in 
land to farmers that, very likely, will never be. These resources might 
be better spent in direct forms of distribution, be that through social 
grants or public spending on services such as housing, healthcare, and 
education, but also through land redistribution to those who actually 
do want to farm.
 Yet the government is not only not doing this. By potentially allow-
ing a further explosion of restitution claims across extensive areas of 
the country, enormous uncertainties about the de facto distribution of 
land and landed rights (let alone the moral rightness of such distribu-
tion) may well prevail for many decades to come. At the same time, 
the recent wave of neotraditionalist legislation is likely to shift power 
balances on the ground toward chiefly definitions of belonging and land 
justice, establishing traditional authorities as crucial nodes in networks 
of distribution that might be more and more difficult to circumvent. 
Within this very South Africa–specific scenario of reshuffled and con-
fused land justice through reopened restitution, more and more people 
might be forced to share the various values of their land with super-
imposed “traditional authorities,” irrespective of whether these enjoy 
“basic legitimacy” on the ground.36 It is doubtful that the authors of the 
constitution had such a set-up in mind when they demanded reforms to 
bring about land justice in the form of equitable access to South Africa’s 
natural resources.
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T w E L v E
Transitional Justice and Ordinary Justice  
in Postconflict Acholiland
a n n a  m a C d o n a L d
T O D AY,  I F  Y O U  w E R E  T O  G O  T O  G U L U — A C h O L I L A N D ’ S  M U N I C I PA L 
center—you would find it hard to believe that the region so recently 
experienced a devastating twenty-year war between the government 
of Uganda (GoU) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). There is a 
supermarket in Gulu, as well as numerous coffee shops, a pizza parlor, 
and even a cocktail bar. Much of this caters to the now-dwindling 
numbers of expatriate NGO and aid-agency staff based in the re-
gion, as well as the scores of foreign researchers and North Ameri-
can religious missionaries that come through every year. This is not 
exclusively the case though, and prosperous, entrepreneurial Acholi 
residents talk enthusiastically about their hopes for the future of this 
“northern city.”1 Across the region more broadly, now that the “guns 
are silent,” relative peace has returned. In 2010 it was estimated that 
the vast majority of the 1.8 million people displaced into camps at the 
peak of the crisis had returned to their areas of origin, or resettled else-
where.2 Homesteads are functioning, people are farming, and life goes 
on. In the towns, trading centers, and rural areas, things—on the surface 
of it—seem peaceful, and people generally reject the idea that the war 
should define them. It does not take long, though, to scratch beneath 
the surface to uncover the often-devastating legacy that the conflict has 
inflicted on people’s lives.3
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 Today, as in many postconflict places, that legacy is the subject of ex-
ternal interventions centered on global discourses of transitional justice, 
despite the fact that there has been no substantive political transition in 
Uganda since the war ended. Since the early 2000s, transitional justice 
has been embraced by the UN as a key postconflict intervention, often 
linked to broader liberal peacebuilding packages, and yet scholars and 
practitioners accept there is very little evidence to demonstrate whether 
it actually achieves its intended effects.4 Transitional justice is defined 
by the UN as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated 
with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large scale 
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation.”5 It is associated with a set of processes—including 
criminal trials, truth commissions, amnesties, community-based dis-
pute mechanisms, and reparations—and a set of institutional structures 
and regimes, including the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
international humanitarian, human rights, and criminal law.6 While 
“transitional justice” was originally designed to address justice dilem-
mas specific to contexts such as those in Latin America, where countries 
were transitioning from authoritarianism to, it was hoped, democracy,7 
today, it operates across a vast range of contexts, sometimes even in “il-
liberal states with little pretension to democratic transition.”8
 While each transitional justice process should be seen as a “particu-
larized” and heavily politicized “bargain on the past,”9 proponents coat 
such practices in highly normative language. The notion of the transi-
tion is not simply “descriptive of a process of change”; rather it tends to 
be “positively oversignified.”10 Thus, transitional justice is said to deliver 
widespread benefits in any given context, including accountability, truth, 
peace, reconciliation, rule-of-law strengthening, and democracy con-
solidation. During a PowerPoint presentation in March 2014, the UN 
assistant secretary general for peacebuilding had an acronym for cur-
rent approaches: “SCHLEP.”11 Transitional justice came under the “H,” 
which stood for “healing,” and was placed there alongside an inventory 
of other public goods: “reconciliation, mediation, protection, psychoso-
cial therapy, IDPs/Returnees, SGBV, reparations.” The connections be-
tween intentions and outcomes were expressed as self-evident, but the 
reality is that such assumptions are value driven; they are not based on 
evidence about the role of transitional justice in achieving these ends.12
 This chapter explores the relationship between international and 
domestically driven “transitional justice agendas” and the plurality of 
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ways in which communities across Acholiland, affected by violence, (re)
construct social and economic relationships in the context of their 
everyday lives.13 As Anders and Zenker have argued, despite the growth 
of transitional justice across postconflict contexts, there are “other sites 
in countries and regions affected by violence and armed conflict where 
ideas about justice, reconciliation, retribution and political participation 
are being instantiated and contested.”14 I argue that one such “site,” the 
local resolution of land disputes, can tell us a great deal about broader 
notions of justice and “order-making” in Acholiland.15 This, in turn, 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of how transitional justice, 
as an external project, is understood and experienced in this context. I 
am motivated by three concerns: the first is to critique oversimplistic 
depictions of Acholi “perceptions” of transitional justice that continue 
to dominate debate; the second is to uncover the stark dissonances be-
tween normative ideals linked to transitional justice efforts in Acholil-
and and local realities of “postconflict” life; and the third—given that 
transitional justice is rarely experienced in daily lives—is to explore and 
explain these dissonances more fully through an examination of “actu-
ally existing” justice provision in the current Acholi context.
 Findings below are based on eleven months of field research in both 
Kampala and Acholiland in the period between 2012 and 2014. The ma-
jority of time was spent in Acholiland, which was at the epicenter of the 
twenty-year war (1987–2008) between the government of Uganda (GoU) 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Fieldwork was conducted in 
four rural sites (in Agago District, Gulu District, Nwoya District, and 
Pader District) and one urban site (in the town of Gulu). Data was 
gathered using a range of qualitative methods. This involved over one 
hundred semistructured interviews with individuals across the Ugandan 
political spectrum, from donors and cabinet ministers in Kampala to 
local traditional and council leaders in Acholiland. In addition, twenty-
five informal discussion groups were conducted in the five research 
sites. These were held at the village level and explored broad questions 
about life since the end of the conflict and how people are moving on 
with their lives. Interviews and focus groups were conducted in both 
Acholi and English, and where Acholi was used an interpreter provided 
translation. The third strand of data collection involved participant ob-
servation. Ethnographic methods were deemed particularly useful be-
cause they explore the subjects’ “frames of reference” while remaining as 
open as possible to different understandings and interpretations of the 
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world.16 This generates data that provides insight into the “inherently 
relational” and “inherently contested” nature of the sociolegal dynam-
ics under study.17 Below, where quotes are given, it is because they are 
representative of broader opinion and dominant themes.
Transitional Justice, Ordinary Justice, and “Terrible Simplifiers”
The LRA was formed in 1987 by Joseph Kony, not long after Yoweri 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) had captured 
Kampala the previous year. Kony is an Acholi from northern Uganda 
who sees himself as a spirit medium and “spokesperson of God.”18 The 
war between the NRM government and the LRA lasted from 1987 to 
2008 and was characterized by the brutal suffering of northern Ugandan 
civilians who bore the brunt of both LRA and government violence. 
In late 2003, the GoU issued a “referral of the situation concerning the 
Lord’s Resistance Army” to the newly formed International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Early the following year, at a press conference in London, 
the ICC chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, and the president 
of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, made public a legal process that placed 
the ongoing conflict in northern Uganda at the heart of debates about 
the relationship between peace and justice. In October 2005, the ICC 
unsealed its first ever arrest warrants, charging five Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) commanders with war crimes and crimes against human-
ity. Payam Akhavan, a former legal adviser to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), boldly suggested that because of the 
ICC intervention, “the prospect of sustained national peace may finally 
be within Uganda’s reach for the first time since its independence in 
1962.”19 A year later, in 2006, peace talks between the LRA and the GoU 
began in Juba, the capital of the then semiautonomous government of 
South Sudan (GoSS).20 For some, Akhavan’s position remained credible; 
for others, precisely the opposite was now the case: the ICC arrest war-
rants were a direct impediment to the successful completion of the most 
promising peace process in twenty years.
 From the outset, the ICC faced significant controversy in Uganda. 
This centered on two particularly delicate issues. First, commentators 
questioned the wisdom of attempting to render justice prior to the set-
tlement of the conflict; and second, they questioned the appropriateness 
of an international body intervening in a local space.21 Many Ugandans, 
particularly the Acholi in the north, who had suffered at the hands of 
both the LRA and the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF), were 
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angry that only one side was being held to account. Then, as it became 
clear that the ICC would under no circumstances withdraw its warrants, 
the court came to be seen by many as the ultimate peace spoiler, an 
institution whose inflexibility would prolong a devastating conflict and 
thus determine the fate of millions of northern Ugandans.22 A “victim” 
discourse developed, amplified through Uganda-based NGOs, sympa-
thetic scholars, and Acholi religious, traditional, and political leaders. 
The narrative was damning: the very people in whose interests the ICC 
should have been acting—the victims of mass atrocities—viewed the 
court as biased, counterproductive, and recklessly irresponsible.23 These 
charges were compounded by another: not only was the ICC dangerous, 
it was an expression of Western judicial neoimperialism that sought to 
privilege foreign concepts of retributive justice over traditional “Acholi 
values” of reconciliation and forgiveness.24
 These contentions created a highly charged atmosphere at the Juba 
peace talks and sparked a vociferous debate among researchers, interna-
tional donors, and civil society and local leaders about “what the Acholi 
truly want in terms of justice [italics added]” and how that might be 
achieved in the context of ongoing negotiations.25 At Juba, an Agree-
ment on Accountability and Reconciliation and an implementing pro-
tocol (from here on the AAR accords) were signed by both parties and 
purported to address and resolve justice and accountability dilemmas 
linked to the conflict, including the ICC impasse. The accords proposed 
a national procedure for dealing with LRA and UPDF crimes, includ-
ing a special international crimes division of the Ugandan High Court, 
support for traditional justice, a “body” to “inquire into the past,” and 
reparations for victims.26 And to ensure that the amnesty act that had 
been in place since 2000 did not jeopardize the “principles” of the agree-
ment, the accords also contained a clause advising the government to 
amend the act. Regardless of the eventual failure of the talks, the GoU 
committed itself to implementing the AAR framework as part of a na-
tional transitional justice policy.
 Nearly ten years since the signing of the AAR accords at Juba in 
2007/8, there exists a mixture of international, governmental, NGO, 
private, and hybrid initiatives aimed at transitional justice and broader 
social repair in northern Uganda, but these do not fall within a single 
policy framework or set of guiding principles. At the state level, tran-
sitional justice discussions, research, policy development, and program-
ming has been based on implementation of the AAR accords. This has 
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been coordinated by the Justice Law and Order Sector ( JLOS) secre-
tariat, which oversees the work of seventeen government departments 
and is funded mostly by European donors. Linked to transitional justice 
objectives but not explicitly framed as such is the government’s Peace, 
Recovery and Development Programme for Northern Uganda (PRDP), 
launched in September 2007. This program has been administered by 
the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and contains four strategic 
objectives, one of which was “peace-building and reconciliation.” This 
objective is predominantly donor funded.
 In mid-2013, JLOS circulated a draft transitional justice policy 
amongst “key stakeholders” for comment, but it was widely criticized as 
“incoherent” and incomplete.27 Numerous drafts have followed, and in 
mid-2017, a “final draft” of the policy was publicized. It has not yet been 
put before cabinet and has therefore not yet been approved for debate 
before Parliament. The future of the policy remains unclear, and propo-
nents are concerned about a serious lack of political will and “waning 
momentum.”28 Of all the accountability and reconciliation “modalities” 
agreed upon in the AAR, only the establishment of a special division 
of the Ugandan High Court—later named the International Crimes 
Division (ICD)—has been implemented.29 The GoU also passed the 
International Criminal Court Act (ICC Act) of 2010, which provided 
for domestic jurisdiction over ICC statute crimes.30 There has been no 
significant progress on initiatives aimed at reparations or truth seeking. 
“Traditional” justice processes, meanwhile, still remain the subject of 
policy discussion.31 Outside of the central government framework there 
have been numerous interventions in Acholiland that explicitly use the 
term “transitional justice.” There exists, for example, a plethora of donor-
funded and civil-society initiatives aimed at encouraging dialogue around 
reconciliation and forgiveness for wrongs committed during the conflict.
 Two dominant stories continue to shape the way in which “the Acholi” 
are portrayed in relation to postconflict justice and accountability issues, 
both of which involve some “terrible simplifiers” about particular “ways,” 
“traditions,” and “needs” of a heterogeneous and diverse ethnic group.32 
On the one hand, advocates of a more “local” form of postconflict justice 
emphasize the restorative possibilities of both Christian forgiveness and 
Acholi reconciliation techniques, placing emphasis on a particular ritual 
called mato oput, which proponents said had been used before the war 
to reconcile clans after a murder had taken place. In a landmark report 
produced by International Alert and authored by Denis Pain, Oxfam’s 
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Uganda country representative in the mid-1980s, it was claimed that 
“Acholi traditional resolution of conflict and violence stands among 
the highest practices anywhere in the world.”33 After the ICC warrants 
were announced, the Canada-based Liu Institute for Global Issues in 
association with the Gulu NGO Forum produced a report expressing 
concern that the ICC might “damage cultural identity and beliefs.”34 
NGO reports were buoyed up by calls from local religious, traditional, 
and political leaders who stressed the cultural proclivity of the Acholi 
toward forgiveness and reconciliation.35 Branch has argued that such ar-
guments comprise a pernicious and mendacious “ethno-justice” agenda, 
which implies the existence of “a single, coherent positive system that is 
presented as being universally, consensually and spontaneously adhered 
to by all members of that culture.”36 Armstrong, meanwhile, points out 
that this narrative comprises a set of deliberately “culturist claims,” reli-
ant on “strategic essentialism.”37 In other words, the Acholi leadership, 
along with sympathetic scholars and activists, have made claims that 
quite evidently “essentialised” something that was in fact “fluid and 
contradictory” but did so “in order that their claims be heard.”38 With 
international judicial intervention believed to represent a serious threat 
to peacebuilding and reconciliation across the region, oversimplified 
cultural depictions of the Acholi as having a unique ability to forgive 
and move on were also an appeal to advocates of prosecutorial criminal 
accountability to do no harm.
 The second story is different. It is the one promoted by international 
human rights activists and donors engaged in rule-of-law promotion 
and access to justice initiatives in Uganda. In his book Trial Justice, 
Allen concludes that “most Acholis want those responsible for terrible 
crimes to be held to account, and in northern Uganda, as in Europe, it 
is possible for trials to contribute to peace-building.”39 This sentiment is 
reflected in the approach of justice sector donors and Uganda’s Justice 
Law and Order Sector ( JLOS) secretariat, responsible for devising a 
national transitional justice policy based on the AAR accords signed 
at Juba. Based on conventional liberal peacebuilding logic, the central 
interpretation of the AAR accords appears to be the need to strengthen 
the rule of law across the country through “institution building” and 
bureaucratic skills development. The JLOS strategic plan on transitional 
justice, drafted in coordination with European justice-sector donors, sets 
out a long list of reforms based on a preapproved donor template.40 The 
technocratic logic is that if a transitional justice policy can manage and 
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promote legal “capacity building” and contribute to broader programs 
designed to strengthen the rule of law, then the chances of a return to 
conflict will diminish.
 Both transitional justice stories objectify “Acholi” justice needs 
around false dichotomies of the local versus the international and re-
storative approaches versus retributive approaches, positing the notion 
of a “non-Western local order” against a “Western liberal order.”41 This 
has led to what Hinton calls identity “shrinkage.”42 On the one hand, 
ethnojustice conceptions of transitional justice are clear examples of 
cultural essentialism: the argument is that the Acholi should both fol-
low and be defined by a circumscribed “culture.” On the other hand, 
the liberal transitional justice paradigm implies a single, fundamental 
human identity in which people exist as “autonomous,” liberal subjects: 
they have the capacity to achieve and enjoy “freedom,” “equality,” and 
“rights,” and they have the chance to take part in democratic and juridi-
cal processes as soon as the moment is right.43 Both identity categories 
are idealized, obscuring the “ambivalent, dual and ambiguous” choices 
that people make and the actions they take in the context of their 
everyday lives.44 Although there are important epistemological and 
ontological distinctions between different transitional justice agendas 
in Uganda, both the “ethnojustice” category and the more universalist 
liberal conception represent heavily mediated and sometimes coercive 
“ideal type” responses to mass atrocity and the reconstruction of social 
relations in northern Uganda. They emphasize forms of justice, social 
repair, and peacebuilding as they should be, rather than as they are.
 What has been missing from the debate so far is a real understand-
ing of what Richmond calls the “local-local,” which is what represents 
the local beyond the “artifice” of socially constructed identities and is 
much harder for researchers to capture.45 Below, I argue that a closer, 
more microlevel examination of how people negotiate “ordinary” justice 
in postconflict Acholiland highlights the hybrid nature of the public 
authorities that people draw on and the highly contingent nature of 
their justice decisions. These are not based on the norms espoused in 
transitional justice debates but rather on the most pragmatic and ef-
fective means by which to restore balance and meaning to postconflict 
social relations.46 Such an approach cannot be translated neatly into 
“rights discourses . . . legal certainties and political objectivity” in the 
way that the liberal transitional justice paradigm presupposes, nor can it 
be understood through cultural essentialism.47
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Stark Dissonances:  
Transitional Justice Norms and Local Priorities
In late 2012, a group of practitioners and academics working on justice- 
and security-related issues in developing countries met at a prominent 
think tank in central London. The focus was on how to make existing 
policy in conflict affected areas more “context sensitive.” During one ses-
sion, discussion centered on accountability for past human rights abuses 
in such places. A senior official from the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Pre-
vention and Recovery spoke up: “what does a state need to get over a 
legacy of violence?” she asked rhetorically, before declaring, “the answer 
is transitional justice.”48 In a session in which participants were encour-
aged to “think outside of the box” and transcend conventional policy 
prescriptions, this assertion fell somewhat flat. Earlier that year, I had 
been living in northern Uganda, carrying out field research. As I heard 
the UNDP representative make her argument with such confidence, my 
mind cast back to a hot and rainy July day in Nwoya District, western 
Acholiland. I had accompanied a locally based, internationally funded 
NGO to the district capital of Anaka to observe a “public dialogue” 
meeting with a group of thirty or so local councilors, ranging in senior-
ity from village to district level. Such “public dialogues” or “stakeholder 
consultations” are a frequent occurrence across postconflict Acholiland, 
satisfying as they do the “popular participation” imperative of aid agen-
cies and international donors.
 This meeting proposed to cover “the issues affecting your community 
today,” but the NGO in charge was mainly interested in transitional 
justice policy and particularly keen to gather views about the recent 
decision by the government to lapse an Amnesty Act that had been in 
place since 2000 and that had ostensibly benefitted thousands of return-
ing LRA members and their communities.49 The problem was that the 
issue in what was supposed to be a local-led discussion did not come up 
spontaneously. So, during testimony about local land disputes, elephants 
escaping from the nearby Murchison Falls National Park and destroying 
crops, and fears about international oil conglomerates dumping poison-
ous waste around recently discovered crude deposits, meeting organiz-
ers introduced a non sequitur by raising the fact that the Amnesty Act 
had recently been axed and requesting opinions from the audience. The 
resident district commissioner (RDC), the president’s representative in 
the district and the person responsible for local security matters, looked 
confused: he had no idea that the act had been suspended.
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 In fact, twelve years on from the passing into law of the Amnesty 
Act, not one person in that meeting hall was aware that it had lapsed. 
This was a law designed and championed in Acholiland. It had been 
passed in 2000 and had survived International Criminal Court (ICC) 
investigations and arrest warrants, the failed Juba peace talks between 
the GoU and the LRA, and the setting up of a war-crimes division in 
Uganda’s high court. This was a piece of legislation that, from the begin-
ning, has been heralded by its loud and proud supporters (including 
the NGO chairing the meeting) as the key to successful peacebuilding 
in northern Uganda.50 The rationale behind the act—and continued 
support for it locally—was fairly straightforward: it is estimated that 
roughly sixty-six thousand people were abducted by the LRA during the 
period that it was operational in northern Uganda, the “bulk” of whom 
were under eighteen.51 Many of those who carried out violent acts as 
members of the LRA could not, therefore, be pigeonholed into definite 
“victim” or “perpetrator” categories.52 Dominic Ongwen is a personifica-
tion of this dilemma: in early 2015 he was the first LRA commander to 
actually be transferred to the ICC in The Hague. Ongwen was a senior 
LRA commander for many years and allegedly committed unspeakable 
crimes, but he was also abducted by the rebel movement and forcibly 
conscripted at the age of ten, on his way to school. The ICC has charged 
him, in part, with the same crimes that were initially perpetrated against 
him, including the forcible conscription of child soldiers.53
 On hearing the news, local leaders in Nwoya protested the lapsing of 
the Amnesty Act, raising concerns about lack of consultation and the 
fact that there were still people out there in the bush, with the remnants 
of the LRA, who might now be scared to come back home. The assured-
ness and clarity with which participants had been talking about land dis-
putes, distrust of oil companies, and conflicts with the Uganda Wildlife 
Authority over national park boundaries, however, was absent. As much 
as the NGO wanted the lapsing of the act to represent a key advocacy 
issue, it simply was not, not according to these local representatives any-
way. Experiences of coping with the effects of war and moving through 
postconflict life were largely articulated without reference to what Das 
calls “grand gestures” or the metanarratives of transitional justice.54
 The first scholars to really engage with the “local” in transitional jus-
tice expressed concern that “many assumptions about the effects that 
justice has on individuals and societies have gone unexamined and un-
challenged for too long.”55 This is an area of inquiry that remains in its 
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infancy, but edited collections and journal issues have been published 
recently that engage closely with how transitional justice is viewed from 
the bottom up, across cases. A shared finding is that local experiences 
and attitudes rarely fit with the normative assumptions and values 
widely ascribed to orthodox transitional justice efforts.56
 In what follows, I build on this line of inquiry through an inter-
rogation of the lived relationship between transitional justice and the 
local provision of what will be termed “ordinary justice” in Acholiland, 
with a particular focus on the resolution of local level land disputes. As 
a policy intervention, transitional justice falls within the existing legal 
realm and broader notions of social order. However battered by war, 
conflict, or poverty these concepts may be, and however much they are 
subject to continuous renegotiation and mutation, they have in some 
form existed in the past, have continued into the present, and will shape 
the future. Criticism of such an approach may be that transitional jus-
tice is “qualitatively different” from ordinary justice: it carries a different 
set of objectives and a different set of processes.57 Posner and Vermule, 
however, argue that analysts of transitional justice have “gone wrong 
through insufficient appreciation of ordinary law.”58 Bearing in mind 
E. P. Thompson’s maxim that law does not “keep politely to a level” but 
is imbricated “at every bloody level,” this argument can be stretched 
further to encourage a better appreciation of “ordinary life.”59 Given 
that transitional justice is contiguous with “ordinary” justice and with 
the existing political settlement and social order in any given place, it is 
quite perplexing that so little attention is given to “ordinary justice” in 
discussions about “transitional justice” in the Acholi context.
Practical Justice Provision and Attitudes  
toward Transitional Justice
From the mid-1990s onward, the GoU began moving civilians, often 
forcibly, from rural areas and into camps where the Uganda People’s 
Defence Force (UPDF) could “protect” them.60 By the late 1990s the 
majority of people living in the Acholi subregion were kept in wretched 
conditions likened to “rural prisons,” subjected to what Dolan would 
later term “social torture.”61 Many people spent years on end in the 
camps, and in Acholiland today, people talk of a “lost generation” of 
young men and women who came of age under these circumstances.
 Mass displacement into camps had an overwhelmingly unsettling 
impact across northern Uganda, where, as Okot explains, “land means 
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more than real estate . . . land equates to history, heritage, identity, be-
longing, rights and relationships.”62 Camp life was impoverishing and 
unproductive, and on people’s return to the villages, access to customary, 
communal land was the only “productive asset” most people could rely 
on.63 The securing of this access has been subject, however, to many 
pressures and difficulties, ranging from confusion and disagreement over 
predisplacement land boundaries between households to controversial 
attempts by the government to open up Acholi land to investors for 
large-scale commercial farming.64 Given that land is the “epicenter”65 
of social, economic, and cosmological life, disputes related to access, 
boundaries, and ownership affect the “rest of life” profoundly. As one 
man explained, “if you really want to mess with the Acholi, you play 
with their land.”66 In northern Uganda this represents a huge transi-
tional dilemma that people are actively seeking to resolve on a daily 
basis. As a senior Acholi donor staff member explained, off the record, 
“resolving transitional issues is a priority for people, but not the way 
donors understand it. In Acholi a lot of time is spent on resolving ten-
sions and conflict, especially over land. This is a key framework through 
which people are negotiating life. But that is not the transitional justice 
which is discussed in public forums in Kampala and Gulu, and if you are 
looking for that you are missing something.”67
 His point was that transitional justice—as a set of prearticulated 
conceptions—was not the right entry point through which to explore, 
let alone understand, the dynamics of postconflict justice and social 
repair in Acholiland. Equally, as is argued below, an examination of the 
way in which such war-related disputes are being resolved on a daily 
basis elucidates and complicates assumptions inherent in prevailing 
transitional justice conceptions.
 In Acholiland, there is no word for “justice.” The translation most 
commonly used is “ngol matir,” which literally means to “cut straight” and 
is used to describe the process by which fair judgment has been made.68 
People are rarely familiar with the term “transitional justice.” The starting 
point during my fieldwork with communities in Acholiland was there-
fore to start from an examination of people’s understandings of injustice. 
Thus, during individual conversations and broader discussions, people 
were asked to reflect on instances since and during the war when they, 
or people they knew, were tero I yoo matir, which is a locally recognized 
way of saying “not being treated the right way.” They were then asked 
what forms of redress or resolution were sought (if at all) to deal with 
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such situations. It is important to note that, as Porter has explained in her 
extensive study of Acholi responses to rape and sexual violence, “social 
harmony” rather than “justice” (conceived as judicial avenues of redress or 
individual justice for the victim) is often the “paramount imperative” of 
communities when dealing with wrongdoing or settling disputes.69 She 
understands social harmony as “a state of normal relations among the 
living and the dead, linked to an idea of cosmological equilibrium and a 
social balance of power and moral order.”70 This means that in the after-
math of wrongdoing, the restoration of social and economic relationships 
is regularly given priority over individual redress for the alleged victim.
 An examination of who the “principal providers” of redress and 
settlement are in land cases gives important insight into how dispute 
resolution acquires meaning in the Acholi context.71 Across research 
sites the vast majority of people who made reference to land-related 
disputes were referring to land grabbing and boundary disputes, usually 
between households at the village rather than the parish level. As Hop-
wood has pointed out, “the law is largely silent on matters of customary 
land,” and “decision making authority is vested in clan, sub-clan or ex-
tended family leaders.”72 In such land cases, people overwhelming said 
that they would first consult clan elders who were familiar with the old, 
preconflict boundaries, and if the elders could not resolve the issue or 
were no longer alive, either the rwot kweri or the local councilor I (LC1) 
would be consulted. The rwot kweri is a “chief of the hoe,” an elected 
or appointed local customary leader who provides leadership and ar-
bitrates over issues of land, farming, and agriculture in subdivisions of 
villages. The LC1, on the other hand, was originally an elected political 
representative at the village level, the lowest level of the decentralized 
governance system.73 Elders, rwodi kweri, and LC1s derive their author-
ity from different sources and have contrasting relationships with the 
Ugandan state, yet they share a perceived ability to arbitrate on cases 
based on unwritten customary law. This was usually because of physical 
presence and deep knowledge of the area rather than kinship affinities 
or authority status.
 Thus the highly local order of Acholi society creates a sliding scale of 
legitimacy in justice institutions. The choice of who to turn to depended 
on the proximity of the authority to the location of the dispute, the 
perceived integrity of the individual, his (almost always “his”) range of 
relevant knowledge, and the degree to which he is both trusted by the 
community and nested within it.74 What was striking was that situations 
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resolved at this very local level (elders, rwot kweri, or LC1) were rarely 
contested openly. As one informant in Lukodi explained, “if the dispute 
starts at a small level we normally go to the nearby elders. Sometimes we 
cannot even involve the LC1. If it is big you will go to the LC1. Others 
might raise it at the subcounty but mostly we have been handling issues 
that stop at the level of the LC1. People get satisfied with the rulings. I 
have never heard of anyone going to the level of the magistrates.”75
 This did not necessarily mean that decisions were universally ac-
cepted, but it did support the argument put forward by Hopwood and 
Atkinson that the overall number of discrete rural land disputes has 
been “declining significantly” owing to “high resolution rates” arbitrated 
by elders and lower-level councilors and courts.76
 What people frequently emphasized was the great asymmetry of 
information that existed between those authorities who were closely 
acquainted with the geographical area under dispute and those authori-
ties whose role and function transcended the immediate context. Indeed 
preferences were not so much “culture bound” as they were “context 
bound,” so that any authority outside of the immediate locus of the 
dispute was viewed with some trepidation.77 Even the LCII, the local 
parish chief, was talked about as coming “from a far distance” and “not 
knowing the history of the area.”78 As an authority figure he may be a 
member of the broader community, but he is also more tangential to the 
symbiosis of village life and therefore more prone to misinterpretation, 
misinformation, and corruption.
 The distinction people made between the knowing and the unknow-
ing, the legitimate and the illegitimate, complicates understandings of 
Acholi attitudes toward the state authorities, which arguably amounts 
to more than an abstract lack of trust. Respondents did not express a 
cultural aversion to formal legal institutions (which begin at the level 
of the magistrates’ court) inasmuch as they expressed qualified concern 
about any form of public authority that was not equipped to act in their 
interests. This could be a corrupt elder or a distant chief just as much 
as it might be an incompetent local magistrate. It was the issue of ef-
ficiency and positive outcomes that people raised most emphatically, 
what Baker and Scheye call “performance accountability.”79 In Odek 
subcounty, during a discussion group about local disputes and their 
resolution (or not), people were asked whether they would like to have 
their cases heard in magistrates’ courts, if the opportunity were there. A 
typical response was as follows:
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“No, we would not like to go to a magistrates court, even if it was 
here, right here and we had the money.”
 “Is it because you do not trust the courts to rule fairly?”
 “Not because of trust, no. It is because it is pointless. It is be-
cause the people who know the boundaries are already here, among 
us. It is a local thing.”80
 The word “pointless” is interesting here, and it reflected a more gen-
eral sentiment about the superfluity of rules and practices that were not 
rooted in the relevant context. This was hardly surprising as the disputes 
arise in situations where, as Scheele notes, people “rarely deal with ab-
stract things or with abstract people, but rather with neighbours, family 
members and in-laws.”81 This is particularly the case with land, where 
validity of claims depends “less on universal truth than on neighbour’s 
opinion”82 but is also relevant for other disputes arising from acts of 
wrongdoing, as Porter has shown in her study of responses to rape and 
gender violence in Acholiland.83 People grapple with the “generality” 
of the law and its universality because these properties stand in tension 
with the highly place- and circumstance-specific way in which right-
ful order is maintained. The risk in conceptualizing justice as “context 
bound” is the suggestion that modes of resolution are deeply parochial. 
People appear, however, to embed their justice decisions in a logic that is 
cognizant of the wider world, giving meaning to the sort of actions that 
will allow or threaten what Lon Fuller called a “programme for living 
together.”84 The resolution of disputes and wrongdoing is a practical 
and consequentialist process in which wrongdoing and punishment are 
defined and determined by context and circumstance.
 As an aside here, it is important to note that—depending on whom 
you talk to—such processes are more aptly described as locally present 
than as locally desirable. There is debate about whether customary justice 
provision is best seen as an interim measure that exists in the absence 
of a functioning state or as a viable, long-term formula for contextually 
relevant accountability and reconciliation.85 What I describe above is not 
a “utopian” form of self-regulation; rather, these are the means by which 
family, kin, traditional social structures, and the most local-level public 
authorities negotiate life in a highly strained postconflict environment, 
and such processes inevitably involve unequal power relations.86 How this 
plays out, however, is not always predictable. So, for example, in a recent 
study, Hopwood has shown that women are not disproportionately mar-
ginalized in current land disputes.87 On the other hand, there is evidence 
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that groups—particularly LRA returnees—who feel dislocated and mar-
ginalized in their home communities prefer external organizations, par-
ticularly NGOs, to help them mediate local disputes. The International 
Organisation of Migration (IOM), for example, has reported that 50 
percent of all succession and inheritance land cases it dealt with between 
August 2003 and October 2009 were filed by young adults between the 
ages of eighteen and thirty who no longer felt protected by the customary 
rights arbitrated by elders in their own communities.88
 In the case of local land disputes, the decision to refer a dispute and 
seek redress seems to be premised on three key considerations: (1) avail-
able information, (2) a realistic assessment of the likelihood of a tolerable 
outcome, and (3) the implications of that outcome on moral, social, and 
cosmological stability. Below, I argue that it is the uncertainty relating to 
these three premises that make peoples’ attitudes toward prearticulated, 
ideal-type transitional justice initiatives so ambivalent. Whether or not 
amnesty, criminal trials, truth telling, or external funding for mato oput 
are preferable options or not remains largely unresolved in the minds of 
most people. In fact, when asked, most people today stress the deeply 
complex implications of such processes on “local coexistence situations” 
and emphasize their lack of power in the ability to shape their direc-
tion.89 As I argue below, this ambivalence applies as much to the formal 
processes of criminal justice promoted in the AAR accords as it does 
to the less institutionalized processes of forgiveness and reconciliation 
promoted by NGOs and religious leaders in the region.
 In discussions with people about the role that the state can play in 
criminal accountability for war crimes, for example, one gets a strong 
sense of the inner tension that such questions pose. People shifted about, 
sometimes they sighed or laughed, other times they became agitated. 
Their spoken and physical reactions expressed a sense of what Campbell 
has called the “trauma of the law”: the torment of an incorporeal “justice” 
that is mediated in faraway places by people who cannot be trusted and 
that brings no immediate material benefit. The “trauma of the law,” writes 
Campbell, “is that it cannot represent justice. The trauma of justice is that 
it is a juridical impossibility. . . . [ J]ustice requires a fundamental change 
to the social order which made possible the originary trauma of crimes 
against humanity. In this sense, justice remains an event to come.”90
 The long-term nature of this realization informs a sense of uncer-
tainty about whether or not criminal justice for war crimes can be ap-
propriate in the Acholi context. Indeed, people talked frequently about 
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there not being enough “time” to push transitional justice. Acholiland, 
said one elderly man, has been like “stagnant” water for twenty years.91 
People, younger people included, worried that their lives were being 
wasted; they were getting older and could not sacrifice any more of 
their resources on broad political questions or projects. People’s atti-
tudes toward the state that had been complicit in war crimes but was 
now in charge of implementing a transitional justice policy were com-
plex. There was a desire to castigate, but also a recoiling force rooted 
in people’s own marginality.92 As Salwa Ismail noted in her work on 
Egypt, citizens “come to experience the state in the ways in which it 
does not exist for them, and not just the ways that it does.”93 It was not 
the state as a concept that was criticized but its failure to function well 
in people’s everyday lives. In the absence of political transition, if the 
state was going to function at all, people wanted it to deliver services 
and material compensation for what they lost during the war. Other 
processes, including talk of criminal trials and truth commissions, were 
viewed with deep suspicion. This was not because of a cultural aversion 
to “formal” or “retributive” justice, nor was it fatalistic. It was pragmatic 
and based on a clear understanding of the hegemony of the NRM and 
its narrative about the LRA war. It was not considered practical or wise 
to separate the processes themselves from the deeply unequal political 
environment in which they would operate. To equate transitional justice 
with peace, accountability, reconciliation, and healing is to “implicitly 
assume effective and equitable governance,” and people in northern 
Uganda, understandably, rarely make that assumption.94
 Similarly, in discussions with people about the role that forgive-
ness and reconciliation might play in a transitional justice policy for 
northern Uganda, answers tended to relate back to the exigent and 
highly place- and context-specific “political economies of survival” that 
shape postconflict life.95 The relationship people described with the 
forgiveness that they enacted was ambiguous. While there was often 
an acknowledgment that claims for revenge and “bitterness” must be 
surrendered, this did not equate to “absolution” for the wrongdoing 
that had been perpetrated.96 Religious doctrine was often mentioned 
in relation to forgiveness, but it tended to be ideas about judgment and 
divine retribution that were emphasized.97 A young man who had wit-
nessed a massacre in which two of his own brothers were killed and 
dismembered insisted that what happened “does not affect me now . . . it 
cannot”; when asked why, he explained that “God will judge Kony and 
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those people.”98 In other instances, the decision to forgive was captured 
well by Rosalind Shaw’s use of Begona Aretxaga’s term “choiceless deci-
sions,” whose logic is located in “everyday requirements of living.”99 In 
one village in Amuru District, a group of women explained that “one 
of the things we have to do is to just pray and forgive these people, you 
cannot retaliate or there will be more war”; far away in another village, 
in Agago District, a group explained that “if you are not for forgiveness 
then there would be no government structures here or government pres-
ence because there would still be war.”100 Forgiveness was described here 
as a social act—it is a way of “restoring civic life” but is not necessarily a 
complete change in feeling toward the wrongdoer or the wrongdoing.101
In late 2013 I had coffee with a lawyer friend in Kampala who had been 
closely involved in the drafting of the AAR agreements. He lamented 
how transitional justice initiatives in the Ugandan context existed in 
“cyberspace,” exogenous to the everyday realities of postconflict life in 
Acholiland. Just a week earlier, an expat NGO worker who had been 
living in the region for nearly ten years explained how, from the very 
outset, transitional justice agendas had been “wildly out of sync” with 
local needs. As Prieto has found in Colombia, this does not mean that 
transitional justice concepts of accountability, truth, and reconciliation 
are “meaningless” or “irrelevant”; “on the contrary,” he argues, “they are 
highly relevant, but on a different level.”102 As in Uganda, that is the level 
of the abstract, and it is hard to envisage how the transitional justice rep-
ertory—the “grand gestures,” the shiny institutions, the UN manuals—
might be anchored to everyday realities in a way that will help people 
in their immediate contexts. One of the great fallacies of contemporary 
transitional justice discourse is the assumption that postconflict spaces 
exist as blank justice slates. The reality is that systems are in place across 
the region, linked to exigent political economies of survival so that, as 
Finnström notes, “life can go on.”103 There exists a range of customs, 
practices, knowledge, and public authorities that people deploy and turn 
to on a daily basis to ensure the basic functioning of meaningful and 
productive social and economic relations as well as cosmological and 
spiritual balance. These systems and the intersubjectivities that shape 
them should not be romanticized, but they must be understood.
 In cases of land-related disputes, for example, the location, the crime 
(or dispute), and the identity of the alleged perpetrator and victim are 
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key, as are questions like “what is available?” “what works and what will 
the consequences be?” and “what can I afford?”104 These considerations 
are, as was argued earlier, “context bound” rather than “culture bound.” 
The same questions apply in response to war crimes and tell us a lot 
about people’s attitudes toward the kind of redress they see as legiti-
mate and feasible. Perceptions of the best way forward depend on the 
precise set of issues at hand and the implications for the “rest of life.” 
The protean approach people adopt toward justice is “law in action,” and 
it is something that makes international agencies and donors feel very 
uncomfortable.105 It rubs up against their own subjective understanding 
of law and justice as a set of “more of less formalized rules” and instead 
presents the prospect of “improvised responses to circumstances.”106 Ar-
guably all legal systems, including the ICC, are prone to this. What we 
have not managed to come to terms with is what to do when this is the 
premise of the system rather than its perversion. What is clear is that 
past and current transitional justice approaches tend to analyze any given 
situation too myopically, using a set of binaries—for example, local versus 
international justice or retributive versus restorative justice—that quickly 
collapse under empirical scrutiny. In Acholiland, these conceptual divi-
sions do not adequately take into account the substantive complexity of 
the justice choices that people make or the hybrid nature of the authori-
ties that are called on to adjudicate. To paraphrase Badiou, transitional 
justice can never be an “uninherited reality”: it should never be viewed as 
a straightforward problem of “norm-construction” but rather as unavoid-
ably “inscribed into the context of political struggle” in any given place.107
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K a m a r i  m a x i n e  C L a r K e
T h E  S C O P E  A N D  I M P O RT  O F  T h I S  v O L U M E  I S  T R E M E N D O U S ,  A N D  I T S 
significance lies in the work of a new generation of scholars who refuse 
to take discussions of universalist or relativist approaches to justice as a 
point of departure. Rather, they are engaged in critical and contextually 
grounded senses of justice that move us to justice as aspirational—as 
what should and ought to be, as that which we strive toward. Of course, 
the essays in the volume recognize that justice represents spaces of 
practice, of embattlement. They are rich and illustrative of a new field 
of Africanist sociolegal studies as they tack between pieces concerned 
with notions of “justice” understood widely and diversely and those uses 
of justice that are deployed to manage conflict in African landscapes. 
The essays are broad and varied, addressing case studies from Malawi to 
Uganda, from Kenya to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from 
Tanzania to South Africa and beyond. They compel us to rethink the ter-
rain on which transitional justice and classic legal questions concerning 
reasonableness, rights, and duties have been debated. Yet, central to the 
volume’s themes are the rhetorical and practical efforts being deployed 
in Africa to deal with injustice, as well as the significance of historical 
research on justice in African contexts. What we see through this work 
is how futures are and were imagined and what that tells us about the as-
pirational aspects of justice. In this light, it is the aspirational possibilities 
of justice that distinguishes this work, and that sets a standard for future 
work on justice in Africa and beyond. And, by extension, what we see is 
that such forms of justice as aspirational are deeply affective.
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 Over the past decade, research on sentimental affects have spanned 
a range of domains, and the study of emotional affects has been central 
to understanding the way that people learn to express feelings. We see 
that, when combined with feelings about justice, justice is deeply af-
fective and a product of structures of the past, learned practices, and 
future imaginaries. When considered through the empirically driven 
case studies in this volume, the contextual aspect of justice is infolded in 
its aspirational content. For making sense of justice in a wide range of 
regions throughout Africa is also about considering how bodies infold 
contexts, and in doing so, they are enmeshed in particular ways in vari-
ous histories and hopes for the future.1 This is where the aspirational 
content of justice comes into clear focus in these essays.
 Pursuing Justice opens the doors conceptually to discussions about 
justice in Africa being bound up with sociopolitical affects when pro-
pelled by particular emotional commitments, which make senses of 
justice possible. These modalities of justice sense making are embedded 
in particular domains of feelings about justice and emerge through 
particular emotionally charged rights discourses that are shaping new 
international imaginaries, disrupting other conceptions of justice, and 
propelling new forms of social action through which people express 
their anguish or regulate and self-regulate their behavior within a politi-
cally charged environment such as violence, loss, fear, and so forth.2 As 
the essays in this volume demonstrate, various stakeholders—survivors, 
defendants, witnesses, civil-society organizations (CSOs), governments, 
and everyday citizens—are engaged in the explicit aspirational pursuit 
of justice. That is, through their hopes for a different future, through 
their expectations and actions, they contribute to how justice is imag-
ined and played out in daily life. These affective expressions are not just 
peripheral. They perform a particular type of discursive work that takes 
shape through widespread actions, including legal actions, that compel 
other constituencies to act. These actions not only shape the vocabular-
ies for concepts like guilt and innocence, “victim” and perpetrator; they 
also contribute to the regimentation of justice imaginaries that shape 
which justice expressions are deemed legitimate, appropriate, or unac-
ceptable to particular audiences.
 The examination of justice affects and their social regulation provides 
critical possibilities for understanding the ways that inequality, history, 
and perception are linked to emotional responses to injustice, yet socio-
cultural analyses of these affective developments have been minimal. In 
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studies of justice in Africa—especially in relation to violence—often it 
is normative conceptions of justice that are articulated, and aspirational 
conceptions are deemed secondary. Yet, in reality declarations, threats, 
and calls for protection and for ending violence are shaped by signifi-
cant emotional force. The affective sentiments expressed in support of 
or against the International Criminal Court’s release of arrest warrants 
in Uganda at the risk of failed peace talks reflects just that—the interre-
lationships between violence, legality, and aspirations in shaping justice 
in African contexts.
 These affective spaces highlight the reality that, in the midst of and 
despite legal technocratic knowledge procured in the interest of justice, 
senses of justice are foundational in shaping justice through emotional 
affects. These emotional expressions and “aspirations for justice” lead 
the editors, Jessica Johnson and George Karekwaivanane, to assert that 
“justice exists on a plane with hope.” Thus, the key contribution of the 
volume returns us to the conviction that justice is varied and negoti-
ated not just because of its cultural contexts and specificities, but also 
because of the sociocontextual spheres that inspire feelings of justice 
and accompany how relations come to be perceived as just. For this is 
where the complexities between justice and conflict in Africa become 
even more profound and clearly highlighted. The volume returns us to 
these very critical realizations about the forces of hope that sustain the 
human condition. Therein lies the book’s profound significance now and 
in the years to come.
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